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 i 
Abstract 
The mechanisms of accountability of government–voluntary sector contracting are 
problematic for both government agencies and voluntary organisations.  If they are to 
be revised, new mechanisms need to be appropriate for both parties.  While the 
public accountability system has been relatively well described and analysed, the 
accountability systems of voluntary organisations have not.  This research aimed to 
explore accountability from the perspective of voluntary sector managers and board 
members asking to whom, for what and why they thought themselves accountable.   
Four organisational case studies were undertaken involving 34 in-depth interviews 
with managers and board members.  Interview data was triangulated with document 
analysis and supplemented with field observations.   
The results showed that respondents thought themselves most accountable to their 
clients.  Clients were prioritised because respondents were focused on maintaining 
their organisations’ legitimacy. Being seen to provide quality services to clients 
meant that their organisations were viewed in a positive light by key stakeholders, 
including funders.  A group of internal stakeholders (staff, members and the board) 
were considered second most important. Staff were seen as important because they 
delivered the organisations’ services.  The support of members also brought 
legitimacy. Government agencies were ranked third.  Government funding was 
viewed as a ‘means to an ends’: an input needed to provide a quality service to 
clients. 
An implication of the findings for the reform of the accountability mechanisms of 
contracting is that the assumptions that the current system is based on – influenced 
by agency theory – may not be valid.  Respondents were found to have similar goals 
to government agencies: achieving positive outcomes for clients.  The goal 
incongruence assumed by agency theory was not identified.   
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 1 
Part One  
Introduction and Context 
 
his section establishes the foundations of the research.  Chapter One 
presents the rationale and aims of the research.  Chapter Two describes the 
context within which the research was conducted.  Chapter Three provides 
a discussion of the relevant literature and theory that informed the research, 
identification of the gaps in the literature and the specific research questions that this 
research seeks to address.  The chapter concludes with a framework of predicted 
findings that will be used to guide the research design and analysis.  Chapter Four 
discusses the methodology adopted to address the research questions.   
 
T
 2 
Chapter 1  
Problematic Accountability 
Relationships 
 
Working as a government official in the area of voluntary organisation1 funding, I 
was very aware how dependent we were on voluntary organisations for the 
achievement of the outputs and outcomes we were tasked with.  Voluntary 
organisations were, in many ways, the operational arm of our departments.  But the 
process of funding and contracting with voluntary organisations was fraught.  Staff in 
the voluntary organisations had different ideas about what was important.  Systems 
and processes within the organisations seemed, from an official’s perspective, lax 
and haphazard.  I lived in fear of what an organisation might do with its funding that 
could end up on the front page of the morning paper, or being called to the Minister’s 
office late at night to account for a grant to a group that was going to be the subject 
of parliamentary scrutiny the next day.   
                                                 
1 There is much debate in the voluntary sector literature about what these organisations should be 
called: non profits, not-for-profits, voluntary organisations and third sector organisations are terms 
most commonly used (Kendall and Knapp, 1995).  The term ‘voluntary organisation’ will be used in 
this research as it focuses on the defining aspect of these organisations: that they are created and 
operated to undertake voluntary (not coerced) effort.  This is a common definition and was adopted by 
the only major international comparative study undertaken to date (Salamon and Anheier, 1994).  
Further defining characteristics of voluntary organisations are that they are formally structured, 
independent of the state and cannot distribute any surplus accrued by their activities but instead re-
invest it in actions, which align to their mission (Osborne, 1996).  
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I have also had the privilege of wearing another hat.  As a volunteer, I was a member 
of a voluntary organisation that provided a social service and contracted with a 
number of government agencies.  I was involved in several government audits of the 
organisation and was struck by what an artificial process it was.  We filled in forms 
that were sent by the government departments and were fleetingly visited by an 
official who took no more than a glance over our files and premises.  The exercise 
did not add any value to our work.  Rather it absorbed volunteer hours that could 
have been better used.  More frustratingly it did not provide us with any support for 
the real issues we faced as an organisation providing services to an increasingly large 
and diverse client base, with increasingly complex problems, and on a shoe string 
budget reliant on the good will of a decreasing pool of volunteers.   
From my voluntary sector perspective, the contracting and funding accountability 
processes were little more than a paper-shuffling compliance exercise.  They did not 
touch on any real issues, namely the organisation’s capacity to actually cope with the 
demands of the service we were contracted to provide.   
I concluded from my experiences as an official and volunteer that the processes of 
accountability for government contracting and funding with voluntary organisations 
were much less than effective.   
But why are problems with accountability important issues? At its essence, 
accountability is an exercise in limiting discretion and wielding power.  Mulgan 
(2003) argues that governments are under increasing pressure to be accountable.  
Such calls are said to be made by a populace increasingly dissatisfied with the 
performance of government agencies and mistrusting of Ministers’ actions (OECD, 
2000; OECD, 2001).  Increasing demands for accountability can be seen as the 
public attempting to limit or redirect government activity, or flex its collective 
power.   
Similarly, for the members of voluntary organisations, calls for tighter accountability 
are usually calls for increased control of their activities to prevent fraud or poor 
performance (Office of the Auditor General, 2003).  The staff of voluntary 
organisations providing social services on contract to government are expending 
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millions of taxpayers’ dollars and the recipients of the services are among the poorest 
and most vulnerable members of society (Ott and Dicke, 2000).   
1.1 Accountability and Contracting: From a Government Perspective  
Public administration researchers would not be surprised by my conclusion.  The 
problems of accountability in contracting and funding relationships with voluntary 
organisations, from a government agency perspective, have been well documented.   
1.1.1 Voluntary Organisation Providers are Less Accountable than Public Servants 
There is consensus amongst Public Administration scholars that voluntary 
organisations providing services on contract are not as accountable as public servants 
employed by the agency (Behn and Kant, 1999; Schick, 2003). 
Romzek and Dubnick (1987) provide an analysis of why this occurs.  They argue that 
accountability has four dimensions: legal (fiduciary obligations); political (political 
processes and trade-offs between competing view points); bureaucratic (organisation 
hierarchies) and professional (professional standards and monitoring). Contracts only 
include the legal dimension. The members of voluntary organisations are not 
required to account for the three other dimensions.  Public servants, in contrast, are 
accountable for at least one additional dimension.  They are accountable to their 
superiors (bureaucratic accountability).   
Wake Carroll’s (1989) research showed that the bureaucratic dimension of 
accountability was most effective in ensuring high quality performance.  This is not 
available in contractual arrangements.  Indeed, she concluded that reliance on the 
legal dimension of accountability – as accountability which occurs after the services 
have been provided – is the weakest form.  Mulgan (1997) and Gilmour and Jensen 
(1998) draw the same conclusion.  In their view, voluntary organisation staff are 
subject to fewer controls than their public service counterparts. They are not part of 
the hierarchical chain of control that typifies public accountability systems and are 
not subject to the same constitutional, statutory and oversight restrictions as their 
public service colleagues.   
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1.1.2 The Quality of the Service Provided can be Jeopardised by Contracting  
Being less accountable can lead to reduced service quality.  For Schick (2003) non-
government providers of public services are likely to work to the letter of the 
contract as they do not have the public service ethic.  Contracts become a checklist of 
what the provider needs to deliver.  Providers cannot be called to account for services 
or standards that are unspecified.   
Voluntary organisations may receive funding from many government agencies.  For 
Hill and Lynne (2003) this means that they have few incentives to be fully 
accountable to one agency as funding can be gained from others.  They can ‘cream’, 
that is, provide services to the clients with the easiest problems to address, and pass 
over difficult – and costly – clients (Behn and Kant, 1999; Klingner et al., 2001).  
Indeed, few incentives are said to exist for the staff of voluntary organisations to 
actually achieve the public purpose underlying any contract (Behn and Kant, 1999).   
Further, in some areas of social service provision, there may be few providers 
(Milward and Provan, 2003).  Government agencies may be dependent on the 
voluntary organisations for the provision of services.  Sanctioning voluntary 
organisations for under or non-performance in such circumstances becomes difficult 
(Schwartz, 2001).   
1.1.3 Specifying what Constitutes Quality is Difficult 
Not only do the researchers conclude that there are few incentives for voluntary 
organisations to exceed performance expectations but what constitutes quality and 
good performance is often unclear.  Government agencies may not even be able to 
specify what products are required.  This is particularly so in the area of social 
services.  Many government agencies have had difficulty developing acceptable and 
realistic outcome measures and benchmarks for evaluating contractor performance 
(Klijn and Teisman, 2000; Klingner et al., 2001; van Slyke, 2002).   
1.1.4 Reduced Transparency 
The details of the contracts and funding arrangements are often considered 
commercially sensitive.  As such, information is not made publicly available.  This is 
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seen to reduce the transparency of government (Zifcak, 2001).  At a time when the 
legitimacy of government is being questioned and the public trust in government is 
said to be at an all time low, reduced transparency is not desirable (Schick, 2003).  
Indeed, contracting makes it difficult for the public to attribute accountability for 
inadequate performance and seek satisfaction (Klingner et al., 2001; van Slyke and 
Roch, 2004).   
1.1.5 Challenges to Ministerial Responsibility 
The traditional Westminster public accountability system where Ministers are 
accountable for the appropriation to their departments is challenged when the service 
providers are voluntary organisations.  Mulgan (1997), Wilkins (2002) and Ling 
(2002) question whether the principles of individual and collective ministerial 
responsibility to the taxpayer through Parliament are appropriate when the 
boundaries of the public and voluntary sectors are becoming so blurred.  Martin 
(1995), contemplating the New Zealand context, draws the same conclusion. 
1.1.6 Summary: From a Government Perspective  
Unfortunately, these public administration researchers do not provide any solutions 
to the problems they identify.  Peters and Pierre (1998) and Grubbs (2000) conclude 
that accountability research, particularly that considering contracting between 
government and non-government agencies, is a weak spot in the public 
administration literature. Van Slyke (2002: 500) goes as far as saying: 
Contracting creates serious public management and accountability problems for 
which public administration theory fails to prepare us. 
From the New Zealand perspective, Martin (1995: 51) concludes: 
…contractualism is at the heart of public service reform [so] we need to devote 
some attention to these aspects of accountability for ‘third party’ government. 
And Majumdar (2004) argues: 
New Zealand witnessed a more substantial growth than almost anywhere else in 
the application of contracting out as part of the public sector reforms carried out 
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by the fourth Labour government between 1984 and 1990…However, in the 
very same country there are very few empirical analyses or case studies of the 
effects of contracting out.  This is especially the case in the domain of social 
welfare where contracting out has formally been in use since the early 1990s.  
The relative dearth of raw data places limits on the conclusions in respect to the 
advantages and short comings of contracting out in social welfare (Majumdar, 
2004: 89).  
The research to date also defines the issues from the perspective of government 
agencies and, as such, ‘misses a large part of the point’ (Mulgan, 2000a: 87) as there 
are at least two parties to any contract.    
1.2 Accountability and Contracting: From a Voluntary Sector 
Perspective 
The problems of accountability are less well documented from the voluntary sector 
perspective.  Kramer (1994: 46) concludes after his review of the available literature 
that there is a ‘paucity of empirical research’ and that: 
Many of the generalisations about the impact of … government funds on 
nonprofit organisations or the service delivery system are inferred from findings 
that are often equivocal, anecdotal, or impressionistic.  There are few 
longitudinal or comparative studies; most research is based on very small 
samples, over short periods of time, and in selected fields of service and 
political settings (Kramer, 1994: 42). 
Several themes can, however, be identified in the limited available research. 
1.2.1 Loss of Organisational Autonomy 
Nowland-Foreman (2000) speculates that ‘mission drift’ has occurred in New 
Zealand voluntary organisations as a result of managers prioritising contract 
requirements at the expense of other activities better aligned with the organisations’ 
missions.   
A loss of autonomy and independence is identified as a result of mission drift.  
Nowland-Foreman (2000) concludes that organisations undertake less advocacy and 
The Accountability of Voluntary Organisations 8  
research as a result of contracting.  Taylor (1999) draws similar conclusions from her 
study of British voluntary organisations, though she does so with caution.   
Contracting is also considered to encourage the standardisation of services and 
voluntary organisations are said to increasingly emulate government agency 
structures and processes, so reducing the distinctiveness of the sector (Nowland-
Foreman, 1997; Nowland-Foreman, 2000). 
This perspective is, however, debated.  Kramer’s (1994) literature review identified 
another perspective critical of the ‘loss of autonomy’ thesis.  Contracting was seen to 
increase government and voluntary sector inter-dependence, and government funding 
had allowed voluntary organisations to provide more services than ever before.   
Kramer concluded, however, that no one disagreed with the findings that voluntary 
organisations had become more institutionalised and bureaucratic as a result of 
contracting.   
1.2.2 Inequitable Distribution of Resources 
Small, locally based voluntary organisations, researchers concluded, are the losers in 
the contracting process.  In New Zealand, a large proportion of public funding is 
appropriated by Parliament directly to large national voluntary organisations.  
Newer, smaller organisations can not access such funding (Ashton et al., 2004; 
Majumdar, 2004).  The centralised nature of government decision-making also 
makes it difficult for locally-based organisations to access funding.  Maori 
organisations find accessing mainstream funding difficult, as do organisations 
serving ethnic communities (Nowland-Foreman, 1997).   
American research has also found that the financial systems, performance 
management and reporting processes needed to manage contracting are only viable in 
large organisations (Alexander, 1999).   
1.2.3 High Overhead and Compliance Costs 
The computer-based systems needed for information gathering and reporting are 
costly for voluntary organisations to develop (Ashton et al., 2004).  The type of 
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information required by government agencies often changes every year with 
increasing amounts of detail required.  Restructurings and frequent changes in 
government agency staff drive such changes in New Zealand (Ashton et al., 2004). 
Different funders require different information.  Deadlines and processes also often 
conflict (Kramer, 1994; Munford and Sanders, 2001).   
1.2.4 Reduced Ability to Provide Quality Services 
In New Zealand, the increased specification of services has resulted in government 
agencies purchasing pieces of services.  Voluntary organisations report that they 
struggle to provide a holistic service (Munford and Sanders, 2001).  Furthermore, the 
structure of some funding arrangements, such as capitation grants, encourage an 
emphasis on numbers of clients at the expense of the quality of care provided 
(Nowland-Foreman, 1997).  Strathdee (2004) argues that such arrangements create 
pressures for new forms of ‘Taylorism’2 amongst social service providers.  
American voluntary organisations report that in order to achieve contract service 
levels, staff have been required to take on more clients.  Maintaining what they 
consider acceptable professional and ethical standards of care has become difficult 
(Kettner and Martin, 1996).  Organisations are also financially discouraged from 
serving client populations with deep-seated and chronic needs (Alexander, 1999).   
1.2.5 Summary: From a Voluntary Sector Perspective  
The problems of contracting and accountability have been identified by the United 
Kingdom’s National Council of Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) – the advocacy 
body for the United Kingdom sector – as one of its prime concerns (NCVO, 2003).   
                                                 
2
 In 1911, Frederick Taylor’s work ‘The Principles of Scientific Management’ was published (Taylor, 
1911 / 1998).  The Principles aimed to scientifically transform work by introducing production lines 
with rules for workers and standardised tasks.  Approaches to work based on breaking jobs into 
components and standardising production are often labelled ‘Taylorism’.   
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In New Zealand, the Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party3 reported: 
at all levels and across a wide range of organisations, a frustration with 
government funding and accountability arrangements, summed up by many as 
opposition to the ‘contracting model’ (Community and Voluntary Sector 
Working Party, 2001: 27). 
Accountability for contracting is of concern for voluntary sector leaders, here and 
abroad.  This review shows that the accountability mechanisms of contracting are not 
proving appropriate for voluntary organisations.  As Klingner et al (2001: 139) 
succinctly states ‘further research should explore the nonprofit perspective.’   
1.3 Voluntary Organisations as an Operational Arm of Government 
It has been estimated that in 1998 the New Zealand government purchased over $650 
million of social services from voluntary organisations.  This is a modest estimate as 
the analysis included data from only 14 government departments (Community and 
Voluntary Sector Working Party, 2001).  The actual extent of government 
contracting with voluntary organisations is unknown.  Conversations with officials 
and attempts at requesting data via official information legislation revealed that 
generating such data would be too difficult given the decentralised nature of the New 
Zealand public management system.  It would also be too politically sensitive, as 
officials predict that government departments are more dependent on voluntary 
organisations than they would care to admit.   
Many of the publicly-funded services New Zealanders consume are provided 
exclusively by voluntary organisations contracted to government departments.  To 
escape a violent partner, take a disabled child swimming, get information about 
                                                 
3
 The Working Party was established in August 2000 by the Labour Government to provide 
recommendations for how the Government–Voluntary sector relationship could be improved.  It 
consisted of government officials and voluntary sector representatives and reported in April 2001.   
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government services, or extinguish a rural house fire means interacting with a 
voluntary organisation.    
Voluntary organisations are an important feature of the landscape of government.  
Ensuring the mechanisms of accountability for contracting are effective for both 
parties is, therefore, important.   
1.4 Increasing Interaction between Governments and Voluntary 
Organisations 
And if the predictions and trends proposed in the recent public administration 
literature eventuate, voluntary organisations will play an even more important role in 
the delivery of publicly-funded services in the future.   
Public administration researchers and theorists have largely moved their focus from 
the study of the structures and processes of government to those of governance 
(Rhodes, 1996).  Governance, though developing into a ‘promiscuous’ concept 
(Newman, 2001), is broadly defined as the methods and instruments of governing 
(OECD, 2001).  It is much broader than the study of government.  The move to the 
broader notion has been driven by the increasing realisation of the importance of 
non-government actors in the processes of government and the need to develop 
frameworks to study this (Kooimen, 1993).   
A number of reasons for the increasing importance of non-government actors are 
proposed.  The impact of globalisation is challenging the authority of governments’ 
sovereignty over the nation state.  Welfare and administrative reforms of the 1980s 
have also altered the relationship between the governed and governors with 
government now reliant on other agents (usually voluntary organisations) for the 
delivery of public services.  Increasing societal fragmentation means no single 
agency can manage the complex problems this generates (Newman 2001, Rhodes 
1996).  Whether this equates to a diminished role for government or just a different 
one is subject to debate (OECD, 2000; Pierre and Peters, 2000; Daly, 2003).  
Whatever the outcome of this debate, the general consensus is that voluntary 
organisations will be an increasingly important part of the landscape of government 
in the future.   
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Networks are proposed as the instrument of policy-making for the new governance 
arrangements.  Networks of public and private sector actors, removed from the 
influence and control of governments, are predicted to become powerful policy 
makers (Rhodes, 1996; Kickert et al., 1997).  Actors with specialist knowledge, 
competence and resources will form stable networks to solve complex policy 
problems (Borzel, 1998).  Voluntary organisations will become important actors in 
such networks (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000).   
‘Partnership’ or ‘collaboration’ is also considered in the literature as an emerging 
feature of the new governance arrangements (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; 
Newman, 2001; Brinkerhoff, 2002).  Partnerships between voluntary organisations 
and government have been a popular feature of recent policy making and delivery 
initiatives in both the United Kingdom and New Zealand (Osborne and Murray, 
2000; Yarword, 2002). Whether such partnerships involve real collaboration is 
subject to debate. Billis (1993), for example, questions whether the widespread 
adoption of ‘partnership’ as a policy concept to describe voluntary sector interaction 
with government is just political rhetoric.  Taylor (2001) argues that the language of 
partnership is used by governments to signal that voluntary organisations are no 
longer ‘outsiders’ in the policy process.  The reality for voluntary organisations is, 
however, that they are often excluded from any meaningful participation.  Deakin 
(2002) also questions whether voluntary organisations can partner, if partnership 
implicitly means they act as the sole representatives of their clients.  He outlines the 
risks - sectarianism among civil society bodies, especially those that are faith based, 
and the potential for individual or minority rights to be eroded - of such.  Whatever 
configuration they take, whatever the potential risks, the increasing involvement of 
voluntary organisations in partnership arrangements is, however, not in dispute 
(Billis, 1993; Osborne and Murray, 2000; Taylor, 2001; Deakin, 2002; Teisman and 
Klijn, 2002).   
Voluntary organisations’ involvement in the design and delivery of publicly-funded 
services is set to increase so getting the accountability mechanisms which govern the 
delivery of services right is even more important. 
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1.5 The Aims of this Research 
Voluntary organisations are important providers of public services to New 
Zealanders.  Their importance will increase.  The research reviewed in this chapter 
has shown, from both the government and voluntary sector perspectives, that the 
accountability mechanisms governing the relationship are less than adequate. 
Moutlon and Anheier (2001: 14) conclude that: 
Developments make it necessary for local governments in particular not only to 
improve governance and accountability requirements but to put in place new 
ones that may be more in line with the complex partnerships of the future.  
Standard public administration programmes and tools will most certainly not 
measure up to the new contract regimes. 
If the complex social problems that face society are to be addressed, the 
accountability mechanisms governing the relationship between voluntary 
organisations as service providers, and government agencies as funders, needs to be 
improved.   
Public management systems have recently been reformed in a number of countries, 
including New Zealand.  Academic critique of the reforms has resulted in the detail 
and limitations of current public accountability systems being relatively well 
documented. Examples of scholarly critique of reformed public accountability 
systems include Gilmour and Jensen (1998), Gregory and Hicks (1999) and Parker 
and Gould (1999).  
In contrast, little is known about accountability from a voluntary sector perspective 
in any jurisdiction.  The key piece of research, Accountability and Voluntary 
Organisations, by British researcher Diana Leat, is by her admission small-scale and 
dated (Leat, 1988; Leat, 1996).  The consensus is that voluntary sector accountability 
is under-researched and concepts under-developed:  
Only recently has the non profit literature begun to address the topic of 
accountability, and the field is groping toward standard definitions … the 
literature is normative [and] not empirical (Ospina et al., 2002: 7). 
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There is considerable confusion about the concept of accountability [from a 
voluntary sector perspective (Kramer, 1994: 51). 
While the specifications for any reform of accountability mechanisms can be 
identified from the perspective of governments’ public accountability systems, the 
same cannot be said for voluntary organisations.  Little is known about voluntary 
sector accountability relationships and processes.  If systems appropriate for both 
parties are to be implemented, more needs to be known about accountability from a 
voluntary sector perspective.   
Generating knowledge about what accountability means to the members of voluntary 
organisations is, therefore, the primary aim of this research.  The research focuses on 
voluntary sector perspectives of accountability so does not attempt to represent 
government officials’ or Ministers’ perspectives.   
The secondary aim of this research is to contribute to improving the government–
voluntary sector relationship. It will consider the implications for the voluntary 
sector–government relationship of the knowledge generated about accountability 
from the perspective of members of voluntary organisations.  
1.6 Thesis Outline 
The thesis is divided into three parts.  The parts are divided into chapters.   
1.6.1 Part One: Introduction  
Part One lays the foundations for the research.  This chapter, Chapter One, has 
presented the rationale for the research.  The following chapter outlines the research 
context.   Chapter Three reviews the available literature and theory; and the fourth 
chapter outlines the methodology adopted. 
1.6.2 Part Two: Results 
In Part Two the research results are presented.  The results are organised thematically 
with three themes discussed in three chapters.  The full results are presented as 
Appendix D. 
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1.6.3 Part Three: Discussion, Implications and Conclusions  
The final part presents the analysis, discussion and implications of the findings.  This 
part comprises three chapters: discussion, implications and conclusions.   
 
 16 
Chapter 2  
Voluntary Organisations in New 
Zealand 
 
Voluntary organisations have existed in New Zealand since the beginning of 
colonisation.  Scholars conclude that they have been dependent on government 
funding from the earliest Parliaments (Suggate, 1995; Munford and Sanders, 2001; 
Tennant, 2001).  Prior to the 1990s, the most common method of state funding for 
voluntary organisations was a system of grants and subsidies not usually attached to 
specific services (Smith, 1996; Munford and Sanders, 2001).   
2.1 Contracting and Voluntary Organisations  
The early 1990s, driven by rising fiscal debt, saw a rethink of what was the 
appropriate size and function of the state.  New Zealand’s public management 
system, drawing on economic and administrative theories, was consequently 
radically restructured (Boston et al., 1996).  Several aspects of the restructuring 
altered how government agencies approached their relationship to voluntary 
organisations.  In particular, based on insights from agency theory, the assumptions 
government agencies made about voluntary organisations were changed.   
2.1.1 Agency Theory 
For agency theorists, social and political life can be understood as a series of 
contracts.  Principals delegate tasks, using contracts, to agents. Agents undertake 
work on the principals’ behalf in return for rewards.  The focus of the theory is the 
contract governing the relationship between principal and agent and determining how 
the contract can be made as efficient as possible (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  What 
constitutes a contract is broadly interpreted by agency theorists.  Contracts may be 
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‘classical’: arms length, formal and explicit.  They may also be ‘relational’: implicit, 
open-ended, incomplete and based on obligations (Boston et al., 1996). 
Two problems can arise from contractual relationships because agents need a degree 
of discretion to complete their tasks (Davis et al., 1997).  First, problems arise when 
the goals of the principals and agents are different (the problem of goal conflict) 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). Second, problems arise because the agent is assumed to have 
more information than the principal about the task at hand.  Their performance, 
especially when it is difficult and expensive for the principal to verify what the agent 
is actually doing, creates the problem of information asymmetry (Waterman and 
Meier, 1998).  The focus of agency theorists is how to minimise the impact of these 
problems for the principal (Moschandreas, 1994; Boston et al., 1996; Shaw, 1999).   
The theory, drawing on its neo-classical economic roots, assumes that individuals are 
‘rational, self-interested, utility-maximisers’.  As such, the interests of principals and 
their agents are bound to conflict because each party will be trying to maximise 
personal benefits (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  Even if principals and agents have similar 
goals, the assumptions about the nature of individuals leads to the suggestion that 
agents will still shirk by producing outputs at a higher cost than required or produce 
outputs of a lower quality than required (Waterman and Meier, 1998).  This is termed 
moral hazard: a lack of effort on the part of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  Agents 
may also claim that they have skills and expertise and capacity to deliver that they 
actually do not.  Adverse selection may occur as principals contract with agents who 
have misrepresented their abilities (Eisenhardt, 1989a).   
Principals have a number of options available to them to minimise the risk of their 
agents shirking, cheating, or operating with guile.  They can provide incentives for 
the agent to operate according to the principal’s wishes, monitor the agent’s actions 
to ensure they are doing so and sanction the agent if their performance is not 
satisfactory (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Boston et al., 1996). 
2.1.2 Agency Theory and Contracting 
Influenced by agency theory, a number of relationships within the New Zealand 
Public Service were restructured to model contracts.  Purchase agreements between 
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ministers and chief executives for the purchase of services from departments were 
introduced, as were performance agreements between chief executives and the State 
Services Commissioner. 
The contract model was also applied to the relationship between government 
agencies and voluntary organisations. Grant-based funding ceased for many 
voluntary organisations in the early 1990s and instead they signed contracts for the 
delivery of services (Martin, 1995; Smith, 1996).  As voluntary organisations were 
expected to shirk and use information asymmetries to their advantage, government 
agencies as principals attempted to specify what services they required, introduce 
monitoring regimes and sanction poorly performing organisations by not renewing 
their contracts.  Clear objectives in the contracts would ensure the voluntary 
organisation providers focused on results.  Reporting on the objectives would 
provide good information to government agencies about the provider and the quality 
of the service (Boston et al., 1996).   
Overlaying the introduction of contracting was pressure to reduce government 
spending.  Competition between providers was encouraged.  Voluntary organisations 
were often required to tender.  Market pressures were sought to ensure efficiency in 
service delivery (Shaw, 1999).   
A drive to increase transparency and accountability was also an important aspect of 
the restructuring.  Accountability, as it was used in the restructuring process, was 
interpreted as answerability and took the form of formal reporting against specified 
measures (Mulgan, 2003).  As Martin concludes: 
Officials have received a message: this is your allocated task, you are being 
given resources and authority to achieve it; go to it; report at intervals; and your 
remuneration and often continued employment will be related to your 
performance of the given task (Martin, 1997: 5). 
Enhanced accountability was seen as a way of developing more efficient and 
effective organisations and service delivery.  
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… the argument runs, improved performance in the public sector will follow if 
there are clear and transparent systems of managerial accountability within 
agencies, those providing policy advice as well as those delivering services 
(Martin, 1997: 4). 
Accountability was to be increased at the department level by carving them up into 
entities with specific functions: policy or the delivery of services.  This was based on 
another influential body of theory: Public Choice.  Public Choice theorists contend 
that all public servants will seek to advance their personal interests in terms of their 
own pay, size of their department, status or ambition.  This is called ‘rent seeking’ 
behaviour. Departments with monopolies are assumed ripe for public servant or 
‘provider capture’; public servants will be able to extract the most personal benefit in 
such situations.  Similarly, departments with many functions are prone to provider 
capture; any policy advice given will ensure the department grows and benefits in 
terms of its service delivery (Shaw, 1999). 
The performance of public servants in the decoupled organisations could be closely 
specified and monitored and any inefficiencies generated by ‘provider capture’ 
removed.  Any tensions caused by multiple accountabilities or conflicts of interest 
would also be removed in the new organisations as they had only one function 
(Boston et al., 1996).  At the personal level, increased accountability was to be 
ensured by making managers more accountable for measurable outputs.  Managers 
were given more discretion but more emphasis was placed on them reporting against 
specified measures of their performance (Mulgan, 2003). 
By the mid 1990s, the result of these changes for voluntary organisations with a 
funding relationship with government was that they were now service-providers.  
Many had a formal contract, usually a ‘classical’ contract, with government.  What 
they were required to provide, at what quantity, quality and price was specified in the 
contract.  Detailed reporting on service delivery was required.  They often interacted 
with officials from operational departments who had little input into policy 
processes, including programme design.  Officials also had specific performance 
measures to achieve, often with tight budgets and timelines.  Driving down the price 
of service delivery was also at the forefront of officials’ agendas.   
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, the extent of public service delivery via 
contract is unknown.  Indeed, Boston et al (1996) consider the question of the extent 
of contracting being undertaken as one of the key areas of the New Zealand public 
management system needing research.  However, it is widely considered an 
important part of the delivery mechanisms of the New Zealand government so much 
so that Von Tunzelman and Murphy (1998) conclude that the contract has become 
the predominant means for the government to procure services.   
2.2 Current Policy Environment 
On entering power in 1999, the Labour-Alliance government sought to acknowledge 
the widespread disquiet amongst voluntary sector leaders about government 
contracting, funding and the perceived mistreatment of the voluntary sector.  
Improving the government–voluntary sector relationship was part of their social 
policy agenda.  This was based on a belief that they would need to work with 
voluntary organisations to address difficult social problems (Maharey, 2003).  
One of the Government’s first acts was the creation of a new portfolio - Community 
and Voluntary Sector - and the appointment of a Minister Responsible for the 
Community and Voluntary Sector.  The Hon. Steve Maharey, the first such Minister, 
led a number of policy initiatives.   
2.2.1 Community and Voluntary Sector Relationship Working Party and Steering 
Group 
One of the flagship initiatives was the establishment of the Community and 
Voluntary Sector Working Party in August 2000.  It comprised voluntary sector and 
government representatives and was tasked with reporting on how the government–
voluntary sector relationship could be improved.  The Working Party report, 
Potential for Partnership: Whakatopu Whakaaro, was published in April 2001 
(Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party, 2001).  The government agreed to 
the Working Party’s recommendations and established a Community–Government 
Steering Group in September 2001, to oversee implementation. 
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Improving resourcing and accountability was one of the two major work areas.  
Good practice guidelines and on-line resources were developed in order to help 
government agencies recognise the diversity of the voluntary sector, and interact 
appropriately with voluntary organisations.   
2.2.2 Statement of Good Intentions for an Improved Community–Government 
Relationship 
In November 2001, the Prime Minister signed a Statement of Intentions on behalf of 
the Government to signal its commitment to build strong and respectful relationships 
with the voluntary sector.   It made six commitments:  
Culture of Government. Government expects public servants to treat all New 
Zealanders with dignity and respect.  This requires leadership from public 
service chief executives and senior managers to ensure that all staff have a good 
understanding of the values, governance arrangements and working realities of 
the community, voluntary and iwi/Maori organisations with whom they interact. 
Whole of government approach. Government recognises that community, 
voluntary and iwi/Maori organisations interact across a range of government 
ministries and departments.  Government agencies will give priority to working 
together, breaking down ‘silos’ and establishing co-ordinated, inter-sectoral 
policies and programmes. 
Treaty of Waitangi.  Government expects its departments and ministries to 
recognise and apply the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.’ 
Participation in decision making.  Government values the contribution of 
community, voluntary and iwi/Maori organisations to good policy making and 
delivery of effective services.  Government agencies and the community sector 
will work together to develop and improve consultation processes through 
sharing good practice, guidelines, workshops and training. 
Government funding to community organisations.  Government acknowledges 
the valuable contribution made by community, voluntary and iwi/Maori 
organisations to the achievement of shared social, cultural, environmental and 
economic goals.  Government agencies will, together with the community 
The Accountability of Voluntary Organisations 22  
 
sector, undertake a programme of work to address concerns about funding 
arrangements, effectiveness, compliance costs and related matters. 
Strengthening the community sector.  New Zealand’s social, cultural, 
environmental and economic well-being requires a healthy and strong 
community sector.  Government will work alongside community, voluntary and 
iwi/Maori organisations to support and strengthen the community sector 
(Ministry of Social Development, 2001: 2-3).   
The degree to which the Statement of Intentions is adhered is not known.  As it does 
not specifically bind any government agency, and there does not seem to be any 
formal evaluation or monitoring of its implementation, it is not known how important 
it is in guiding departments’ interactions with voluntary organisations.   
2.2.3 Office of the Community and Voluntary Sector 
The Office of the Community and Voluntary Sector was established in September 
2003.  Its role is to develop policy specific to the voluntary sector and work 
alongside government departments to facilitate a positive working relationship with 
voluntary organisations.  Since its inception it has prepared a series of good practice 
guidelines.  With a small staff and a wide brief, the Office has been set a challenging 
role.   
2.2.4 Establishment of the Charities Commission 
Policy and legislation to introduce the Charities Commission is currently being 
developed.  The Commission will register and monitor charities. Its aim is to 
improve the sector’s accountability to the community by ensuring they operate for 
the purposes for which they were established, and by increasing the level of 
transparency and public disclosure of information (Ministry of Economic 
Development, 2004b).  The role of the Commission will be to approve and register 
charities; receive annual returns and monitor the activities of charities; to educate, 
advise and support charities to ensure that they comply with their core regulatory 
obligations; and to provide advice on New Zealand’s charities to the government 
(Ministry of Economic Development, 2004a).   
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2.2.5 Contracting Guidelines 
In 2001, the Treasury issued its Guidelines for Contracting with Non Governmental 
Organisations for Services Sought by the Crown, in recognition of the widespread 
and unregulated practice of government agencies contracting with voluntary 
organisations (The Treasury, 2001).  The guidelines were revised in 2003 after 
consultation with the voluntary sector and government departments.  Their aim is to 
encourage better contracting practices, from both voluntary sector and government 
perspectives, by encouraging government agencies to improve their relationships 
with voluntary organisations.  However, as they are only guidelines, government 
agencies are not compelled to adopt the recommendations.   
The Community–Government Relationship Steering Group surveyed government 
agencies to investigate responses to the guidelines.  They found only a few agencies 
had developed substantial changes to practice in line with the guidelines 
(Community-Government Relationship Steering Group, 2002).  Respondents 
interviewed by Treasury officials during the process of revising the Guidelines also 
questioned the ability of officials to implement them (The Treasury, 2003). 
2.2.6 Improving Service Delivery 
Concern over the performance of the state sector led to the appointment of a 
Ministerial Advisory Group in 2001.  The Group’s report in late 2001, Report of the 
Advisory Group on the Review of the Centre, highlighted the need to achieve better 
integrated service delivery.  Co-ordination of service delivery, both from government 
and non-government agencies, was identified as a weakness of the public 
management system (Advisory Group on the Review of the Centre, 2001).   
The Integrated Service Delivery work programme was established.  Officials 
undertook a review of New Zealand and international literature on collaboration, 
undertook field work and drew on previous government reports.  The findings were 
used to develop the good practice guidelines issued in 2003, Mosaics: Whakaahua 
Papariki: Key Findings and Good Practice Guide for Regional Co-ordination and 
Integrated Service Delivery (Ministry of Social Development, 2003).  The 
Guidelines present ideas about how collaborations can be best managed, with 
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specific sections for how to manage government–voluntary organisation 
collaborations. 
A number of subsequent projects stemmed from the Integrated Service Delivery 
work stream – Funding for Outcomes being a major one (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2004).  The aim of the project is to accelerate the process of 
implementing an integrated approach to government contracting with voluntary 
organisations.  Funding advisors have been contracted to work on behalf of voluntary 
organisations to ‘join-up’ their contracts with government.  Having one contract, 
with one set of reporting requirements, it is hoped will reduce the organisations’ 
compliance costs of contracting with government and allow voluntary organisations 
to provide ‘wrap-around’, or holistic services, to their clients.  As of April 2004, the 
advisors had been appointed, organisations involved in the trial identified, and the 
evaluation plan developed.   
2.2.7 Summary: Policy Context 
A wide range of projects are underway to try to improve the Government’s 
relationship with the voluntary sector.  As in other jurisdictions, the policy 
documents talk about collaboration and partnership.  Commentators in other 
jurisdictions (refer section 1.4 for summary of the debate) have questioned the actual 
ability of governments to have ‘partners’.  Most of the initiatives outlined here are 
either still being implemented or have recently been established, so have not yet 
evaluated.  Their contribution to improving the government–voluntary sector 
relationship remains uncertain.   
2.3 Voluntary Organisations in New Zealand 
Given the importance of voluntary organisations in service delivery and current 
policy initiatives, it is surprising that there is little information on the nature and 
activities of voluntary organisations in New Zealand (Ministry of Economic 
Development, 2004b).  Few researchers work in this area and few relevant official 
statistics have been collected (Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party, 
2001).  Most of the information that is available has resulted from ad-hoc reports on 
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specific issues (Robinson and Hanley, 2002).  After reviewing the available 
information, Suggate (1995: 1) concluded: 
There is much information which is not known, including: the economic 
contribution of the sector, the number of organisations of different types; how 
many paid/unpaid people are involved; how many people benefit from services; 
the infrastructural capacity of the sector; what training needs are unfulfilled; and 
what ratio of funding comes from government, philanthropic and corporate 
services. 
Nearly ten years on, the information gaps she identified are generally still empty and 
the Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party (2001: 55) extended the list of 
gaps to include: 
the informal components of iwi and community organisations; ‘in kind’ 
contributions; the full range of iwi/Maori organisations; the full range of Pacific 
peoples’ organisations; the community organisations of other minority ethnic 
groups. 
2.3.1 The Number and Type of Voluntary Organisations 
The only source of estimating the number of voluntary organisations in New Zealand 
is the Registry of Incorporated Societies and Charitable Trusts.  To claim tax 
benefits, organisations must be registered with the Ministry of Economic 
Development. 
As of the end of 2000, there were 21,444 registered incorporated societies and 
11,582 registered charitable trusts.  Every year around 3,000 organisations are newly 
incorporated.   
However, these figures only cover voluntary organisations that have registered as 
charities or incorporated societies.  Many organisations that fulfil the definition of 
voluntary organisation outlined in the first chapter do not seek to be tax-exempt so 
will not seek registration.  Others will not maintain their registered status.  Some 
iwi/Maori organisations that could be classified as voluntary organisations are also 
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not included in the figures as they are registered under specific legislation 
(Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party, 2001).   
Nor is information recorded concerning the size, structure and functions of the 
organisations.  They vary in size, composition and function from small, volunteer run 
community groups to large national organisations with corporate structures and 
thousands of staff (Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party, 2001).   
2.3.2 Funding of Voluntary Organisations 
Voluntary organisations are generally reliant on government funding.  Based on 
estimates of the sources of funds available to the voluntary sector, Robinson and 
Hanley (2002) conclude that 56 percent ($920,595,000) of funds available to 
voluntary organisations came from central government, 17 percent from personal 
donations, 9 percent from philanthropic trusts, and 8 percent from the proceeds of 
gambling machines.  Compared with the results of a similar exercise in 1996 (refer 
Robinson, 1996), the percentage and amount of central government funding of 
voluntary organisations has increased.  Robinson and Hanley conclude that this is 
because voluntary organisations, especially in the area of health, are delivering more 
services on contract.  They also conclude that there is insufficient data available 
relating to the funding of voluntary organisations.  In particular, they argue that the 
information available from central government is of limited use, as government 
figures did not differentiate between for-profit and voluntary organisation providers.   
2.3.3 Economic Contribution 
An important gap in knowledge of the sector is understanding the role of voluntary 
organisations in New Zealand’s economy (Suggate, 1995; Community and Voluntary 
Sector Working Party, 2001).  The New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare 
Organisations (NZFVWO), an umbrella group of social service providers, has 
attempted to fill this gap and make visible the importance of the voluntary sector.  
They commissioned an analysis of the estimated value of ten voluntary organisations 
to the New Zealand economy (NZFVWO, 2004).   
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They found that if the ten organisations they studied operated as businesses or 
government agencies, and if they paid their staff, they would be in the top five 
percent of New Zealand enterprises.   
Quantifying the value of volunteer hours showed that the time spent by volunteers in 
the ten organisations is comparable to the total time worked by paid employees in the 
dairy industry - 7.63 million volunteer hours each year or the equivalent of 4,063 
full-time workers (NZFVWO, 2004).   
Other sources of data confirm the volume of volunteering that occurs in New 
Zealand.  Questions in national censuses regarding unpaid work, and a Time Use 
Survey in 1998–9, provide a picture of the volunteer component of voluntary 
organisations (Wilson, 2001).  The 2001 Census reported that 16.2 percent of the 
working-age population undertook voluntary work in the four weeks preceding 
census night and that volunteering is an important part of many peoples’ daily lives. 
Maori and Pacific peoples, in particular, do much volunteer work (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2001).   
Methodologies to measure the contribution of the voluntary sector to New Zealand’s 
economy are still being developed.  Statistics New Zealand, the Government body 
charged with collecting official statistics, has concluded that the amount of unpaid 
work (which includes volunteering) needs to be measured because, in its words: 
New Zealanders aged 15 years and over spend, on average, more time in unpaid 
work than they do in paid employment. Yet, despite its potential contribution to 
the productive activity of the New Zealand economy, unpaid work is excluded 
from conventional economic statistics, such as the national accounts and 
employment measures (Statistics New Zealand, 1999: 1). 
The Department is currently developing mechanisms to facilitate such measurement.   
2.4 Summary 
Voluntary organisations play an important role in New Zealand.  However, little is 
known about voluntary organisations.  This review has brought together what 
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information is available, which provides only a rough sketch.  More systematic and 
robust information about the New Zealand voluntary sector is needed (Robinson and 
Hanley, 2002).   
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Chapter 3   
Literature Review and Theoretical 
Framework 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, little is known about voluntary organisations 
in New Zealand.  How accountability is perceived from a New Zealand voluntary 
sector perspective is consequently unrecorded.   
A similar lack of knowledge about accountability from a voluntary sector perspective 
exists in other jurisdictions.  As discussed in section 1.2, key American and British 
voluntary sector researchers and commentators have lamented the paucity of 
empirical research about voluntary organisations’ accountability relationships (Leat, 
1988; Kramer, 1994; Ospina et al., 2002; NCVO, 2003).   
This chapter reviews empirical research and theoretical knowledge relevant to the 
aims of this research.  The review has two purposes: to identify specific research 
questions based on gaps in the current body of knowledge, to ensure this research 
makes a contribution to what is known about accountability from a voluntary 
organisation perspective; and to develop a framework to guide the research design 
and analysis.   
The research reviewed was generally located within three bodies of literature: on the 
voluntary sector, public administration and social policy.  Research conducted in the 
United Kingdom, Australia and Canada (fellow Westminster-based systems) is 
prioritised in the review.  Though each country represents a different expression of 
the Westminster system, the systems are similar (through shared histories, similar 
government structures and approaches to the voluntary sector).  Thus, research 
conducted in these contexts will provide the most relevant insights for the New 
Zealand context (Mulgan, 2003).   
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Notwithstanding this, much of the small pool of research is generated by American 
researchers.  Philanthropy, be it personal or corporate, is an important part of 
American culture.  Voluntary organisations can be seen in the American context as a 
part of a tradition of minimal reliance on government intervention (McIlnay, 1995; 
Aksartova, 2003).  Many American hospitals and schools are voluntary organisations 
(Herzlinger and Krasker, 1987; Gamm, 1996).  In contrast, New Zealand does not 
have a strong history of personal or corporate philanthropy.  Instead, state provision 
of services has been the norm (Nowland-Foreman, 1997).  Differences between the 
American and New Zealand context must be noted.  
3.1 Structure of the Literature and Theory Review 
When considering the concept of accountability, Leat argues that there are four key 
questions that need to be addressed (Leat, 1988).  She identified them undertaking 
research for her much cited work Voluntary Organisations and Accountability4.  
Leat’s four dimensions of accountability are: 
• What is accountability? 
• Who are voluntary organisations accountable to? 
• What do they give account for? 
• Why do they give account? 
A number of other accountability researchers take a similar approach.  For Aldons 
(2001), these dimensions represent ‘all familiar’ questions needing to be addressed 
when considering accountability.  Mosher (1968), Romzek and Ingraham (2000) and 
                                                 
4
 The book is, to date, the key piece of research looking at voluntary organisations and accountability.  
But by the author’s admission it is ‘small scale and exploratory’ and ‘not representative of … the 
voluntary sector’ (Leat, 1988: 17).  It is also nearly 15 years old and was undertaken in the United 
Kingdom, focusing on voluntary organisations and their funding by local authorities.  Despite its age, 
difference in context, and the small sample size, it provides a much needed starting point. 
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Mulgan (2003) adopt similar approaches to studying accountability in the public 
sector.  Munro and Mouritsen (1996) even use the question ‘who is accountable to 
who over what’ to structure their book on accountability.  Given the general 
consensus about the way to explore accountability, these four dimensions will be 
used to structure this review.   
3.2 What is Accountability?  
Theorists have labelled accountability an ‘elusive’ concept that is being used to 
describe an increasingly wide range of relationships (Sinclair, 1995; Martin, 1997; 
Behn, 2001).  As such there is no agreed definition of what constitutes accountability 
(Willmott, 1996; Mulgan, 2003). Bovens (1998) even argues that a universally 
acceptable definition may never be identified.  Mulgan provides an analysis as to 
why the meaning of accountability is unclear: 
Analytical confusion over the meaning of accountability is partly due to the fact 
that ‘accountability’ has only recently become popular as a generic term for 
scrutinising and controlling authority… Twenty years ago or more, the term 
was much more limited in scope, being largely confined to the areas of financial 
accounting and audit… Since the 1980s, the widespread adoption of accounting 
and audit not only as techniques of financial oversight but also as general 
models for management processes, public as well as private… has helped to 
project ‘accountability’ as the preferred name for processes of general scrutiny 
and rectification (Mulgan, 2003: 6). 
For Leat (1988), an accountability relationship occurs when one party is called to 
account or report on their actions undertaken without immediate supervision.  This 
definition contains elements of what will be termed ‘hard’ accountability in this 
research.  Hard accountability is how most accountability researchers and theorists 
(be they studying the voluntary sector or otherwise) implicitly or explicitly define 
accountability.  This definition is based on the linguistic roots of the word: to give an 
account, as Gregory (2003: 558) explains:   
The Accountability of Voluntary Organisations 32  
 
... the etymology of accountability in government is traceable to the requirement 
that the expenditure of public money be verifiable and controllable.  Literally, 
expenditure of taxpayers’ money should be rigorously accounted for. 
3.2.1  ‘Hard’ Accountability 
Hard accountability describes a relationship between two parties which is structured 
as such (Stewart, 1984; Laughlin, 1990; Mulgan, 2003): 
• One party delegates to another the power to act on their behalf.  This is usually 
because the ‘Delegator’ does not have the time or skill to perform all the tasks 
they need completed; 
• The Delegator provides some sort of reward for the party undertaking the task, 
usually a financial payment; 
• The Delegator requires a report on what activities have occurred to ensure that 
their instructions have been followed.  Usually the party undertaking the work 
will provide the Delegator with a written report of what they have done.  The 
report is retrospective based on completed work;   
• The Delegator then scrutinises and judges how well the party undertaking the 
work has done in completing what was required of them; and 
• Sanctions, punishment or some form of redress will be applied if the Delegator is 
not satisfied that the work was completed as requested.  Sanctions are often 
financial, such as the withholding of payment.   
Mulgan provides a summary of the elements of hard accountability in terms of the 
rights and obligations of the two parties: 
[Hard] accountability thus includes the right of the account-holder to investigate 
and scrutinise the actions of the agent by seeking information and explanations 
and the right to impose remedies and sanctions.  Conversely, for the accountor, 
the agent, accountability implies the duty to inform and explain to the account-
holder and to accept remedies and sanctions.  Within this process, we may 
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identify an inner core consisting of the prior rights of investigation and scrutiny, 
and the parallel obligations to inform and explain (Mulgan, 2003: 10). 
Hard accountability is the process of the Delegator seeking to control the actions of 
those to whom they have delegated tasks, and those delegated tasks answering for 
their actions (Gregory, 2003).   
While acknowledging the core elements of control and answerability, theorists 
working in different areas describe this relationship slightly differently.  Bovens 
(1998), from an organisation behaviour perspective, labels it passive responsibility.  
He attempts to further define the relationship and in doing so adds several elements 
to the definition:  
• Transgression of a norm.  The potential must exist for some action or inaction to 
contravene a norm or do some damage.   
• Causal connection.  There needs to be a connection between the conduct of the 
person held to account and the damage done.  Contravention of the norm or 
damage done must be directly attributable to the underperformance of the person 
contracted to do the work.  
• Blameworthiness.  The party undertaking the work must have had the ability to 
act in ways other than they did.  Any persons who could not help being in the 
causal chain should not be held accountable (Bovens, 1998).   
Mosher (1968), from a public administration perspective, labels the relationship 
objective responsibility.  For him the relationship is based on the responsibility of a 
person or organisation to someone else, outside of themselves, for something or 
some kind of performance.  If one fails to carry out legitimate directives they are 
irresponsible and should be subjected to penalties.  Objective responsibility is a 
relationship based on someone answering to someone else for carrying out specified 
tasks.  Within Mosher’s conceptualisation are notions of predictability (doing what 
one is expected to do) and hierarchy (the definition and delegation of duties to 
subordinates), measurement (evaluation of accomplishments) and authority (to 
sanction). 
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Laughlin (1990), studying religious organisations, talks about contractual 
accountability as a relationship where expectations are formally recorded  and for 
Roberts (1991) the relationship is called hierarchical accountability based on 
subordinates accounting to their superiors.  Leat (1988) identifies two variations of 
hard accountability: explanatory accountability where the relationship is based on 
those demanding accountability having the right to require an account but no power 
to enforce sanctions other than expressing disapproval or criticism; and full 
accountability where the right to require an account and impose sanctions exists.  
She identifies a difference in the degree to which formal and direct sanctions can be 
applied.   
Different theorists also place importance on different aspects of hard accountability.  
Information is highlighted by some as the key aspect, with access to it as a proxy for 
power and as a mechanism of control (Stewart, 1984; Swift, 2001).  Contracts - be 
they formal or informal - are the focus for another group of theorists.  Some argue 
that without a contract there can be no accountability (Laughlin, 1990; Swift, 2001), 
while the presence or threat of sanctions is considered the most important aspect for 
others (Mulgan, 2003). 
Hard Accountability and Agency Theory 
Often those adopting the hard accountability definition are influenced by agency 
theory (as described in section 2.1). The party delegating are conceptualised as 
‘principals’ and the party undertaking the tasks as ‘agents’ (Laughlin, 1990; 
Tornqvist, 1999; Mulgan, 2000a; Whitaker et al., 2002).  Principals have the right to 
call and hold agents to account because they transfer resources to the agent with 
expectations of how these resources are to be used (Laughlin, 1996; Chew and Greer, 
1997; Gray et al., 1997).   
Agency theory assumes that agents cannot be trusted.  They cannot be trusted to 
complete their work and complete it to the required standard.  They also cannot be 
trusted to give an accurate report of their actions.  Making them account for how they 
have used the principal’s resources is, therefore, a serious exercise.  Agents must be 
called to account -  that is, give an account of their work; and also held to account - 
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that is, sanctions must be inflicted if needed.  Agents will act opportunistically and 
with guile if there is no threat of punishment.  Mulgan (2003: 9) summarises:   
Agents must not only be ‘called’ to account; they must also be ‘held’ to 
account.  Accountability is incomplete without effective rectification.  Where 
institutions or officials are found to have been at fault, there must be some 
means of imposing remedies, by penalising the offenders and compensating the 
victims…The principal must be able to have remedies or sanctions imposed on 
the agent as part of the right of authoritative direction that lies at the heart of the 
accountability relationship. 
Whether or not principals do call their agents to account is a moot point for Mulgan 
(2003: 10); the potential or existence of the right to do so makes the relationship.  
...the concept of accountability implies potentiality (accountability), the 
possibility of being called and held to account.  Someone can therefore be 
accountable without actually be held to account.  All that is necessary is that 
some account-holder has a right to call the agent to account, not that this right is 
actually exercised.  Thus professionals in a position of trust, such as elected 
leaders or public officials, can say that they are accountable for everything they 
do and that there is no area of their behaviour that is free form public scrutiny.  
They do not mean that every action actually is questioned, only that every 
action might be.   
The principal–agent relationship is fundamentally unequal.  Ultimate authority lies 
with the principal who has the right to call and hold the agent to account.  As agency 
theorists have well documented, this does not necessarily translate into actual power.  
Information asymmetries and incomplete information (as described in section 2.1) 
disadvantage the principal.  Resolving this position of weakness is the basis of the 
accountability relationship (Mulgan, 2003).   
Hard accountability can be presented diagrammatically as in Figure 3.1 below.  
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Figure 3.1: Hard Accountability 
Hard Accountability and Voluntary Sector Research 
The concepts of principals and agents have been widely adopted in voluntary sector 
research.  American researchers have been particularly vigorous in their application 
of agency theory.  This can be linked to a preoccupation in the American literature 
with fraud prevention.  Several recent high profile fraud cases involving prominent 
voluntary organisations have driven this (Young et al., 1996; Hoefer, 2000; Holland, 
2002).  Agency theory, with its inherent distrust of agents, provides a useful 
framework for studying organisations in this context. 
Hard accountability is the most widely adopted way of thinking about voluntary 
sector accountability.  In the United Kingdom, the key voluntary sector researchers 
adopt a hard conceptualisation (Leat, 1988; Rochester, 1995; Kumar, 1996; Leat, 
1996).  Similarly, Cutt and Murray (2000) (prominent Canadian voluntary sector 
researchers) adopt what they call a ‘core’ definition of accountability which also 
aligns with the hard definition.   
Agency theory has been particularly influential in thinking about accountability and 
public service contracting with voluntary organisations. Kearns (2003: 582) 
summarises: 
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Current approaches to maintaining accountability in a diffused system of public 
service delivery are based primarily on principal–agent theory, which brings 
with it accountability measures like competitive bidding, performance 
contracting, mandated quality controls, outcome measurement, program 
evaluation and independent financial audits… These accountability instruments 
focus exclusively on compliance and address the most narrow definition of 
accountability – requiring service providers to literally ‘account’ for 
expenditures and activities to ensure that they are in accordance with legal, 
regulatory and contractual agreements.’ 
Indeed, Ott and Dicke (2000: 294) conclude that accountability and control are used 
interchangeably: 
The operational definition of accountability in today’s human service contracts 
is mostly limited to control. 
3.2.2 Limitations of Hard Accountability 
While widely adopted as a way of thinking about accountability, hard accountability 
(with the principal–agent relationship at its core) is not without its limitations.    
Reporting occurs after the agent has completed their work.  While the possibility of 
sanctions may deter the agent from shirking, sanctions after the fact are a weak form 
of control (Mulgan, 2003).  Agents also cannot be trusted to give principals the best 
information in their reports.  It is not in the agent’s interest to let the principal know 
that they have performed poorly (Swift, 2001).  Indeed, Miller’s (2002a) Canadian 
research showed that even if the staff of voluntary organisations wanted to provide 
good information on their performance it was difficult to do so as performance was 
difficult to quantify and measure.   
Agency theory suggests that one solution for principals seeking better assurance is to 
tighten control over their agents by increasing the level of specification in contracts.  
Laughlin (1996) found, however, in his study of religious organisations, that as 
contracts became more specified, and agents lost autonomy, the level of conflict 
increased.  Agents were also increasingly motivated to work to their own agenda and 
misreport their activities.   
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Principals are assumed to have the right to control the behaviour of agents.  Any 
departure from the principal’s wishes is worthy of sanction (Laughlin, 1996).  
Principals may require agents to do things that may be considered inappropriate5.  
The managers of voluntary organisations (agents) may be expected to prioritise the 
needs of their funders (the principal) at the expense of focusing on their organisation 
mission (Tandon, 1995; Kearns, 1996).  The economic frame that agency theory 
operates within also means the focus is on individual gain and survival, and not the 
wider societal impacts of any behaviour (Shearer, 2002).   
Thinking about accountability as a relationship between principals and agents 
enforces hierarchical thinking.  In reality, however, principals often play multiple 
roles in relation to their agents6, and agents may have relationships with many 
principals (Ebrahim, 2003).  Indeed Llewellyn and Lindkvist (2003: 252) concluded 
that communality is discouraged and issues of morality, tradition, culture and ethics 
are ignored when accountability is narrowly defined in hierarchical terms:   
When such procedural rationality reigns, action is a matter of each individual 
following the impersonal rules of the system … Roberts (1991) is concerned 
about the propensities of accounting and hierarchical accountabilities to produce 
“…a sense of the self as essentially solitary and singular, nervously preoccupied 
with how one is seen.” (p 355).  More generally, the dominance of these forms 
of accountability also implies the suppression of moral values. 
Hard accountability cannot cater for relationships based on trust.  Agents are 
assumed untrustworthy, and to that extent may even become untrustworthy: the self-
fulfilling prophecy effect.  Formal agreements and reporting are needed as proxies 
for trust.  These are costly and ineffective methods of accountability (de Leon, 2003).  
                                                 
5
 Gregory (2003) uses the example of Nazi officers to make this point.  While they may have been 
completely accountable to their superiors, their actions were unacceptable.   
6
 A government agency, for example, may fund an organisation and monitor it accordingly, as well as 
work to build the organisation’s capacity to deliver services.   
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Many relationships are based on trust and their accountability mechanisms need to be 
designed accordingly. 
... in situations where trust is present the trusted tend to disclose more accurate, 
relevant and complete information, whereas the trusting feel less need to impose 
social controls in order to gain access to or influence over information (Swift, 
2001: 20). 
Hard accountability is based on the assumption that principals have the ability to 
sanction agents.  Kearns (1996) and Miller (2002a) argue that this is not always the 
case and hard definitions of accountability cannot explain relationships when the 
principal is not the higher authority.  Kearns found that the American voluntary 
organisations he studied answered to a wide range of stakeholders, some with a 
limited ability to sanction them. 
Accountability includes much more than just the formal processes and channels 
for reporting to a higher authority.  Instead, the term accountability generally 
refers to a wide spectrum of public expectations dealing with organisational 
performance, responsiveness, and even morality of government and nonprofit 
organisations … the range of people and institutions to whom public and 
nonprofit organisations must account includes not only higher authorities in the 
institutional chain but also the general public, the news media, peer agencies, 
donors and other stakeholders (Kearns, 1996: 9). 
Miller (2002a) came to similar conclusions in the Canadian context. Voluntary 
organisation staff provided accounts to stakeholders who had little power over them 
because, among other things, they felt they had a sense of responsibility to do so.   
The accountability trail also extends beyond those with a direct claim on the 
organisation to others with no immediate contact or knowledge about it.  What 
they do have is a view on how all such non-profits should behave and the 
expectation that each non-profit has a responsibility to uphold standards for the 
credibility of that part of the sector.  The degree of felt accountability to each of 
the diverse stakeholders will vary significantly.  Moving from those with direct 
claims to the more tenuous or diffuse relationships, such as ‘constituency’ or 
‘sectoral’, depends on the degree of organisational consciousness about their 
The Accountability of Voluntary Organisations 40  
 
value, the sense of responsibility toward sometimes ‘imagined’ stakeholders, 
the capacity to fulfil this and the pressure exerted by the stakeholders 
themselves (Miller, 2002a: 555). 
The everyday use of the term accountability is much broader than the hard 
accountability definition.   The public does not see accountability in strictly legal or 
organisational terms.  It usually includes professional, ethical and moral dimensions.  
In practice, being accountable can mean being responsive to the needs of clients or 
community members, upholding professional and societal values, and being open 
and transparent (Thomas, 2003).  Indeed, Kearns (1996) argues that defining 
accountability in ‘hard’ terms is not meaningful to the professionals, elected officials, 
trustees and others who have to manage being accountable every day. He states in a 
more recent article that: 
Citizens, watch-dog agencies and the news media simply do not adhere to strict, 
academically precise definitions of accountability.  To them, accountability 
means much more than reporting one’s compliance through an established chain 
of command.  These stakeholders believe that accountability extends to broader 
goals such as serving the public interest and preserving the public trust.  In their 
view, compliance with technical contractual obligations is only part of the 
equation.  They want to ensure that their standards of appropriate behaviour, as 
well as the standards of the enforcing agency, are adhered to (Kearns, 2003: 
583). 
Hard accountability, with a focus on controlling agents, is a punitive model of 
accountability.  It retrospectively scrutinises the actions of agents.  This can lead to a 
‘gotcha’ mentality focused on attributing blame (Romzek and Ingraham, 2000).  
Gregory (2003) argues that this can be counterproductive.  Opportunities to learn 
from mistakes are lost when accountability becomes a witch hunt.  Collaboration 
between government and voluntary sector is currently encouraged and policy issues 
are increasingly complex.  In such an environment, a more collective, remedial 
approach may be more appropriate than solely relying on individualised, punitive 
mechanisms.   
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Indeed, hard accountability assumes that agents act independently and have complete 
control over their work.  In an increasingly inter-dependent world, this assumption 
must be challenged as: 
The traditional, vertical, straight line and individualistic interpretation of 
accountability does not fit with the emerging reality of a horizontal, 
interconnected and collective approach to problem solving (Thomas, 2003: 
550). 
Summary 
Hard accountability involves a principal delegating work to an agent and ensuring 
the work is completed as required.  Agents are required to report on their progress, 
principals will monitor them and apply sanctions if necessary.  A number of 
limitations of thinking about accountability in these terms have been identified.  Hard 
accountability cannot explain relationships that do not fit the principal-agent model.  
As this discussion has shown, one or more of the agency theory assumptions may not 
be present and, while the hard accountability definition is widely adopted in the 
literature, the everyday use of the word is broader.     
3.2.3  ‘Soft’ Accountability 
An inability to explain relationships that do not conform to the model of hard 
accountability has lead to alternative, broad conceptualisations.  These definitions 
relax the agency theory assumptions.  In particular, these conceptualisations 
encompass relationships where the agent has voluntarily chosen to undertake work.  
No formal delegation occurs.   
Theorists describe alternative definitions of accountability in slightly different ways.  
Bovens (1998: 26), in his study of behaviour in complex organisations, identified 
what he called active responsibility.  This is a relationship between parties based on 
acting responsibly, taking responsibility and behaving responsibly towards the other.   
A party is said to be behaving appropriately towards the other when they: 
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• Base their actions on or show signs of acknowledging potential dangers to the 
other party; 
• Consider the consequences of their actions;   
• Operate independently.  Both parties need to be autonomous and not under any 
coercion; and  
• Operate on a verifiable and consistent code and not impulse or sudden reactions. 
Conduct should be comprehensible and verifiable by outsiders. 
Bovens (1998: 148-9) identifies five types of active responsibilities:  
• Hierarchical.  The relationship is based on loyalty to one’s organisation and, in 
particular, to one’s superior;  
• Personal.  Personal ethics and loyalty to one’s conscience are at the fore; 
• Social.  The relationship is driven by loyalty to peers and social norms, such as  
decency; 
• Professional.  The emphasis lies on professional ethics and loyalty to one’s 
professional group; and  
• Civic. The relationship is based on adhering to civic values, such as democratic 
control, loyalty to parliament and public (Bovens, 1998).   
Mosher (1968), writing about public service, identified what he called subjective 
responsibility.   
Its [subjective responsibility] focus is not upon whom and for what one is 
responsible for but to whom and for what one feels responsible and behaves 
responsibly.  This meaning is more nearly synonymous with identification, 
loyalty, and conscience than it is with accountability and answerability.  And it 
hinges more heavily upon the background, the processes of socialisation, and 
current associations in and outside the organisation than does objective 
responsibility [akin to hard accountability] (Mosher, 1968: 8). 
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Communal accountability is identified by Laughlin’s (1990) study of religious 
organisations.  The relationship is informal, morally defined and based on high levels 
of trust.  Agents have more discretion to carry out the wishes of the principal.  
Roberts’ (1991) socialising accountability occurs in social settings where roles are 
unclear or uncertain, less structured, and there is a reliance on talk between parties.  
Stewart (1984) identified the presence of links of accountability where parties are 
linked together but there is not a clear bond of accountability such as a formal 
contract.  Instead, one party is responsive to the needs of the other.  Leat (1988) also 
identifies responsive accountability where those accountable ‘take into account’ the 
demands of those to whom they are accountable. She views this as a weak form of 
accountability, as there are no formal sanctions.   
Kearns (1996) identifies the characteristics of ‘a broader approach to accountability’.  
Performance measures may be formally codified in laws and regulations but they are 
also defined by the subjective standards and expectations of those engaged in the 
accountability relationship.  Anticipating emerging standards and taking proactive 
steps to meet them is an important aspect of an accountability relationship.     
Ebrahim (2003) also considers that accountability is socially constructed.  What are 
accepted levels of performance will depend on the nature of the relationship between 
parties, and the cultural and historical contexts of the relationship.  To illustrate his 
point, he concludes that  
The changing context and increasing size of nonprofits [in America] in the late 
twentieth century render traditional accountability mechanisms, which relied on 
shared religious beliefs and compact communities, largely unworkable 
(Ebrahim, 2003: 194). 
Definitions of alternative forms of accountability seem more aspirational than 
analytic - some are just vague - but the key elements of a broad conceptualisation of 
accountability can be identified: 
• One party, free to act, chooses to do so on behalf of another party or for a certain 
purpose; 
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• Their actions are guided by values, morals or the achievement of organisation 
missions.  A duty or obligation to another party may drive the relationship; 
• Performance measures will be negotiated between parties and may be informal, 
fluid and dynamic.  Measures will be influenced by the social, cultural and 
historical contexts, as well as the nature of the relationship between parties; 
• Parties will be in constant dialogue. Reporting will be proactive (anticipating 
issues) as well as retrospective (on actions completed);  
• External scrutiny of tasks completed will be coupled with self-regulation by the 
party doing the work.  Within reason, the party doing the work is trusted to get on 
with it; and 
• Sanctions for poor performance may be direct (such as withdrawal of funding) or 
indirect (such as loss of reputation, less trust). 
For the purposes of this research, this definition of accountability will be called ‘soft 
accountability’. 
Like hard accountability, answerability is a component of soft accountability.  Actors 
will answer to themselves (self-regulation of performance), may give accounts to 
stakeholders they view as important or have agreed to report to (so to maintain their 
trust or reputation) or, like hard accountability, be required to report on their actions.  
Soft accountability is, however, characterised by actors feeling responsible for their 
actions.  Responding (as an act of free will) to a need or desire is core to these 
relationships.  Soft accountability encompasses the internal or moral dimensions of a 
relationship.    
Some voluntary sector researchers have adopted the soft definition.  For Brown and 
Moore (2001) an actor is accountable when they recognise that they have made a 
promise to do something and accepted a moral or legal responsibility to fulfil that 
promise.  It could be a promise between two actors, or an actor could feel and act as 
though it was accountable to an abstract purpose.   
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Fry (1995) argues that while voluntary organisations may be judged on formal 
measures of accountability (hard accountability), these do not govern their actions.  
Voluntary organisations base their actions on a deeper acceptance of responsibility 
and as such they are guided by their self-monitored soft accountability relationships.   
Soft accountability can be seen as an emerging concept.  As such, unlike hard 
accountability, it has been less subject to critique.  Some assertions must be 
challenged even at this early stage.   
It has been widely documented that organisations and indeed individuals find it 
difficult to assess their own performance in any meaningful way (Brett, 1993; 
Buckmaster, 1999).  Self-regulation is a difficult task.  Further, the fluidity of 
performance expectations is both a strength and weakness.  Negotiation can involve a 
vast amount of time and resource and negotiated agreements, if left informal, may be 
recalled differently in time by parties. The risk is that negotiated relationships  
unravel over time if not renewed.  
Differences between Hard and Soft Conceptualisations of Accountability 
Soft accountability encompasses a broader range of relationships than hard 
accountability.  As such, a number of differences can be identified. 
Hard accountability assumes that one party has formal authority over the other.  The 
relationship between principals and agents is unequal.  Principals are assumed to 
have the right to sanction agents.  The soft accountability definition does not make 
this assumption.  Parties to the relationship may be inter-dependent.  Sanctions may 
be both direct (such as the withdrawal of funding by one party) or indirect (such as a 
reduction in trust or damage to an organisations’ reputation).   
For both hard and soft definitions, accountability involves answerability.  For hard 
definitions, accountability is also about control.  For soft definitions, accountability 
is about being responsive.  Hard accountability relationships are focused on 
controlling agents by external scrutiny and monitoring.  Agents are required to 
formally report on their actions.  The principal’s expectations of agents will be 
clearly specified.  Soft accountability does not have the same focus on control.  
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Agents may still answer for their actions but they will be assumed trustworthy and 
committed to achieving similar goals to the principal.  Soft accountability includes an 
‘internal’ dimension.  Actors may be guided by a sense of duty, their ethics, morals 
and values.  While subject to external scrutiny, actors will also self-regulate their 
behaviour.   
Legal contracts usually structure hard accountability relationships.  Dialogue and 
negotiation based on values and goals structure soft accountability relationships.  
Agents in a soft accountability relationship will have more discretion to act.  Those 
in hard accountability relationships will be more focused on discharging assigned 
duties.   
The focus of a hard accountability relationship is when the work is completed.  This 
is when the principal judges whether the agent has met the principal’s expectations, 
and whether sanctions are required.  In contrast, constant self-monitoring, dialogue 
between parties, and readjustment occurs in a soft accountability relationship.   
The two concepts can be summarised as such:  
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Hard Accountability: Answerability Soft Accountability: Responsivess 
A legal contract as the basis of the relationship Moral, ethics and a sense of duty as the basis of 
the relationship 
Accountability for pre-specified outputs Accountability for a desired outcome, mission or 
goal 
Those who hold the organisation to account 
have the authority to do so 
 
Those who hold the organisation to account may 
have power to shape events but no formal 
authority over the organisation 
Sanctions for poor performance are usually 
direct and tangible (such as withdrawal of 
funding) 
Sanctions will be both direct and indirect (such 
as loss of reputation) 
Clear, objective and explicit performance 
standards 
Negotiated and dynamic expectations 
External monitoring and control Internal self regulation, as well as external 
scrutiny 
Assumption that relationship is based on the 
need to control the agent who will act 
opportunistically if not controlled 
Assumption that all parties will work together 
towards the agreed outcomes, missions or goals 
Assumption that agent can not be trusted Assumption that agent can be trusted 
Retrospective reporting and punishment after 
deviance has occurred 
Individuals choose not to deviate from 
expectations, do not shirk and self regulate their 
behaviour 
Table 3.1: Hard and Soft Accountability 
3.2.4 Critique of the Broadening of the Definition of Accountability 
The adoption of soft accountability by researchers is not without problems.  A 
number of scholars are critical of the broadening of the definition of accountability.   
… these developments are making accountability a very elastic term, which is 
being applied more and more loosely to a wide variety of situations (Thomas, 
2003: 555). 
In particular, critics wish to keep the definition of accountability narrow in order to 
avoid it being confused with what they argue is the different, but related, concept of 
responsibility.  Accountability should be used to describe relationships based on 
external scrutiny of actions.  In contrast, responsibility should refer to ‘internalised’ 
relationships based on morals and ethics.   
In popular parlance the two words accountability and responsibility are 
frequently used as if they were synonymous.  They are not.  By comparison 
accountability is a matter of political and organisational housekeeping, whereas 
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responsibility is about moral conflicts and issues of life and death (Gregory 
2003: 558). 
For Mulgan (2003) accountability is a relationship between two parties – a principal 
and an agent – where the agent is subject to external scrutiny.  Accountability, he 
argues, does not apply in situations where the agent acts solely on the basis of their 
personal judgement.  When someone acts on their own values and out of free choice 
this should be called responsibility.  Responsibility involves an internal choice while 
accountability implies external monitoring.  While he acknowledges that the two 
concepts are linked – holding someone to account usually implies that they are 
responsible for their actions – he argues that the linguistic roots of responsibility are 
‘to respond’, and someone who chooses to do so can be praised or blamed for their 
actions but are not necessarily required to give an account of them.   
In an organisational context, Gregory agrees.  For him, accountability is 
answerability.  It is a necessary component of responsibility.  Accountability results 
in a demand for an account, responsibility is about the moral obligation to answer, 
and answer honestly.  Accountability is silent on the responsible exercise of 
discretion.  This is the job of the concept of responsibility (Gregory, 1995; Gregory, 
2003).    
But critics acknowledge the difficulty of maintaining a narrow definition of 
accountability, distinct from responsibility.  They recognise that developing 
appropriate accountability mechanisms for the current inter-dependent, devolved, 
and deregulated context may lead to the adoption of broad multi-dimensional 
definitions and alternative ways of thinking about accountability (Behn, 2001; 
Gregory, 2003; Thomas, 2003).  As Gregory (2003: 566) summarises: 
One size does not fit all, and there can be no last word written on these complex 
issues.  The last decades of the twentieth century saw a widespread shift to the 
contractual ‘out-sourcing’ of public goods and services; the adoption of market 
and quasi-market approaches to service delivery;…the general emergence of 
what has been referred to as the ‘shadow state’ or the ‘hollow state’ … The 
growth of discretionary authority has demanded increasingly higher levels of 
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responsible action in the exercise of public power.  But reliance on formal 
accountability procedures, essential as they are, is unlikely to guarantee these 
levels.  Reliance on them alone will diminish rather than enhance them.  New, 
more positive arrangements and expectations need to be established. 
3.2.5 Summary: Definitions of Accountability 
Two conceptualisations of accountability have been identified.  Hard accountability, 
the most widely adopted concept, draws on agency theory.  Soft accountability, an 
emerging concept, takes a broader view of what constitutes accountability.  The 
question now is: to what extent, if at all, do these concepts help explain the staff of 
voluntary organisations’ perceptions of accountability? 
3.3 To Whom Do Voluntary Organisations Account To?  
A wide range of stakeholders to whom voluntary organisations may account are 
identified in the literature.  This section reviews the stakeholders identified in an 
attempt to determine which accountability relationships are important and why.   
3.3.1 Government Agencies 
Governments are the major funders of voluntary sectors in many jurisdictions, 
including New Zealand (Miller, 1998; Kendall and Knapp, 2000; Robinson and 
Hanley, 2002).  Compared with relationships with other stakeholders, much has been 
written about the voluntary organisation–government funding relationships and the 
accountability mechanisms that control them.  However, little is known about the 
voluntary perspective of accountability to government.   
It is generally concluded that accounting to government funding agencies is given the 
highest priority (Kramer, 1994).  Indeed, accounting to government is thought to take 
precedence over the needs of service users (Miller, 1998; Harris, 2001b; Campbell, 
2002) and local communities (Hardina, 1993).  Focusing on contract level goals may 
be at the expense of the organisations’ mission (Nowland-Foreman, 1997; Campbell, 
2002). 
Tightly drawn contracts and close regulation and monitoring can restrict the 
ability of voluntary organisations to develop their own responses to social needs 
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… Participation in government programmes and new projects can deflect 
voluntary agencies from their core missions and receipt of government funding 
can inhibit voluntary agencies from expressing viewpoints different to those of 
their funders.  Voluntary agencies can find it increasingly difficult to make 
choices about whose needs get priority and how those needs are met. (Harris, 
2001b: 218). 
Because voluntary organisations may need to compete with other organisations for 
contracts, relationships between voluntary organisations are said to diminish (Miller, 
1998).  Resources may also be focused on reporting to government at the expense of 
the professional development of the organisations’ staff (Cordes et al., 2001).   
Bernstein’s (1991) voluntary sector interviewees concluded that accountability was a 
mechanism government agencies used to exert control over them.  Government 
agencies exercised their perceived superior power by increasing their demands for 
information without increasing funding, using homogenous grading systems for 
performance monitoring not suited to the organisation or the contract and demanding 
that an increasing number of services be delivered within a specific timeframe, thus 
reducing the ability of the professionals delivering the service to exercise their 
judgement.   
The focus of the accountability relationship is usually financial information (Poertner 
and Rapp, 1985).  As mechanisms for monitoring the performance of the delivery of 
complex social services are not well developed, financial information is perceived as 
a means for government agencies to control and restrict.  Middleton Stone (1996) 
found that organisations changed their board composition on entering contracting 
relationships with government agencies to include members with financial skills to 
address this dimension.  Focusing too strongly on financial elements detracts from 
consideration of important questions about the quality of services provided (Blasi, 
2002).   
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3.3.2 Volunteers 
Volunteers, or unpaid workers, are one of the main ‘internal7’ stakeholders identified 
in the literature.  Voluntary organisations in New Zealand and elsewhere are reliant 
on volunteers to deliver services (Clary et al., 1992; Wilson, 2001).   
Volunteers are not easily controlled, as the contractual accountabilities between 
employer and paid employees do not exist.  Monitoring the performance of 
volunteers is considered fraught (Leat, 1996; Vigoda, 2001).  The sheer number of 
volunteers working for many organisations makes it difficult to design accountability 
procedures for them, as do issues of retention, recruitment (Clary et al., 1992) and 
competition over them (Bruce, 1995).    
Volunteers often have simultaneous roles within an organisation.  As board 
members, they are subject to the ultimate accountability for the organisation’s 
performance.  As volunteers, they may be accountable for their personal 
performance. As clients of the organisation, they may also be dependent on the 
quality of service provided (Brophy, 1994).  As such, they will be subject to multiple 
and conflicting accountability expectations. Complicated accountability relationships 
result (Leat, 1996). 
3.3.3 Large Donors 
The relationship voluntary organisations have with non-government funders, such as 
philanthropic trusts, foundations and large individual donors, has not been well 
documented.  The consensus is that voluntary organisations invest much energy into 
the accountability relationships with organisations and people that donate large 
amounts of money (Bruce, 1995).  Indeed, Hardina’s (1993) study found that 
organisations abandoned programmes that were not consistent with the foundations’ 
policies that funded them.   
                                                 
7
 ‘Internal,’ in that they work for the organisation and as such may be considered subject to internal 
processes of control and monitoring.   
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3.3.4 Peer Organisations 
Accountability to peer organisations – voluntary organisations working in similar 
areas – was identified in the literature as an important relationship.  Ospina et al 
(2002) concluded that ‘sideways’ accountability was considered important to the 
organisations she studied.  Kumar (1997) drew similar conclusions from her work.  
Markham et al (1999) found that resource allocation was guided by the networks the 
organisation belonged to.  Programme funding was allocated by the organisations 
they studied based on formal and informal contacts with other organisations.  
Barrett’s (2001) New Zealand study, although limited in its focus on one 
organisation, drew similar conclusions: the organisation placed much emphasis on 
attending inter-agency committees of peer organisations and engaging peer 
organisations in decision making.  
3.3.5 Members 
The majority of voluntary organisations have members whose membership involves 
expressing financial support for the organisation.  Formally, such members have the 
power to call the board and management to account and impose sanctions but few 
take part in democratic processes (6 and Taylor, 1994; Rochester, 1995; Lansley, 
1996).  6 and Taylor (1994) reported on empirical evidence that showed 
environmental group members were content to pay their dues.  Few elections were 
contested.  Indeed, many organisations surveyed were unclear about who their 
members were and what membership actually entailed.  Members are often 
geographically dispersed, which makes accounting to them more difficult (Leat, 
1996).  Posting a periodical newsletter is the usual form of accountability (Rochester, 
1995).   
3.3.6 Clients 
A number of UK studies have explored voluntary sector managers’ attitudes towards 
the clients of their organisations.  Emphasis by policy-makers in the 1980s and early 
1990s on individual consumerism, as well as increased activism amongst disabled 
people and people with mental health problems in the face of service cuts, saw an 
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increased awareness of the importance of clients (Robson et al., 1997; Locke et al., 
2001).   
However, the degree to which voluntary organisations are actually committed to 
accounting to the users of their services is debated.  Taylor (1996b) and Rochester 
(1995) observe that being close to their clients is part of the rhetoric of the voluntary 
sector.  Taylor doubts that voluntary organisations account to their clients and 
research supports her doubts.  Robson et al (1997) found 75 percent of UK voluntary 
organisations surveyed attempted to increase their accountability to users by getting 
them more involved in organisation decision-making.  When probed further, most 
organisations meant that they had begun consulting with users.  This was considered 
a weak response given the potential forms the accountability relationship could take.  
The researchers concluded that while the organisations’ intentions were noble, they 
were not accountable to their clients in any real sense.  Barrett’s (2001) New Zealand 
study drew similar conclusions.   
Hoyes et al (1993) identified the difficulties involved in accounting to service users.  
Getting an accurate measure of what clients think of the service is difficult.  Some 
groups of clients may be incapable of judging service quality.  Often the most vocal 
clients are middle class and represent only a small proportion of the client base.  
Rochester (1995) argues that if the needs of current users were to solely determine 
the nature of services provided, the wider constituency of potential beneficiaries 
could be neglected.  Also client demands can conflict with professional judgement, 
and practical issues arise in listening to clients and reconciling responses with 
demands from funders.  Bruce (1995) also argues that many UK voluntary 
organisations are in a monopoly provider position and users can be easily neglected, 
particularly when demand for the service usually always far exceeds supply.   
3.3.7 Communities 
The literature concludes that accounting to the communities they serve is difficult, 
and often given a lower priority than accounting to funders.  Markham et al (1999) 
concluded from their study that voluntary organisations were more responsive to the 
interests of donors than to groups in their community.  That they studied only one 
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type of organisation (chapters within an American women’s service club) would 
reduce the generalisability of their findings had their results not been backed by other 
studies.  The NGO literature documents numerous studies where accounting to 
government funders is at the expense of relationships with local communities (van 
der Heijden, 1987; Biggs and Neane, 1995; Najam, 1996).  Leat’s (1988) study found 
a similar pattern amongst voluntary organisations working with ethnic communities 
in Britain, as did Chaskin (2003) in American voluntary organisations established to 
represent local communities in political processes.  Chaskin concluded of the 
organisations he studied: 
reporting requirements lead community organisations to expend the bulk of 
their energy and organisational resources on the completion of discrete 
requirements for which they receive targeted funding (Chaskin, 2003: 184). 
Barrett’s (2001) small scale New Zealand study drew similar conclusions.  While 
those involved in the organisation thought themselves accountable to their 
community and the public, they had failed to file the documents required for their 
incorporation.  These documents outline their financial information and can be seen 
as a key mechanism of being transparent and accountable to the public.  The focus 
instead for this organisation was on addressing the expectations of their government 
funders.   
Miller’s (2002a) study of Canadian voluntary organisations committed to remaining 
accountable to their communities illustrates the difficulties in doing so.  He found 
that to be accountable to communities, who have no real power over the 
organisations, was a complex process, fraught with conflict, and requiring a high 
level of resource investment.   
The main reason given for the weak relationships with communities was the 
organisations’ tendencies to become bureaucratised.  That organisations over time 
tend away from participatory engagement with constituencies is well documented 
(Milofsky, 1987; Powell and Friedkin, 1987; Cnaan, 1991).  As organisations 
become more formalised, dependent on government funding and appoint governing 
bodies, they de-emphasis their links with local communities (Cnaan, 1991).   
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3.3.8 Small donors 
Individuals are acknowledged as an important source of funding for voluntary 
organisations in both New Zealand and the UK (Bruce, 1995; Robinson and Hanley, 
2002).  However, Bruce (1995) found that voluntary organisations do not invest 
much energy into the accountability relationships with individual donors or 
organisations that do not donate large amounts of money.   
3.3.9 Professional Bodies 
Accounting to professional bodies and compliance with professional codes of 
conduct were identified by Kearns (1994) as one of the four main types of 
accountability relationships voluntary organisations will be engaged in.  However, 
few other studies identify professional bodies and their codes as important.   
3.3.10 Paid Staff 
Limited attention is given to accountability and the organisations’ staff (Keating and 
Frumkin, 2003) other than the widespread observation that the nature of the 
accountability of staff to their governing bodies is often unclear (Rochester, 1995).   
Staff may become a more important body of stakeholders as the voluntary sector 
‘professionalises’ (Fink, 1989; Berman, 1999).  To win government contracts, the 
management of voluntary organisations are becoming increasingly reliant on paid, 
professional staff, at the expense of the traditional volunteer base (Taylor, 1996b; 
Locke et al., 2001; Middleton Stone et al., 2001).   
The processes of contracting with public sector agencies required enhanced 
professional managerial skills within voluntary organisations, both in bidding 
for contracts and managing the delivery of services.  Tighter management 
seemed necessary because the consequences of defaulting on a contract were 
more serious than defaulting on a grant … In some voluntary organisations 
users and non-expert stakeholders were marginalized (Locke et al., 2001: 202-
3). 
Vigoda (2001) views the lack of attention to the systems of accountability for paid 
staff as problematic.  Management and organisation theory considering employee 
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performance is not appropriate for the staff of voluntary organisations.  The 
motivation of voluntary sector employees may be different to their private and public 
sector counterparts, and the voluntary sector is a unique environment requiring 
independent scholarly attention.   
3.3.11 The Governing Board 
The literature is divided on the issues of who the governing board think they are 
accountable to and for what.  Several studies report that board members did not 
acknowledge their legal or fiduciary accountabilities (Green and Griesinger, 1996; 
Gibleman et al., 1997).  Other studies report that board members felt accountable to a 
wide range of stakeholders including being actively involved in the relationship with 
government funding agencies (Saidel, 1993; Harlen and Saidel, 1994; Miller et al., 
1994; Saidel and Harlen, 1998; Harris, 2001a).   
The literature is similarly divided on perceptions of accountability to the board. 
Some studies found CEOs thought themselves accountable to the board while others 
found that CEOs saw the board in terms of ‘rubber stamping’ their activities 
(Kramer, 1965; Kramer, 1985; Bradshaw et al., 1992; Fletcher, 1992; Golensky, 
1993).  Indeed, Fink (1989) identifies the concept of ‘paper boards’.  Kumar (1997) 
found that the senior managers she interviewed did not think they were accountable 
to the board as members were out-of-touch with the organisation.  A number of 
studies identify tension between staff and board members based on a lack of 
understanding of their respective roles (Harris, 1993b; Bradshaw, 2002). 
3.3.12 Important and Unimportant Accountability Relationships  
Table 3.2 summaries the status of accountability relationships based on the relevant 
literature.    
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Important accountability 
relationships 
Acknowledged but Less 
Important Accountabilities 
Potential or unclear status  
Government agencies Members Professional bodies 
Volunteers Clients Paid Staff 
Large donors Local Communities Governing Board 
Peer organisations Small donors  
Table 3.2: Important and Less Important Stakeholders  
3.3.13 Multiple Accountabilities 
The table above shows that voluntary organisations are potentially accountable to a 
large number of stakeholders.  This is also widely recognised in the literature by a 
number of researchers (refer Leat, 1988; Rochester, 1995; Kumar, 1996; Leat, 1996; 
Kumar, 1997; Brown and Moore, 2001).   
The tension between the demands of different stakeholders is well documented: in 
particular, the tension between the accountability demands of funders (upwards) and 
accounting to users and communities (downwards) (refer Leat, 1988; Rochester, 
1995; Kumar, 1996; Kumar, 1997; Brown and Moore, 2001).  Edwards (1996: 87) 
succinctly illustrates this dilemma: 
All NGOs have multiple accountabilities … accountability is overwhelmingly 
‘upwards’ to trustees and regulators.  But since their mission and values 
emphasise ‘empowerment’, they also want to involve stakeholders in decision 
making or at least consultation. 
FitzGibbon (1997), taking an historical perspective, shows that managing multiple 
stakeholders and their vested interests has long been a problem for voluntary 
organisations.   
Non profits occupy a unique position in terms of the variety of constituencies to 
which they are accountable: the public at large, the government, donors, clients, 
and their own employees.  In part, this often places nonprofits at the centre of a 
complex of conflicting, often irreconcilable demands and vested interests.  In 
the 1870s [in Cleveland, USA], the personal, ad hoc, and independent voluntary 
associations exhibited a rather straightforward and uncomplicated set of 
relationships.  After the turn of the century, however, as organisations grew 
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more elaborate, interdependent, and reliant on an ever-broadening pool of 
public and private funding, the set of relationships into which they were drawn 
became more intricate and burdensome.  A conflict arose over the need of a 
benevolent organisation to satisfy its many constituencies while trying to retain 
the traditional flexibility and voluntary impulse of charitable organisations 
(FitzGibbon, 1997: 34-5). 
Walking the fine line between keeping powerful stakeholders happy and resources 
flowing as well as staying true to the organisations’ purpose of serving clients and 
communities is considered the key voluntary sector management challenge (Leat, 
1988; Kendall and Knapp, 1996; Brown and Moore, 2001). 
Given that managing the conflicting demands of multiple stakeholders is a key 
management challenge, it is surprising that few studies consider the relative 
importance given to accounting to stakeholders and how tensions are managed.   
Kumars’ (1997) UK research attempted to map stakeholder relationships.  She found 
voluntary sector managers she interviewed acknowledged five accountability 
relationships: 
• Ultimate accountability to users; 
• A strong sense of two way accountability with the government official in the 
purchasing organisation with whom they interacted.  The relationship was on a 
personal level, though they were aware of consequences of not being seen to be 
accountable and potential removal of funding; 
• They personally thought they were directly accountable to their line manager 
within the organisation; 
• They rarely observed their line management accountability as extending to the 
trustees, about whom they spoke in fairly disparaging terms and who were not 
seen to be in touch with the organisation;  
• They also felt they were accountable to their local network of voluntary and 
statutory organisations; and 
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• They believed they were accountable to ‘people who put the money in the 
collecting boxes’ (Kumar, 1997). 
Her research studied two large organisations that were selected because they were 
established social services providers with a long history of contracting to 
government.  She interviewed the managers involved in the service delivery.  Given 
these factors, her findings of the importance of users are not surprising.  Had she 
interviewed the governors she may have found a very different ‘map’, perhaps with 
more emphasis on the local community.  While couching her research in terms of the 
contractual relationship with government provides useful information about this type 
of accountability relationship, it is only the perspective of one type of organisation 
(large, established social service providers) in one type of relationship (long-term 
contractual relationship with government). 
Ospina et al (2002) also attempts to map stakeholder relationships.  Their exploratory 
research with managers in American voluntary organisations looked at how they 
managed the relationship between their funders and communities.  They found that 
managers create a variety of formal and informal mechanisms to sustain their 
relationships with the community in the midst of ongoing accountability demands.  
Their sample consisted of voluntary organisations selected for their determination to 
maintain their relationships with the community.  So while her research shows that it 
is possible to balance the relationship between the community and funders, it is very 
much skewed to ‘successful examples’.  
Woodward and Marshall (2002) is the only study found to date that considers what 
priority voluntary organisations place on stakeholders.  Their large scale national 
survey of over 2000 Australian not-for-profit companies (a specific legal type of 
voluntary organisation) asked the companies to nominate the top three most 
important stakeholders.   
Members were considered the most important, followed by the organisation’s clients, 
followed by government.  The general public was ranked in the top three by only 11 
per cent of organisations.  The results did not differ by organisation type.  The 
researchers concluded that the survey technique used, while providing an overview, 
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could not detect what dynamics and processes were at play, nor suggest explanations, 
and their open-ended questions yielded limited results.  They urged follow-up 
research, using qualitative techniques (Woodward and Marshall, 2002).   
Some authors have theorised about how voluntary organisations should prioritise 
between stakeholders.  Smith (1993) argues decisions on managing multiple 
stakeholders should be made on a moral basis; Lawry (1995) on an ethical basis; and 
Bogart (1995) for economic considerations to guide the decisions.  Brown and Moore 
(2001) argue that all three bases as well as legal requirements need to be considered.  
Lansley (1996) suggests that many organisations only cope because some 
stakeholders do not assert their rights for an account, or managers decide who to give 
account to based on a calculation of the support the organisation can least do without, 
or base their decisions on ideological positions.   
There has been limited theoretical or empirical work to date on the relative priorities 
assigned to accountability relationships.  Given that there is a potentially wide range 
of stakeholders to account to, and the problems that multiple accountabilities 
generate, this is an important omission in the literature.  Indeed, Leat’s (1996: 62) 
conclusion still stands:  
There is little data on how voluntary organisations define accountability, what 
priority they attach to it, and what systems and procedures they have in place.  
Studies raising the issue of accountability tend to be concerned primarily with 
accountability to statutory funders.   
3.3.14 Stakeholder Theory: Predicting Important Accountability Relationships 
The question must be asked why some accountability relationships are prioritised and 
others are not.  Stakeholder theory provides an explanation for this and attempts to 
predict who managers will see as important stakeholders to account to (Gray et al., 
1997).  The essence of stakeholder theory is an attempt to answer the fundamental 
question – which groups are stakeholders deserving an organisation’s attention and 
which are not (Mitchell et al., 1997)? 
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What is a Stakeholder? 
What constitutes a stakeholder?  Mitchell et al (1997) identify two responses to this 
question – those who propose a narrow definition and those who propose a broad 
one.   
A narrow definition focuses on stakeholders in terms of their direct relevance to an 
organisation’s economic interests.  It focuses limited managerial time on the most 
important external constraints.  Stakeholders are usually mandated by regulations or 
laws or contracts, or pose financial risk, or a risk to the achievement of the 
organisation’s goals (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Freeman and Evan, 1990).  In 
contrast, a broad conceptualisation of stakeholders includes all individuals or groups 
who can affect or are affected by the organisation. The basis of the relationship is 
stakeholder power over the organisation derived from their stake in the 
organisation’s successful achievement of its goals (Freeman, 1984).   
Whatever definition is adopted, theorists recognise that managers only have so much 
energy and that priority must be attached to stakeholders.  Important stakeholders 
will be given an account; managers will not be able to account to all stakeholders 
(Mulgan, 2003).  A number of categorisation schemas of stakeholders are presented 
to guide managers in their stakeholder sorting decisions:  
• Generic vs specific stakeholders: the difference depending on the issues the 
stakeholders are interested in (Frooman, 1999); 
• Primary vs secondary: the difference depending on the strength of the stakeholder 
(Frooman, 1999; Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003); 
• Claimant and influencer: stakeholders rights based on either a direct claim or the 
ability to influence the organisation (Kaler, 2002a);  
• Compatible and incompatible: with organisation objectives (Friedman and Miles, 
2002); and 
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• Voluntary and involuntary: whether the organisation chose to give account to the 
stakeholders or had no choice but to (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003).   
However,  Kanter and Brinkerhoff (1981), D’Aunno (1992) and Harrison and 
Freeman (1999) conclude that most of the schemas are not well developed and offer 
limited guidance on which stakeholders managers should give most attention to.   
Two widely cited studies take up the challenge of showing, conceptually and 
empirically, who organisations respond to and why (Mitchell et al., 1997; Agle et al., 
1999).  They develop the idea that stakeholders become salient to managers to the 
extent that those managers perceive stakeholders as possessing three attributes – 
power, legitimacy and urgency.  Power is defined as the extent to which managers 
perceive that stakeholders can impose their will on the organisation.  Legitimate 
stakeholders are those that are perceived to have an acceptable claim on the 
organisation and the power to enforce their claim.  Urgent claims are those that are 
time sensitive and a manager will need to respond to the claim quickly (Mitchell et 
al., 1997) 
These ideas, and stakeholder theory in general, are widely accepted.  Critics have 
challenged its ‘uni-directional’ assumptions as limited recognition is given to the 
ability of the stakeholder to influence the organisation.  Stakeholder theorists have, in 
the past, focused on how stakeholders should be managed by the organisation. 
Current research is addressing this by exploring stakeholder perspectives as Frooman 
(1999: 192) explains: 
Missing from the theory, then, has been an account of how stakeholders manage 
a firm to enable them to achieve their interests, possibly at the expense of the 
firms’ … And, if what a firm should do is partly determined by what its 
stakeholders will do, we need an account of what its stakeholders will do.  
Therefore, to be really useful to a firm trying to manage its stakeholders, 
stakeholder theory must provide an account of how stakeholders try to manage 
a firm. 
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Others have also cautioned that a generalised theory of stakeholders must not assume 
that stakeholders will behave consistently.  Their significance may change depending 
on the issue at hand:   
Stakeholders’ significance depends upon the situation and the issues and 
managers must have appropriate methods to deal with different stakeholders.  
Of all the possible stakeholders, the ones who will be relevant to the 
organisation’s executives depend on the particular issue.  Both the stakeholder’s 
willingness and opportunity to act are particularly sensitive to specific issues … 
Executives can not assume a supportive stakeholder on the first issue will be so 
on the second, nor that a non-supportive stakeholder on the second issue will 
always be non-supportive.  Issue specificity suggest that stakeholder diagnosis 
is an ongoing activity (Savage, 1991: 62-3). 
Stakeholder Theory and Voluntary Organisations 
Stakeholder theory was developed by theorists considering private sector businesses, 
and has not been widely applied to voluntary organisations, so how applicable is it to 
the study of voluntary organisations?  Bryson et al (2002), proponents of using 
stakeholder theory in public policy development, recently applied stakeholder theory 
to the voluntary sector.  Their conclusion was that the importance of managing 
stakeholders is as important, if not more so, for voluntary sector organisations.  
According to Bryson: 
The notion of paying attention to stakeholders is very, very old. Niccolo 
Macchiavelli, for example, really was operating out of a kind of stakeholder 
theory.  And most social science literatures have an idea of who stakeholders 
are and how they relate to one another, although each literature uses different 
names for stakeholders. So business management has no exclusive claim to 
‘stakeholder theory’ – indeed, I would argue that business management theorists 
are latecomers to the field.  Of course stakeholder theory applies to nonprofit 
organizations (Bryson, 2003). 
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3.3.15 Summary: To Whom do Voluntary Organisations Account? 
Government funding agencies, large donors, volunteers and peer organisations were 
found by the literature review to be the important stakeholders of voluntary 
organisations.  Other stakeholders (their members, clients, communities, and small 
donors) were identified but given a lower priority.  A number of other stakeholders 
(professional bodies, the organisations’ staff and governing bodies) may be 
potentially important stakeholders in the future.   
Stakeholder theory, though relatively untested in the voluntary sector context, 
suggests that these stakeholders are considered important because they are perceived 
as powerful, with urgent and legitimate demands on the organisation.   
3.4 For What are they Accountable?  
Mulgan (2003) argues that accountability is typically focused on the performance of 
some task or duty which the agent is required to perform.  A number of typologies of 
accountability have been advanced by voluntary sector theorists, most of which 
considered what voluntary organisations are accountable for.   
Leat (1988) showed that voluntary organisations are accountable for the proper use 
of money (fiscal accountability); following correct procedures (process 
accountability), the quality of their work (programme accountability), and the 
appropriateness or relevance of their work (accountability for priorities).  Cutt’s 
(1982) taxonomy of accountabilities can be seen as a simpler version of Leat’s.  He 
argues that voluntary organisations are accountable for two things: their procedures 
and the consequence of their actions.  Voluntary organisations must account for their 
processes because those providing the resources need assurance that they are being 
used properly, and for the consequences of their actions because they have used 
scarce resources to produce them.   
Typologies developed in public sector contexts can be seen to have been influential.  
Stewart’s (1984) much cited ‘ladder’ of accountability considers that agents are 
accountable for: 
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• Probity and legality; 
• The adequacy of internal controls; 
• Performance in relation to established standards;  
• Outcomes according to set objectives; and 
• The acceptability of outcomes (Stewart, 1984).  
Day and Klein (1987) and Behn (2001) have also produced typologies along similar 
lines from public service contexts.  The similarities should be noted between the 
public-service based typologies and those proposed by Leat and Cutt.   
Kearns’ (1994) voluntary sector taxonomy takes a different tack and has voluntary 
organisations accountable for compliance with external regulations (compliance 
accountability), maintaining the expectations found in social values or beliefs 
(negotiated accountability), professional standards (professional / discretionary 
accountability) and for changing and influencing the expectations of them 
(anticipatory / positioning accountability).  He criticises the ‘Leat-like’ typologies 
because they trap thinking about accountability relationships into a narrow 
management frame.  Kearns (1994) and Young (2002) argue that voluntary 
organisations are ultimately accountable for fulfilling their missions.  While donors 
and volunteers and funding have to be accounted for along the way, these 
accountabilities are secondary to accountability for holding the organisation in trust 
for the benefit of society.   
Two different responses to what voluntary organisations are accountable for can be 
found in the literature.  One places emphasis on accounting for the achievement of 
the organisation’s purpose.  This could be seen as an outcome approach.  The other, 
more widely adopted, places emphasis on what the first would consider secondary or 
process accountabilities: accounting for the use of resources, processes, quality of 
work and doing the ‘right work’.  As most of the taxonomies are dated, 
contemporary exploration of what voluntary organisations think themselves 
accountable for is timely.   
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3.5 Why are they Accountable?  
The question of why voluntary organisations think they are accountable is given little 
attention in the voluntary sector literature.  Leat (1988) makes a gallant attempt at a 
taxonomy of why voluntary organisations account: 
• Higher authorities in structures or hierarchies (social or organisational structures) 
demand an account (structural accountability); 
• The organisation has accepted a delegation and must report on progress (delegate 
accountability); and 
• The organisation feels that it is accountable and gives an account (felt 
accountability) (Leat, 1988).   
Several organisation theories provide a more comprehensive analysis of why 
voluntary organisations account.  These theories consider the relationships 
organisations have with their environment.  The environment for voluntary 
organisations, as already argued, consists of many stakeholders.   
Resource dependency theory attempts to understand organisation behaviour by 
considering the impact of the flow of resources into the organisation (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978).  Resource dependency theorists argue that if the organisation is 
reliant on one stakeholder for funds, they will be beholden to that stakeholder.  The 
stakeholder is assumed to have much power over the organisation.  Organisations 
will seek multiple funding streams to avoid dependency on one funder.  
Organisations survive and flourish based on how effective they are in managing the 
demands of the stakeholders that provide funds.  The stakeholders that will be most 
important to the organisation are those who hold the resources the organisation needs 
(Scott, 1987).  
While resources are important to an organisation, resource dependency alone 
provides a narrow view of the nature of an organisation’s relationship with its 
stakeholders.  Neo-institutional theory complements resource dependency.  It 
considers the impact on organisational behaviour of a broader range of stakeholders.  
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These theorists are interested in the impact of institutions on the behaviours of 
organisations and the processes of institutionalising: the process organisations go 
through as they respond to the values, cultures, rules and regulations of the 
environment they operate in (Scott, 1998).  Institutions are defined by Scott as 
… multifaceted, durable social structures, made up of symbolic elements, social 
activities, and material resources.  Institutions exhibit distinctive properties: 
they are relatively resistant to change … They tend to transmit across 
generations, to be maintained and reproduced (Scott, 1995: 49). 
The study of the processes of institutionalisation was first brought to prominence by 
Philip Selznick in the 1950s.  Reinvigorated interest in the 1980s by Richard Scott, 
Paul Dimaggio and Walter Powell has seen neo-institutionalism flourish.  The 
importance of organisational adaptation to institutional templates and myths present 
in the organisation’s environment is a well accepted feature of the study of 
organisations (Lowndes, 1996).   
Scott describes the relationship between an organisation and its environment as such: 
how an organisation relates to its environment is influenced by its structure and 
strategy, while its structure and strategy are, conversely, shaped by external forces:  
… organisations are not fortresses, impervious to the buffeting or the blessing 
of their environments.  On the other hand … organisations are not wind tunnels, 
completely open and responsive to every perturbation of their contexts.  
Organisations construct and reconstruct boundaries across which they relate to 
the outside world (Scott, 1998: 123). 
For neo-institutionalists, organisations need legitimacy to survive (Baum and Oliver, 
1991; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995). Survival, they argue, is based not only on 
material imperatives but on conformity to cultural norms and symbols.  According to 
Suchman  (1995: 574): 
Legitimacy leads to persistence because audiences are most likely to supply 
resources to organisations that appear desirable, proper and appropriate.   
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Organisations obtain legitimacy by conforming to the requirements of their 
environment.  These requirements may be regulative (based on laws, rules and 
contracts), normative (based on social obligations and norms) and cognitive (taken 
for granted assumptions) (Scott, 1995).   
Stakeholders also supply organisations with legitimacy.  They impose constraints and 
requirements and create myths about the organisation (Scott, 1987).  Stakeholders 
make judgements about organisational effectiveness that can result in the withdrawal 
of funding (Herman and Renz, 1997).  Organisations need to conform to the 
pressures of stakeholders in order to maintain their legitimacy.  The most important 
stakeholders will be those whose confidence in the firm is most needed (Wood, 
1991). 
Neo-institutionalism has been criticised for over-emphasising environmental 
influences and for focusing on isomorphic pressures.  It cannot account for the 
diversity of organisations, nor the fact that organisations may not be so passive and 
may actually influence their stakeholders.  Its focus on compliance with stakeholder 
demands leaves little scope for collaboration (Hirsch, 1997).  For these reasons, neo-
institutionalism is well tempered by resource dependency theory with its focus on the 
strategic behaviour of organisations in securing resources from multiple sources and 
actively avoiding stakeholder control. 
Both resource dependency (Gronbjerg, 1991; Saidel, 1991) and neo-institutionalism 
(Feeney, 1997; Wernet, 1997; Abzug and Galaskiewicz, 2001) have been widely 
applied to the voluntary sector.  Indeed, Hermovics et al (1993) were bold enough to 
say that resource dependency explains how voluntary organisations work.  
Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld (1998) sought to test various organisation theories for 
their applicability to voluntary organisations, and concluded neo-institutionalism was 
an appropriate and useful framework to explain change in voluntary organisations.   
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3.6 Summary: Research Gaps  
Leat (1988) and other accountability theorists conclude that after defining what is 
meant by accountability, to whom, for what and why are the key questions needed to 
be asked and answered. 
3.6.1 What is Accountability?  
This review has proposed two different concepts of accountability.  But how 
accountability is actually defined by voluntary organisations is a largely unexplored 
question.   
3.6.2 To Whom are they Accountable?  
A long list of potential stakeholders has been identified.  Some indication is given as 
to how the various stakeholders may be viewed.  However, there has been little work 
done on the relative importance of stakeholders.  Stakeholder theory provides some 
suggestions as to who will be given the most priority, but it is relatively untested in 
voluntary sector research. 
3.6.3 What are they Accountable For?  
What voluntary organisations are accountable for has been given limited attention.  
Two opposing camps can be identified.  Many of the studies are dated.  This is an 
area needing investigation.   
3.6.4 Why are they Accountable?  
Again, this has been given minimal attention.  Two organisation theories appropriate 
to the voluntary sector context provide suggestions about why organisations will 
account: to secure funding and legitimacy.  These assertions need empirical 
investigation. 
3.6.5 Research Questions 
In sum, the questions ‘what is accountability’ and ‘to whom, for what and why’ 
posed by Leat (1988) and other accountability theorists have not been well addressed 
by the literature to date.  These questions are said to capture the key dimensions of 
accountability.  Adopting them as the key questions for this research will contribute 
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to the current body of knowledge by providing a systematic analysis of the 
dimensions considered important.   
The specific research questions are therefore: 
• To whom do they perceive themselves accountable? 
• For what do they think they are accountable? 
• Why do they think they are accountable? 
How the staff of voluntary organisations define or conceptualise accountability – 
implicitly or explicitly – will also be considered.   
3.7 Anticipated Perceptions 
The synthesised insights from the literature review can be presented as a framework, 
as in Figure 3.2.  
 
Voluntary
Organisations
Stakeholders
Prioritised by perceptions 
of power, urgency 
and legitimacy
Accountability demanded for use of 
resources
Organisations seek to secure 
resources (proactive)
‘Hard’ Accountability Relationships
‘Soft’ Accountability Relationships
Conform to stakeholder demands 
(reactive)
Secure organisation legitimacy
 
Figure 3.2: Theoretical Framework 
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It is anticipated that the staff of voluntary organisations will seek to give an account 
(proactive behaviour), and that accounts will be demanded of them (reactive 
behaviour).  They will seek to answer to stakeholders to secure resources for the 
organisation and will attempt to ensure that they are not dependent on one or a few 
sources of funding.  They will also respond to the perceived demands of stakeholders 
to ensure the legitimacy of the organisation is maintained.  Both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
conceptualisations will, therefore, be identified.   
It is expected that the majority of accountability relationships will be perceived as 
‘hard’; involving coercion and contracts.  These relationships will support a 
perception of the voluntary organisation as an agent.  Monitoring and reporting will 
be a strong feature, to ensure the agent does not shirk.   
The staff of the voluntary organisations may also recognise ‘soft’ accountability 
relationships; those that do not involve formal sanctions or coercion.  They will be 
entered into voluntarily, and may be concerned with ensuring that the organisation is 
seen as legitimate in the eyes of a broad range of stakeholders. 
The most important stakeholders will be seen to be those that have the most power 
over the organisation and whose demands for accountability are perceived to be both 
urgent and legitimate.   
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Chapter 4  
Methodology 
 
This chapter outlines the methodology used to address the research questions.  The 
methodological paradigm, research strategy (approach to data collection and 
analysis) and mechanisms to evaluate validity, reliability and generalisability are 
presented. 
4.1 Adopting an Appropriate Research Design 
Bryman (2001) identifies a number of factors that need to be addressed when 
designing a research method: 
• The relationship between theory and research, in particular whether the approach 
is deductive (theory guides the research) or inductive (theory is an outcome of 
the research); 
• Epistemological issues, or views of what is acceptable knowledge about the 
social world; 
• Ontological issues, addressing the issue as to whether the world is regarded as 
something external to the social actors or not; 
• The research strategy to be adopted, whether qualitative or quantitative data is 
sought; 
• The impact of values and ethical issues on the social research process (Bryman, 
2001). 
Each of these aspects of the research design will now be considered.   
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4.1.1 Relationship between Theory and Research 
Research can either aim to test an existing theory (a deductive approach) or develop 
new theories (an inductive approach).  A deductive approach would involve 
developing hypotheses from the findings of the literature review.  The research 
would test the hypotheses and draw conclusions as to their validity.   
Given the relatively limited available knowledge about voluntary sector perspectives 
of accountability, a deductive approach was not used.  Also, a number of the key 
areas (for example, the definition of accountability) are contested.  Developing useful 
hypotheses would be difficult.  As this research aims to explore the staff of voluntary 
organisations’ perceptions of accountability, a more inductive approach is 
appropriate.   
However, the distinction between inductive and deductive approaches must be 
categorised as one of degree and iteration (Bryman, 2001; Locke, 2001).  While the 
research does not focus on testing hypotheses, it was conducted with knowledge of 
what previous research has found; the insights of such were presented in the previous 
chapter.  The research questions to be explored in the research are based on 
knowledge of what has been previously discovered.   
4.1.2 Epistemological Considerations 
An epistemological issue concerns the question of what is regarded as acceptable 
knowledge.  The central issue in social science is whether the social world can be 
studied according to the same principles and procedures used in studying the natural 
world.  A positivist epistemology8 affirms the importance of studying the social 
                                                 
8
 Bryman (2001) defines positivism as:  
….an epistemological position that advocates the applications of the methods of the natural 
sciences to the study of social reality and beyond.  But the term stretches beyond this principle, 
though the constituent elements may vary between authors.  However positivism is also taken 
to entail the following: 1) Only phenomena and hence knowledge confirmed by the senses can 
genuinely be warranted as knowledge (the principle of phenomenalism); 2) The purpose of the 
theory is to generate hypotheses that can be tested and that will thereby allow explanations of 
(continued) 
The Accountability of Voluntary Organisations 74  
 
world as if it were the natural world.  An interpretive paradigm9 suggests that social 
actors are different to natural phenomena and research needs to interpret or 
understand their behaviour from their perspective (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; 
Bryman, 2001; Silverman, 2001).    
This research will take an interpretive perspective.  As the perceptions of staff, board 
members and managers of voluntary organisations are the focus of this research, 
access to their thinking is needed to interpret their subjective perceptions.  This 
stance is backed by a number of other voluntary sector researchers.  Herman and 
Renz’s (1999) research on voluntary organisations concluded that accountability 
relationships involved two parties who, on the basis of limited objective performance 
data, based their judgements of each other on subjective perceptions.  For this reason, 
they argue that an interpretive approach is the most appropriate for the study of 
voluntary sector accountability relationships and performance.   
4.1.3 Ontological Considerations 
Ontology is concerned with the issue of whether social entities should be considered 
objective entities that exist external to social actors (an objectivist ontology) or 
                                                                                                                                          
laws to be assessed (the principle of deductivism); 3) Knowledge is arrived at through the 
gathering of facts that provide the basis for the laws (the principles of inductivism); 4) Science 
must (and presumably can) be conducted in a way that is value free (that is, objective) 5) There 
is a clear distinction between scientific statements and normative statements and a belief that 
the former are the true domain of the scientist.  This last principle is implied by the first 
because the truth or otherwise of normative statements cannot be confirmed by the senses 
(Bryman, 2001: 12).   
9
 In contrast, Bryman (2001: 13) defines interpretivism as: 
... an alternative to the positivist orthodoxy that has held sway for decades.  It is predicated 
upon the view that a strategy is required that respects the differences between people and the 
objects of the natural sciences and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective 
meaning of social action. 
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whether they are socially constructed from the perceptions and actions of social 
actors (a constructivist position) (Bryman 2001).   
The entities considered by this research are voluntary organisations.  While they are 
assumed to have structural realities (such as physical locations), they are also the 
product of social interaction and in a constant state of revision.  Their reputation and 
images are, for example, created and recreated by stakeholders’ perceptions of their 
performance and the worthiness of their mission.  Such perceptions are constantly 
changing.    
Research on voluntary organisations has identified their dynamic nature.  For 
example, Golden-Biddle and Rao’s (1997) research concluded that individual board 
members constructed different realities of their organisation’s identity.  A 
constructivist ontology is, therefore, most appropriate.  
4.1.4 Qualitative or Quantitative Research 
Quantitative research emphasises quantification in the collection and analysis of data 
and generally entails a deductive approach, incorporates the norms and practices of 
the natural scientific model and is linked to an objectivist ontology.  Qualitative 
research usually emphasises words, takes an inductive approach and constructivist 
ontology (Bryman 2001).  Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 2) also consider an interpretive 
epistemology central to the qualitative approach as: 
… qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to 
make sense of, or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to 
them … hoping always to get a better fix on the subject matter at hand. 
Qualitative data was sought in this research for a number of reasons.  As well as 
being compatible with the epistemological and ontological positions taken by this 
research (interpretive and constructivist) as demonstrated by Denzin and Lincoln and 
Bryman above, it is suitable for research questions, such as the ones posed by this 
research, that stress how social experience is created and given meaning.  Denzin and 
Lincoln (1994) conclude that qualitative data is, at its essence, descriptions of routine 
and problematic moments and meaning in people’s lives.  Studying what those 
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working for voluntary organisations say provides insights into how they interpret the 
world and the meaning they give to things.  This will allow for an in-depth picture of 
how respondents view their stakeholders and accountability relationships. 
Qualitative data is also considered ‘rich.’  As Miles and Huberman (1994: 1) argue, 
qualitative data is 
… a source of well-grounded, rich descriptions and explanations of processes in 
identifiable local contexts.  With qualitative data one can preserve chronological 
flow, see precisely what events led to which consequences and derive fruitful 
explanations.   
Given the exploratory orientation of this research, rich data is needed to identify such 
consequences and explanations.  Indeed Woodward and Marshall (2004) conclude 
that their large scale quantitative survey of the perceptions of the importance of the 
stakeholders of one type of voluntary organisations (not-for-profit companies) was 
hampered by its lack of qualitative data.  Their quantitative data could not reveal any 
of the contextual and process dynamics that occurred.  Adopting a qualitative 
approach, they stated, would provide a much needed understanding of the 
complexities of accountability relationships and stakeholders. 
4.1.5 Values and Ethical Issues  
Thinking about the process of research and the researcher’s role in it is termed 
reflexivity (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995).   My gender, ethnicity, previous career 
as a government official, and experience of volunteering, may affect the research 
process.  To acknowledge and minimise the effects of my values, reflexive steps 
have been built into the research design.  They are discussed later in this section. 
Ethical considerations were also taken into consideration.  Those interviewed may 
speak negatively about organisations on which their organisation relies for funding.  
Ensuring those interviewed have given informed consent and are aware of the uses of 
their information is important (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). Confidentially will 
be guaranteed by ensuring the case study organisations and those interviewed are not 
identified by using code names and not divulging information that could identify 
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them.  The research design has been given ethical approval by the appropriate 
research body10.   
4.2 Research Strategy: Case Studies 
The term ‘case study’ has been used in a number of different ways in the 
methodological literature.  It is used to describe a research method akin to direct 
observation or unstructured interviews (Turner, 1983; Hammersley, 1992), and the 
object of the research (Stake, 1994; Stake, 1995).  For Yin (1981; 1994), the case 
study represents a way of defining the boundaries of the research within which data 
from different sources are gathered.   
The case study approach is appropriate for this research for a number of reasons: 
• The research questions seek explanations (how and why and what) and so need a 
research design that facilitates understanding of linkages.  Case studies, as data 
collection with a focus on relationships with and between cases, are well suited 
to this research need; 
• It is predicted that the context will be important in determining who the 
stakeholders are that voluntary organisations think they are accountable to.  Case 
studies, as investigations of contemporary phenomenon within the real life 
context, will facilitate the exploration of the links between the context and 
perceptions of leaders of voluntary organisations; 
• The research questions are exploratory, in that they will need clarification and 
development as the research unfolds.  Again, case studies are suitable for this 
because the data collection is concentrated in a bounded area and on a 
manageable number of incidents; and 
                                                 
10
 The Victoria University of Wellington Human Ethics Committee granted this research approval on 
1st October 2003.  The process was a useful exercise as potential ethical issues were identified and 
proactive strategies to manage them developed before field work commenced.   
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• The perceptions of the actors cannot be controlled in this research.  Case study 
research is suited to such conditions (unlike experimental research) because 
control or manipulation of behaviours is neither required nor possible. 
4.2.1 Multiple Case Studies 
A multiple case study approach, as opposed to undertaking a single case, was 
adopted because it increases the ability to generalise and develop theory from the 
findings.  Adopting a single case study approach, and the need to identify only one 
intrinsic case, would limit the ability of the research to do this. 
In order to develop theory, four to nine case studies need to be undertaken 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b).  As a lone researcher within the confines of a PhD programme, 
the minimum number required will be undertaken.   
4.2.2 Study Population 
The four case studies focus on one type of organisation: voluntary organisations that 
provide social services.  Focusing on one organisation type increases the ability to 
undertake analytical generalisations between the organisations (Yin, 1981; Yin, 
1994).     
Salamon and Anheier’s (1994) definition of ‘social service provider’ was adopted.  
In order to undertake their comparative study of voluntary sectors, Salamon and 
Anheier developed an internationally recognised classification scheme.  The 
International Classification of Non Profit Organisations, or ICNPO, has been widely 
adopted and identifies 12 major groups of voluntary organisations.  One group is 
‘social services’ which they define as welfare services provided to children, youth, 
family, handicapped and the elderly (Salamon and Anheier, 1994).   
These organisations are the focus of this research because in Salamon and Anheier’s 
(1994) study this group was the third largest behind education and health service 
providers.  In New Zealand, unlike in many of the nations studied, education and 
health services are generally state-provided, so social services provision can be 
considered a very important function of voluntary organisations.   
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Further, Governments in Westminster Parliamentary systems from the mid 1980s 
have increasingly contracted with voluntary organisations for the provision of many 
public services (Deakin and Walsh, 1996; Smith and Smyth, 1996; Milward and 
Provan, 2000).  Social services, driven by the escalating costs of welfare provision in 
the face of declining government revenues, were particularly selected for provision 
by voluntary organisations (Taylor and Lansley, 1992).  Voluntary organisations 
providing social services are at the forefront of contractual relationships with 
government.  They are therefore at the forefront of the issues of contracting and 
accountability (Schwartz, 2001; O'Regan and Oster, 2002).  By studying the 
organisations at the ‘cutting edge’ of the issues of government–voluntary sector 
accountability problems, the potential for generating insights to improve this 
relationship is greatly increased. 
Social service providers are also likely to have a full range of potential stakeholders 
(such as users, multiple funders, communities and staff), and their activities are 
subject to much regulation.  Studying these organisations allows for exploration of 
the full range of accountability relationships and the priorities given to different 
stakeholders can be observed. 
Practically, there are a relatively large number of social service providers and, 
generally, they have a high profile.  Several umbrella bodies (such as New Zealand 
Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations) represent their interests.  These 
factors made it possible to access the four selected case study organisations.    
4.2.3 Case Study Selection Criteria 
It was not possible to use sampling as a mechanism for selecting case studies.  Four 
case studies is too small a number to represent a complex population and, as outlined 
in Chapter 2, little is known about the voluntary sector in New Zealand.  Yin (1994) 
instead proposes the logic of replication to select case studies.  Each case is selected 
so that it either produces similar results (literal replication) or produces contrasting 
results but for predictable reasons (theoretical replication).   
The replication selections are based on the research’s theoretical framework.  The 
framework should state the conditions under which a particular phenomenon is likely 
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to be found or not.  Yin (1994) states that even in exploratory and inductive research, 
some initial propositions are needed to guide the case study selection.   
The theoretical framework developed for this research is presented in section 3.7.  
An initial proposition, as recommended by Yin (1994), can be identified from the 
framework.  Stakeholders perceived by the staff of voluntary organisations to have 
power over them will be given the most attention.  Those that provide resources and 
legitimacy will be considered to be the most powerful.   
Government agencies are considered the most important stakeholder when the 
organisation depends on them for resources (refer section 3.3.1).  Volunteers are 
considered the next most important stakeholder (refer section 3.3.2).  The framework 
would suggest that this is because they bring the organisation legitimacy. 
The most concrete proposition available from the framework is that voluntary 
organisations which are dependent on government funding will see government as a 
key stakeholder.  Extrapolating from this we can suggest that those that are not 
dependent on government may not see government as such an important stakeholder. 
This is proposed as a replication variable. 
Using Yin’s (1994) theoretical replication logic, two case studies of voluntary 
organisations dependent on government funding (that is, receiving the large majority 
of their funding from government – for example over 80 percent) should show that 
government was considered the key stakeholder.  Two further case studies of 
voluntary organisations that are not predominantly dependent on government funding 
(receiving less than 50 per cent) should show that government was not perceived as 
the key stakeholder. 
This, however, leaves a large population of possible case study organisations, and the 
need to introduce a second replication variable.  Volunteers, the literature review 
found, are another powerful stakeholder.  Research suggests that a high degree of 
reliance on volunteers means it is more difficult to manage internal accountability 
mechanisms (such as performance management) and external accountability 
relationships (such as the reporting required for government contracts).  This is 
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because volunteers are not as easily managed and held to account as paid staff.  A 
large number of volunteers engaged in the delivery of social services may make the 
organisation’s accountability relationships more difficult and complex (Clary et al., 
1992; Vigoda, 2001).   
The performance of volunteers engaged in service delivery is crucial in shaping how 
the overall performance of the organisation is perceived by stakeholders.  Committed 
volunteers delivering a constant, quality service will enhance the reputation and the 
perceived legitimacy of the organisation.  The degree to which the organisation is 
reliant on volunteers in the delivery of services to clients is therefore adopted as the 
second replication variable.  This variable can be arbitrarily quantified for the 
purposes of the research: low involvement of volunteers in service delivery was 
defined as less than 40 per cent; high involvement was defined as more than 60 per 
cent.   
The following matrix outlines the variables used to select the four case studies.   
Voluntary organisation not dependent on 
government funding and low number of 
volunteers involved in service delivery. 
Prediction: Stakeholders other than government 
seen as important (perhaps because they 
generate legitimacy for the organisation).  
Accountability relationships seen as relatively 
simple.   
Voluntary organisation dependent on 
government funding and high number of 
volunteers involved in service delivery 
Prediction: Government as key stakeholder 
because of resource dependencies.  
Accountability relationships seen as relatively 
complex 
Voluntary organisation not dependent on 
government funding and high number of 
volunteers involved in service delivery. 
Prediction: Stakeholders other than government 
seen as important (perhaps because they 
generate legitimacy for the organisation). 
Accountability relationships seen as relatively 
complex.    
Voluntary organisation dependent on 
government funding and low number of 
volunteers involved in service delivery. 
Prediction: Government as key stakeholder 
because of resource dependencies.  
Accountability relationships seen as relatively  
simple. 
Table 4.1: Case Study Selection Matrix 
The four case studies selected conform to the matrix as such: 
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Variable Case 1: Low Government 
Funding / Low Dependence on 
Volunteers  
Case 2: High Government 
Funding / High Use of 
Volunteers 
Services Support services for families, 
youth and seniors 
Community support and 
counselling services for seniors  
Paid Staff 150 Full Time Equivalents (FTES) Head Office: 4 FTES National 
Organisation: 120 (approx. 50 
FTES) 
Volunteers Less than 5, an hour per week 4000 (approx 83 FTES) 
Funding: (2001/02) Public donations 39% 
Grants from Lotteries/ Charitable 
Trusts 19% 
Investments, rent, interest, 
dividends 13% 
Government contracts 11% 
Sponsorship 6% 
Fundraising 4% 
ACC rebate 4% 
Sale of goods 4% 
Public donations 2% 
Grants from Lotteries / Charitable 
Trusts 6.5% 
Interest 1.5% 
Government Contracts 90% (more 
than $1 million) 
Fees for Services 0.01% 
Sale of goods 0.1% 
Operating area Large region National 
Organisation type Head office with branch offices; 
hierarchical management structure 
National office of federated 
organisation; federates 
autonomous and independent.  
National office role: co-ordination 
and policy developed.   
Federates role: service delivery.   
Variable Case 3: Low Government 
Funding / High Dependence on 
Volunteers  
Case 4: High Government 
Funding / Low Reliance on 
Volunteers  
Services A service for children and their 
families  
Family and youth counselling, 
residential care  
Paid staff 1 part time Paid Staff: 930 FTEs 
Volunteers 150 Nominal 
Funding: (2001/02) Grants from philanthropic trusts 
1% 
Government agencies 10% 
($1000) 
Fees for services 89% 
Donations / Lotteries / Grants from 
Philanthropic Trusts 35% 
Government Contracts 60% 
Investments, Rent 4% 
Area of Operation City suburb  Large region  
Organisation type Volunteer committee with 
membership called upon to 
undertake work  
Board with elected members, 
management team in head office 
and regional and institution 
managers.   
Table 4.2: Details of Case Studies 
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4.3 Data Collection: Triangulation11  
Using different ‘lenses’ or research methods to collect data on the same phenomenon 
reduces the likelihood of misinterpretation of data, thus increasing the reliability and 
validity of the research (Morse, 1994).  This is called methodological triangulation 
(Flick, 1992). Because repetition is difficult to build into qualitative, inductive 
research, methodological triangulation serves to clarify meaning by identifying 
different ways the phenomenon is being seen (Stake, 1994).  Within the case studies, 
three data collection methods were adopted (semi-structured interviews, document 
analysis, and observation).   
Data source triangulation – using different data sources to see if the same meaning 
is found under different circumstances – was also adopted (Flick, 1992).  Three 
versions of the actors’ narratives were collected – their spoken accounts (semi-
structured interviews), their written accounts (documents), and their actions 
(observations of interactions with stakeholders).   
4.3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews with Organisation ‘Leaders’ 
In the methodological literature, three types of interviews are identified12 (Berg, 
1998; Bryman, 2001).  Formal (structured, focused) interviews involve the 
administration of an interview schedule by an interviewer.  Because the questions 
and range of responses are standardised, the replies can be aggregated and a degree 
of accuracy obtained (Bryman 2001).  Unstructured interviews allow the respondent 
                                                 
11
 Two other types of triangulation exist: theory triangulation (approaching the data from various 
theoretical perspectives) and investigator triangulation (using different interviewers to correct the 
subjective bias of the individual) (Flick, 1992).  A degree of theoretical triangulation is adopted in this 
research with insights from neo-institutionalism, stakeholder and resource dependency theory to be 
considered in light of the data collection.  Investigator triangulation is not, however, possible within 
the confines of the PhD programme. 
12
 Some authors only acknowledge two – formal (structured) or informal (semi-structured) (Fontana 
and Frey, 1994) 
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to talk about what is important to them with only limited prompting from the 
interviewer.  Semi-structured interviews sit between the two extremes.  The 
researcher has a list of questions but the interviewee has a degree of leeway in how 
to reply (Berg 1998).   
Semi-structured interviews were undertaken because the research is exploratory.  
Using this approach the interviewees often digressed to discuss what they thought 
was important, but a pre-determined interview schedule ensured that set topics were 
covered.  New ideas were captured, and themes from the literature were explored.   
The ‘leaders’ of the voluntary organisation were interviewed.  Leaders are defined as 
those who influence decisions about accountability relationships.  Theory13, law14 
and research evidence15 point to the boards of voluntary organisations as being where 
accountability relationships begin and end.  Boards are ultimately accountable for 
external accountability relationships (such as to funders) and, internally, staff are 
ultimately accountable to the board.   
However, the assumption that board members make decisions alone has been 
challenged.  Chief executives are also influential in decision-making and board 
members often work in partnership with chief executives (Harris, 1993a; Green and 
Griesinger, 1996; Saidel and Harlen, 1998).  Some chief executives also seek a 
degree of control over the board (Senor, 1963).  Senior management may also 
influence board members (Ott, 2001; Bradshaw, 2002).   
                                                 
13
 For examples of voluntary organisation governance theory that situates accountability relationships 
within the roles of board members refer (Middleton, 1987; Leat, 1988; Ott, 2001). 
14
 While Siciliano and Spiro (1992) outline the personal liability of board members and conclude that 
it is unclear in the American setting, Dunn and Legge (2000) present an outline of the legal 
responsibilities of British board members (Siciliano and Spiro, 1992; Dunn and Legge, 2000).   
15
 Young et al (1996) and Inglis et al (1999) are examples of research into the roles of boards in 
voluntary organisations that show the role of boards in accountability relationships (Young et al., 
1996; Inglis et al., 1999).   
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Those who are most likely to influence who the organisation answers or responds to, 
for what, why and how are board members, the chief executive and senior 
management.  These people constitute the sample from which the interviewees were 
selected.  The Chief Executive and Chair of the Board, or equivalents, were 
interviewed in all four case studies.  The remaining interviewees were selected from 
senior managers (up to 5) and board members (up to 5).  Seven to ten interviews per 
case were undertaken to ensure a good cross-section of the leaders and an adequate 
volume of data was generated.  A total of 34 interviews were conducted between 
October and December 2003.  A detailed record of those interviewed can be found in 
Appendix A.   
4.3.2 Document Analysis  
Documents are defined by Bryman (2001) as: material that can be read, has not been 
produced for the purposes of social research, is preserved so that it can be analysed, 
and is relevant to the concerns of the social researcher. 
Written communications from the staff of voluntary organisations to stakeholders 
fulfil these criteria.  Such documents include annual reports, newsletters and 
advertisements.  The text employed in such documents can be interpreted as 
interview transcripts, and presents another version of how the leaders of voluntary 
organisations construct their reality, in terms of perceptions of stakeholders (Miller, 
1997; Flick, 2002).   
Following from the interviews, the stakeholders perceived important to the 
organisation were identified and any documents prepared for them were requested.  
Documents included annual reports, newsletters, letters requesting donations, 
strategic plans, advertising pamphlets, websites and documents prepared for 
government agencies.  The full list of documents analysed can be found in Appendix 
B.   
Bryman’s (2001: 370) criteria for assessing the quality of documents are: 
• Authenticity: is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin? 
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• Credibility: is the evidence free from error or distortion? 
• Representativeness: is the evidence typical of its kind, and if not, is the extent of 
its uniqueness known? 
• Meaning: is the evidence clear and comprehensible? 
These criteria were adopted to consider whether each document received was to be 
included in the analysis.    
4.3.3 Direct Observation  
Direct observations of leaders talking about and interacting with stakeholders 
provide another type of insight into their perceptions of the importance of the 
stakeholders and the nature of the perceived accountability relationship.  How 
interviewees talk about their relationships with stakeholders – tone of voice, body 
language and use of language – tells much about how they perceive this relationship 
(Adler and Adler, 1994).  Detailed notes were taken during and immediately after the 
interviews recording the non-verbal information relayed.   
While the data from observation proved not to be a large or important source of 
insights, it supplemented the other two sources.  Recording observations after an 
interview or meeting brought a useful discipline to the data collection and helped the 
process of analysis and reflection.   
4.3.4 Comparing the Techniques 
Table 4.3 below compares each approach, and Table 4.4 (cont.)  illustrates their 
strengths and weaknesses.  Each method has been selected to collect a specific aspect 
of the interviewees’ perceptions about accountability.  When taken together the three 
methods compensate for the weaknesses in each individual method. 
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Research Method Why selected? Why appropriate? Data Collected 
Semi-structured 
Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews allow 
for open ended questions and 
relatively free flow of ideas (as 
opposed to structured interviews 
that require a response to pre-
established questions and codes 
(Fontana and Frey, 1994).  When 
such questions and codes are not 
immediately obvious, such as in 
research on values, beliefs and 
perceptions Morse (1994 p224) 
states that unstructured interviews 
should be used (Morse, 1994).   
Interview data represents one form 
of ‘speech event’ (Spradley, 1979) 
which is an organised sequence of 
ideas of the world (McCracken, 
1988) prompted by the 
researcher’s questions. 
Document Analysis Documents and text represent 
another source of information 
(beyond the spoken word) about 
the construction of reality (Hodder, 
1994).  While such documents 
require the researcher to interpret 
them, they remove some of the 
bias potential in the interview 
situation.  Interpretation will be 
guided by the themes and issues 
identified in the interview stage.   
Documents, the official sanctioned 
texts of organisations that are not 
produced for the purposes of the 
research and that relate to 
accountability, will be coded with 
the interview transcripts.   
Direct Observation Non participant observations 
provide a third alternative source 
about how reality is being 
constructed – the discussion 
between members, and between 
members and their stakeholders.  
It presents the most naturalistic of 
the data collection methods, so 
removing as much as possible 
observer effects from the data 
collection (this is why participant 
observation has been rejected).  
This will allow further 
understanding of the themes and 
issues identified in the previous 
two stages.   
Detailed field notes and memos 
will be taken while observing 
interactions between members of 
the voluntary organisation when 
discussing stakeholders and 
accountability, and in meetings 
between members and their 
stakeholders.   
Table 4.3: Types of Data Collection Techniques 
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Research Method Strengths Weaknesses 
Semi-structured 
Interviews 
Provides in-depth rich data; 
Gives some idea about how 
respondent views the world 
through the responses they chose 
to give; 
Transcripts are relatively easy to 
analyse and compare; 
The interviewer can seek 
responses to questions that are of 
interest to the research; 
Privileges the spoken word and 
expression, and acknowledges the 
importance of speech as a means 
of constructing realities. 
Prompts during interviews can 
control the information given by 
respondents (leading questions); 
Respondents give the information 
they think is required; and 
Interviewers tailor questions based 
on their preconceived notions of 
the respondent (McCracken 1988; 
Kvale 1996); 
Few standard techniques so 
reliance on the experience and 
judgements of the interviewer 
(Kvale, 1996);  
Focuses on thoughts and 
experiences at the expense of 
action (Kvale, 1996); 
Is an unnatural form of 
communication as respondents 
required to demonstrate 
competence in the role the 
interviewer casts them in.  
Interview data represents a 
particular representation of the 
respondents’ construction of reality 
(Dingwall, 1997). 
Success based on intangibles  
such as rapport, level of 
respondent apprehension 
(Spradley, 1979);  
Document Analysis One form of constructed reality 
captured in time and space;  
Are formal snapshots of an 
organisation’s reality (Miller, 
1997); 
They are enduring and can give 
historical insight (Hodder 1994) 
Need to contextualise the 
document (its history, audience, 
author) in order to interpret it 
sensibly; 
Documents’ meanings are not 
stable and will be interpreted 
differently by different people 
(Hodder, 1994; Miller, 1997); 
Table 4.4: Strengths and Weaknesses of Data Collection Techniques 
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Research Method Strengths Weaknesses 
Direct Observation Able to view the subjects 
interacting with each other; 
Subjects do not have to appear as 
rational to the researcher as in an 
interview (Dingwall 1997);  
Non-interventionalist so removes 
as much as possible observer 
effects;  
Allows insight as much as possible 
into private settings;  
Unstructured so subjects are free 
to reveal what is important to them 
(Adler and Adler, 1994); 
Validity of technique questioned 
because observers rely on their 
perceptions of what is happening 
(in this research strategy the 
observations will be guided by 
themes and issues from the 
interview data and document 
analysis); 
Reliability in question because can 
not verify that the events observed 
are not random (Adler and Adler 
1994); 
Potential bias as only view 
instances that support researchers 
ideas (Lofland, 1971); 
As a non participant, the 
researcher is an ‘outsider’ so not 
so privileged with access to private 
thoughts (Spradley, 1980).   
Table 4.4 (cont.)  
4.3.5 Piloting  
Once the interview schedule was formulated, it was tested with experienced 
researchers to identify poorly worded questions and bias.  It was then tested with four 
leaders in two voluntary organisations that fulfilled the case study selection criteria.  
This was to determine whether the information sought by the research would actually 
be obtained by the research schedule.  The pilot voluntary organisation leaders were 
also asked to identify documents that may be of use to the research.  Observations of 
non-verbal cues were also completed for the pilot interviews.  This provided a useful 
starting point for gathering the three sources of data needed for triangulations.   
Berg (1998) suggests that this two-step process, involving experienced researchers 
and those familiar with the study’s subject, should ensure the interview schedule is as 
well designed as possible.   
The interview transcripts, documents and observation sheets were coded in order to 
develop a standardised process before the proper data gathering began.   
The final interview schedule, and post-interview coding sheet, can be viewed in 
Appendix C.   
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4.3.6 Grounded Theory Approach to Data Analysis 
Grounded theory is a data analysis technique appropriate for case study research 
strategies, such as this one, that are inductive and based on qualitative data.  
Developed in the late 1960s by two academics in reaction to the prevalence of 
quantitative science, it is a systematic process for analysing data and developing 
theory.  Data is coded, categories identified and defined from the codes, and 
relationships between categories are discovered which form the theory.  Coding 
occurs during the research process and the researcher is able to modify the data 
collection to learn more about categories and their inter-relationships.  Cases are 
selected in order to enhance theory development (Strauss and Corbin, 1994; Locke, 
1996; Bryman, 2001; Locke, 2001).   
Grounded theory is not without its critics.  Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000) have 
outlined their concerns.  Grounded theory assumes that by adopting a seemingly 
objective analytical process, the subjectivity of the researcher will be mitigated. In 
effect, however, the researcher will influence the selection of codes and categories.  
They also think that too much weight is given to theory development, as opposed to 
describing the case at hand, and that researchers will ‘reinvent the wheel’ by 
developing their own theory without awareness of what is already available.  As 
such, there is a risk of creating trivial knowledge (and investing a lot of time and 
energy in doing so) and discovering the obvious (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000).     
In light of these cautions and the practical limitations of the PhD process, the main 
tenets of grounded theory were adopted: theoretical sampling, in-depth memoing as 
the research progresses, coding after each case is completed, and the identification of 
categories.      
4.4 Evaluative Criteria for Qualitative Research  
Though the nomenclature differs between authors, three main criteria for assessing 
the quality of social research can be identified: reliability, replication and validity 
(Bryman 2001).  Reliability is the extent to which a measurement procedure yields 
the same answer, however and wherever it is carried out.  Validity is the extent to 
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which the research gives the correct answer, and replicability the extent to which the 
study can be repeated (Kirk and Miller, 1986).   
However, there is debate about these criteria.  Two camps exist16.  One camp argues 
that qualitative methods can be objective and should adopt the criteria applied to 
quantitative methods (namely reliability, replication and validity as defined by 
quantitative texts).  They outline strategies to ensure such criteria are met (LeCompte 
and Goetz, 1982; Kirk and Miller, 1986; Silverman, 2000; Bryman, 2001; Silverman, 
2001).   
For Kirk and Miller (1986) reliability can be achieved in qualitative methods by 
making detailed field notes that eliminate the idiosyncrasies of the researcher. 
Validity can be achieved by adopting a variety of different data collection methods.  
If each method points to similar results, it is likely that the results are valid.  If one 
method involves face-to-face interaction over a period of time, validity claims are 
strengthened.  
LeCompte and Goetz (1982) suggest that external reliability can be achieved by 
identifying the role and status of the researcher within the group studied 
(acknowledging the impact they have on the research findings); giving reasons why 
the informants were selected and how atypical informants were avoided; and 
acknowledging the social setting and its effect on research findings.  External 
validity can also be achieved via multi-site research and theoretical sampling.   
Internal reliability can be achieved by good field notes; using multiple researchers if 
possible; checking the results with participants; and the examination of the study by 
peers.  Qualitative methods are considered to have high internal validity because the 
researcher is constantly checking with field  (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982).   
                                                 
16
 Hammersley (1992) identifies a third camp that rejects the need to judge the quality of social 
research.  Proponents of this position argue that the existence of multiple realities denies that any one 
account is better than another.  I, however, accept the need to prove the quality of my research in order 
to have the results viewed as credible (Hammersley, 1992). 
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Others argue that qualitative methods stem from a paradigm quite different to 
quantitative ones.  Qualitative research, therefore, needs to be judged by standards 
that are appropriate to what it is attempting to achieve.  Alternative criteria are 
presented in the literature, indeed Altheide and Johnson (1994) identify 14 
definitions for a validity criteria.   
The most referenced set of criteria are by Guba and Lincoln (1994).  Lincoln and 
Guba pose trustworthiness to replace reliability and validity and transferability to 
replace replicability. Trustworthiness is defined as: 
• Credibility (a replacement for validity): the extent to which the findings are 
believable and accepted by the people studied;   
• Dependability (a replacement for reliability): the extent to which the findings are 
likely to apply at other times; and  
• Confirmability (a replacement for the condition of objectivity implicit in 
quantitative methods): the extent to which the inferences are based on the data 
and are logical and of high utility.   
I acknowledge the paradigmatic differences inherent in qualitative and quantitative 
research and the need to judge them by different standards.  In conducting and 
writing up my research I aim to fulfil the criteria outlined by Guba and Lincoln 
(1994) in the following ways: 
• Credibility. Two common techniques for meeting the credibility criterion are data 
triangulation and respondent validation (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).  Both are 
employed in this research.  Data triangulation has been mentioned previously.  
Respondent validation is a process whereby the researcher provides the people 
who were interviewed in the research with an account of the findings.  I drafted a 
preliminary research findings report on completion of the case studies and 
invited comments from key respondents.  Several took the time to provide 
comment and confirmed that the findings were appropriate.   
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• Dependability. Guba and Lincoln propose that researchers seek an audit of their 
work to ensure they are making sensible coding decisions.  Complete records 
should be kept of all phases of the research process and peers audit the work.  
Given the large data sets involved in qualitative research, this is not a widely 
adopted practice.  Instead, in the presentation of the research findings direct 
quotes are used as outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994), to allow the reader 
to confirm my categorisations and conclusions. 
• Confirmability is the criterion that shows that the conclusions drawn are based on 
the data gathered.  Important in this is recognition of the personal values the 
researcher brings to the research and the potential affect of these on the research.  
As discussed previously, it is important to be self-reflexive during the research 
process (Bryman 2001).  Through making detailed field notes describing not 
only the actions taken but also the responses to them and my critical thoughts 
about my impact on the research process, I attempted to be as reflexive as 
possible. 
• Transferability is possible when there is a ‘thick description’ of both the sending 
and receiving contexts so a reasoned judgement about the degree of 
transferability is possible (Hammersely, 1992; Bryman, 2001).  Undertaking in-
depth case studies using multiple methods of data collection allows for thick 
description. 
4.5 Summary 
A multi-case study research strategy has been used.  Four cases were undertaken of 
voluntary organisations that provide social services.  The specific cases were selected 
using Yin’s theoretical replication.  Three data collection methods were employed: 
in-depth interviews, document analysis and direct observation.  Qualitative data was 
sought.  A number of steps were also taken to ensure the results are reliable, 
including data triangulation, seeking comment on the findings by respondents and 
taking detailed field notes.   
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Part Two 
Results 
dentifying those to whom the management, board members and chief 
executives of voluntary organisations think they are accountable, for what, and 
why, is the primary aim of this research.  The research revealed the following 
key findings (for the full results refer Appendix D):   
To Whom They Think They are Accountable 
The respondents thought they were most accountable to their clients.  Twenty seven 
out of 34 respondents considered themselves primarily accountable to their 
organisations’ clients.  Staff were the second most important stakeholder to whom 
accountability was perceived (18 out of 34 respondents), followed by the government 
(16 respondents), the organisation’s governing body (14 respondents), and members 
and churches (seven respondents for each).  Other minor stakeholders to whom 
accountability was perceived included future clients (five respondents); voluntary 
organisations with whom they worked closely (five respondents); and the local 
community (four respondents). 
What They Think They are Accountable For 
Overwhelmingly the respondents perceived themselves to be accountable for the 
quality of care of their clients (25 out of 34 respondents).  They also thought that 
they were accountable for ensuring clients remained safe while in their care (seven 
respondents). Attracting enough resources to run the organisation was also 
mentioned (seven respondents), as was financial prudence (five respondents), and 
being a good employer (four respondents). 
I 
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Why They Think They are Accountable 
Respondents thought themselves accountable to the organisation’s clients because 
clients are the reason the organisation exists; they are the purpose for the 
organisation and for their jobs (17 respondents).  Respondents also thought 
themselves accountable to the organisation’s staff to ensure that they were happy and 
thus provided good care for clients.  Retaining good staff was the driver behind this 
accountability relationship.  Accountability to government for the funds they 
received (seven respondents), delivering on the outputs in their government contracts 
for service provision (six respondents), and for complying with regulations (six 
respondents) were also mentioned.   
Board members felt accountable to their fellow board members for their performance 
(six respondents) and staff felt accountable to the board for performance of the 
organisation (five respondents).  Board members also felt accountable to members 
because they are elected by them (five respondents), and are a source of funds (two 
respondents).  In two cases membership was linked to church hierarchies.   
Key Themes 
Three key themes emerged from the results: 
• Client Accountability.  Respondents thought themselves most accountable for the 
quality of care provided to the organisation’s clients, in particular for achieving 
positive outcomes for their clients.  Making a positive difference in their clients’ 
lives was seen as the reason the organisation, and their jobs, existed. 
• Internal Accountabilities.  Accountability to a group of ‘internal stakeholders’ – 
staff, members, churches, the organisation’s governing body – was considered 
very important. 
• Accountability to Government.  Respondents considered accountability to 
government as their third most important accountability relationship. The 
relationship was based on accounting for funding, contracted outputs, and 
compliance with regulation. 
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Each theme is discussed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 5  
Client Accountability 
 “I wouldn’t rank anybody else as more important than the kids.  It’s all about 
the kids” (3:2) 
Accountability to clients was, across the board, perceived as the most important 
accountability relationship.  Accountability for providing quality care for clients and 
making a difference in their lives was what respondents thought they were most 
accountable for.  However, when exploring what is considered quality care and how 
respondents gauged whether they were making a difference, it became clear that 
thinking and action in this area was not well advanced.   
5.1 Clients as the Most Important Accountability Relationship 
Twenty-seven out of 34 respondents mentioned clients as an important accountability 
relationship.  Clients were perceived as those that received the organisation’s 
services.  Sixteen of the 27 respondents perceived their organisation’s clients as the 
stakeholder they were most accountable to.  A further eight respondents considered 
clients as one of their top three accountability relationships.   
The perception that clients were their most important accountability relationship was 
common to all case studies and to board members, chief executives and management 
alike.  Three out the four chief executives interviewed mentioned accountability to 
clients, as did all respondents from Case 1.   
Perceptions of accountability to clients were particularly strong amongst those 
working most closely with clients.  Eleven out of the thirteen managers interviewed 
mentioned their accountability to clients.  Managers generally had the most client 
interface of those interviewed.  Analysis of the seven respondents who did not 
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mention accountability to clients also illustrates the link between working closely 
with clients and perceptions of accountability.  Three worked for Case 2 and four for 
Case 4.  The respondents from Case 2 - a head office of a federated voluntary 
organisation - confirmed that they had limited contact with clients.  Service delivery 
was undertaken by the local federates.  While some in the head office view the 
clients as most important, three saw their role as supporting the local federates.  They 
defined the client not as the end recipient of services, but as the local federate.  Those 
interviewed for Case 4 were managers and board members who work in the head 
office of a large regional social service provider.  They too have limited client 
contact as services are provided by staff in regional offices.   
Interestingly, all committee members from Case 3 mentioned accountability to 
clients.  These committee members were not only in volunteer governance and 
management roles, but also used the organisation’s services.  That Case 3 
respondents were the most client focussed is not surprising given their personal 
interest in the service.   
Five respondents also thought they were accountable to their organisation’s future 
clients.  One CEO and four board members, one from Case 2 and four from Case 4, 
mentioned accountability to future clients. Respondents considered this 
accountability as part of their leadership and governance roles.  Ensuring their 
organisations continued to remain viable and capable of fulfilling their missions of 
serving clients was considered important.  To one respondent, it was the most 
important accountability.  Three respondents placed this accountability among their 
top three accountabilities.   
5.2 What they are Accountable for 
Our role is to try to enhance the well-being and quality of life for [the 
organisation’s clients], that is why we are here (2.5). 
Most respondents thought they were primarily accountable to clients for the quality 
of care they received and the resulting positive outcomes (20 respondents).  For 15 
respondents ensuring quality of care for their clients was what they thought they 
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were most accountable for.  Twenty-three respondents classified accountability for 
quality of care as one of their top three accountabilities.  All CEOs interviewed, five 
out of eight board members, seven out of eight committee members and nine out of 
14 managers considered they were accountable for the quality of the service provided 
to clients.  Needing to make a difference for their clients or achieving positive 
outcomes drove their perceptions of accountability.  This was expressed most 
frequently by those working most closely with clients. 
Because the issue of providing quality care was often mentioned in interviews, 
deeper probing was undertaken into what the respondents meant by quality care.  
Overwhelmingly, for the three cases (1, 2, and 4) that contracted with government 
agencies, quality care was defined by the minimum standards outlined in the 
government contracts the organisation was engaged in.   
We don’t have the time or resources to do proper research and base our 
strategies on evidence.  [Our performance measures] are contract driven, we are 
reactive to what comes across our desk … I would like to be more proactive 
based on what are the priorities for [the organisation’s clients] (2.2). 
Case 3 received limited government funding.  What funding it did receive was in the 
form of small grants that generated minimal compliance requirements.  They did not 
contract with any government agency.  For respondents from Case 3, government 
standards still defined what they considered quality care.  Regulations and laws 
(particularly health and safety) were used as proxies.    
While all respondents respected the need for government to impose standards and 
regulation, they were not positive about the actual nature of these constraints.  A 
number of the specific issues raised illustrate their concerns. 
Government contracts provided standardised measures of service quality.  
Respondents from Case 4, in particular, wanted to individualise their services to 
deliver what they perceived as better quality of care but felt unable to do so within 
the bounds of the contract specifications. 
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I have five people and I need to get them all into their pyjamas so I will start 
with Mrs Jones and then go to Mr Smith and they will get into their pyjamas 
whether they want to or not because it is my time and I have to get through all 
those sorts of things.  The issue is that they are all completely different and they 
all have different needs and they all have different wants and the issue is how 
do you cater for that after the system that says that you should deliver this by 
contract, you deliver this service and you will provide this and provide their 
medical care and provide that (4.4).   
There were differences of opinion as to what constituted quality care, but 
respondents felt they had no option but to adopt the standards for which they were 
receiving payment.  One respondent talked about being ‘hypnotised’ by government 
definitions of service quality so that the organisation could see no other way and 
focussed solely on contract delivery.  The result of this, for this respondent, was that 
some clients received a poor quality service: 
He [an elderly client] broke his wrist and went to hospital and they fixed his 
wrist and they discharged him at 4 o’clock in the morning and had no money in 
his pocket and no way of getting home so he walked up the hills in Brooklyn 
from the hospital.  We say that we are leaders in elderly care and he is an 
elderly man and we should be caring for him.  What do we do?  Give him taxi 
chits. [The voluntary organisation] just gets so hypnotised by the state’s 
definition that we can’t see beyond it and that’s not the real world (4.9). 
Government definitions of service quality were also perceived to take them away 
from their client focus.  All the organisations sought to deal with their clients in a 
holistic way.  Government contracts, however, only provided for ‘bite-sized bits’ of 
care or one stage in the process of care. 
We come from a philosophy that we will give people want they need and worry 
about the funding afterwards (4.4). 
Complying with government standards and regulations was perceived to generate a 
great cost for the organisations.  By spending their resources to achieve compliance, 
and securing government funding in the short term, respondents thought they were 
binding their organisations into dependence on government.  This was particularly so 
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when an organisation hired professional staff to meet a government standard or 
purchased new equipment or buildings.   
Given the unease with government’s standards of care, it is interesting to note that 
the organisations had done very little to develop their own definitions of quality care.  
Most determined what they thought clients needed by what they were contracted to 
deliver, and by relying on the judgement, discretion, and experience of the 
professionals delivering the services.  
Clients were not asked about what their needs were.  One organisation identified this 
as a core weakness of the organisation and intended to develop mechanisms to gauge 
client needs.  Another undertook client satisfaction surveys as a condition of their 
contract with government.  The other two organisations did not seek any information 
from the recipients of their services.  High membership numbers and a queue of 
clients were used as indicators that they must be doing a good job.  Also, the fact that 
government was willing to contract with them showed that they must be providing a 
quality service.   
Barrett (2001) found similar results in his investigation of the attitudes of one New 
Zealand social service provider to their clients.  Apart from questionnaires completed 
by clients, as required by a government department funder, the views of the 
organisation’s clients were not sought.  Most employees of the organisation thought 
this was an issue but more urgent priorities meant that systematic information about 
clients’ needs and the impact of the services provided to them was not collected 
(Barrett, 2001).  The author concluded that the organisation expended more effort 
considering its funders’ needs than its clients.  Funders, in fact, appeared to be the 
primary clients.   
Research in the UK suggests that this reliance on professionals and government to 
determine the quality of the services the organisation delivers, and lack of 
engagement with clients about their needs, should have been expected.  A raft of 
research in the 1990s clearly showed that while the managers of voluntary 
organisations saw themselves as ‘champions for their clients’ they made most 
decisions without consulting them (Taylor, 1996b; Robson et al., 1997).   
The Accountability of Voluntary Organisations 102 
 
Being ‘close to the consumer’ is one of the characteristics often associated with 
the voluntary sector.  Many see themselves as a ‘champion for the user’... But 
service users are challenging this assumption and funders are beginning to 
demand evidence that the organisations they support are involving service users 
(Taylor, 1996b: 56). 
‘User empowerment’, ‘client choice’ and ‘client responsiveness’ were terms 
managers used to describe their approach to service delivery (Taylor, 1996b).  In 
reality, user involvement in making important decisions about their care was rare.  
The staff delivering the services, especially those directly providing the care, made 
most decisions (Lindow and Morris, 1995; Locke et al., 2003).   
While there has been a growing crescendo of government and professional 
rhetoric in recent years on ‘user involvement’ in the planning and development 
of services, in practice such involvement has tended to be dominated by carers 
(Lindow and Morris, 1995: 48). 
Decisions about care were also often based on the demands of government funding 
agencies (Kumar, 1997).  Indeed, Lindow and Morris (1995) conclude that the 
organisations they studied were acting according to powerful agendas that prevented 
meaningful user involvement: the pressures of government funders being the most 
prominent.  
Lindow and Morris (1995) also concluded that incorporating client perspectives into 
discussions about care is difficult.  Carers, usually middle-aged and educated 
professionals, often expect to speak on behalf of clients.  Clients also have diverse 
needs and may have little in common with each other. Incorporating the diverse 
range of needs into planning and service provision and adequately representing 
clients is difficult.   
Inviting participation in decision-making about care can also engender unrealistic 
expectations amongst client groups. Clients may also be physically unable to 
participate fully in such discussions due to ill health or disability.  Medical models of 
service delivery are influential in social service delivery and give prominence to the 
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views of professionals above those of clients.  Other researchers document similar 
problems (Hoyes et al., 1993; Robson et al., 1997).   
It is interesting to note that the accountability relationship to clients can be 
considered ‘soft’.  The organisations chose to serve the clients; as such, there is no 
formal delegation of work from clients to the organisation.  Apart from annual 
reports made available to the interested public, there is also no reporting to clients.   
Mulgan (2000b; 2003) argues that this makes voluntary organisations, as compared 
with public sector and private organisations, unaccountable because there is little 
reporting back to clients (unlike the rigours of parliamentary accountability or 
shareholders) and limited potential for retribution from them.  Indeed, most of the 
clients of the organisations considered in this study are those least likely to demand 
an account.  They have little choice in the provider of services to them, the services 
they receive are free, and they are generally the least-resourced people in the 
community.   
Ironically, client responsiveness is one of the reasons given by governments for 
contracting with voluntary organisations (Jordan and Jones, 1995; Billis and 
Glennerster, 1998; Ospina et al., 2002).  Voluntary organisations are said to be more 
responsive to clients needs (Hirst, 1994) and more innovative than government 
agencies (Kramer, 1979; Osborne, 1998).  The very nature of the contracting 
relationship which drives voluntary organisations to focus and report on the 
specifications of the contract actually seems to ensure that they are not so17.  
Government regulation and specifications in contracts may be seen by government as 
minimum standards, but this research has shown that they become the norm.   
Given that what constitutes a quality service is largely determined in terms of 
government regulation and contracts, it is not surprising that the staff and board 
members of the case study organisations had little knowledge of what impact they 
                                                 
17
 As predicted by Nowland-Foreman (2000), this can be considered a form of voluntary organisation 
‘goal displacement’ resulting from the pressures of contracting with government agencies.   
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had on clients.  One organisation had begun to develop a system to try to track the 
outcomes for its clients.  It was based on developing behavioural Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) for its services.  Expected improvements in clients will be mapped 
by the system.  The KPIs will gather information over and above what was required 
by the organisation’s government contracts.  As the KPIs have yet not been 
implemented, how successful they will be in generating useful information is 
unknown.   
We have key performance indicators for each programme which we are still 
refining and developing.  They started out as basic numbers of people taken in 
and moving through the programme and we are refining them now.  Okay we 
know a lot of good things are happening on our programmes and we need to 
quantify them and we are now saying there are milestones which are 
progressive things and there is the ultimate outcome that you are trying to 
achieve which may be different for each person.  But how do we summarise that 
and tell that the programme is doing well?  So we are in the throes of trying to 
quantify all sorts of behavioural outcomes and get a lot more reporting in place 
of what we are achieving (1.4). 
The other three organisations gathered only the information required for reporting on 
their government contract, or to show compliance with regulations.   
Some respondents demonstrated a degree of paternalism.  Clients were lucky to get 
their services and positive outcomes for clients happened because they were experts 
who provided a good service.  Demonstrating outcomes for clients was not, 
therefore, considered important.   
One organisation relied on unsolicited feedback to measure its performance: 
As much as we would like to run surveys all the time we don’t have the ability 
to do that. We actually pride ourselves on the feedback we get and we do get 
feedback from different areas.  The mana in which the community hold us - if 
we weren’t doing a good job we would lose that (2.3). 
It is widely recognised that measuring the performance of voluntary organisations is 
difficult for a number of reasons.  Voluntary organisations’ missions are focussed on 
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non-financial goals.  The financial bottom-lines used to measure performance in 
private sector organisations and financial prudence measures for public organisations 
are not appropriate (Cutt, 1982; Buckmaster, 1999; Vigoda, 2001).  For Kanter 
(1987: 155) this means: 
Issues of performance measurement for nonprofit organisations are complicated 
by the absence of an overarching measure like financial performance and by the 
mission-directedness of the organisation.  The nonprofit organisation, then, 
faces these dilemmas: (1) knowing when it is doing well, and (2) being able to 
make changes, or to redirect resources, when members of the organisation 
suspect it is not doing well with respect to its ‘market’, but can still attract 
resources by nonmarket means from nostalgic or believing donors.  
Voluntary organisation goals are also usually ambiguous, value-laden and non-
quantitative (Kendall and Knapp, 2000; Kaplan, 2001; Sawhill and Williamson, 
2001).  They are also often long-term and intangible.  This makes developing 
sensible measures of organisation performance complex (Buckmaster, 1999).  
Organisations often have multiple goals.  Goals may be inconsistent and 
contradictory and differences of opinion may exist within the organisation as to the 
relative importance of the various goals (Kanter, 1987).  This is further complicated 
by ambiguity around the issue of who owns and controls the organisation: 
Although directors of a corporate board are ultimately accountable to the 
owners or shareholders, there is little consensus as to who ‘owns’ the nonprofit.  
Simply put, the board of directors for a private sector firm is accountable to the 
shareholders and therefore monitors managerial action to assure that corporate 
behaviour produces efficient and profitable outcomes.  Nonprofit boards are 
answerable to multiple constituencies with differing expectations, which means 
that unless the board has gone through the process of determining ownership, 
accountability is ambiguous and objectives for monitoring lack specificity 
(Miller, 2002b: 438). 
A lack of management expertise and staff resisting measurement and reporting 
mechanisms was recorded in Macdonald’s (1999) research as barriers to effective 
performance measurement.  Organisation staff and supporters may assume that the 
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worthiness of the organisation’s activities means there is no need to measure its 
results (Kanter 1987). 
Differences in judgements between clients, donors and professionals about what 
constitutes good performance further complicate performance measurement as can 
the tension between organisation goals and professional standards (such as social 
worker codes and medical standards) (Kanter, 1987; Macdonald, 1999). 
Traditional and emerging mechanisms of measurement (such as the balanced 
scorecard) have proven inappropriate for the voluntary sector.  Developed in the 
private and public sectors, they make assumptions which are not valid for voluntary 
organisations (Jergers and Lapsley, 2001).  Some assume, for example, that 
organisations exist to generate quantifiable profit.  Voluntary organisations exist to 
render a public or social service, of which financial performance is a small 
component.  Other management tools are focussed on customer satisfaction.  
Customer-based models are inappropriate because the ‘customers’ of voluntary 
organisations may have little choice of service provider, do not pay the full cost of 
the service, and may not be in a position to judge the quality of service provided 
(Green and Griesinger, 1996).  Others assume that abstract goals can be easily 
converted into specific, objective measures and that data can be collected to measure 
them (Herman and Renz, 1999).  The assumption that what constitutes effective 
performance is agreed and overt is also present in most measurement schemes.  
Kendall and Knapp (2000) and Herman and Renz (1999) challenge this assumption 
and argue there will not be a single criterion of performance because voluntary 
organisations have a wide range of stakeholders with differing perspectives.   
Effective measures for human or social services are also notoriously difficult to 
design (Kanter, 1987).  For example, the results of the services may take many years 
to eventuate and the service provided may be only one of a number of services a 
client receives so determining causal impacts is difficult.   Government agencies, as 
outlined in section 1.1.3, are similarly struggling to develop quality measures for 
social services and are doing so with more resources and expertise than voluntary 
organisations.   
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5.2.1 Accountability for Client Safety 
Ensuring client safety was another thing that respondents felt accountable for.  All 
seven respondents that raised this issue worked within Case 4.  That Case 4 provides 
services to a vulnerable clientele (very young children) and most of the workers are 
also members and users of the service (that is, they are the parents of young children) 
provides an explanation for why this was so prominent.  Even though safety would 
be foremost in the organisation’s operations regardless, fear of non-compliance with 
Occupational Safety and Health regulations and any possible retribution was high on 
the respondents’ consciousness.  As with the previous section, this illustrates the 
pervasiveness of government regulation in driving voluntary organisations’ 
perceptions of accountability.   
5.3 Why they are Accountable to Clients 
Seventeen respondents thought they were accountable to their organisations’ clients 
because their organisations’ missions focussed on achieving positive outcomes for 
clients.  Providing quality services for clients was the main purpose of the 
organisations.  Working towards this mission and being accountable for doing so was 
considered important.   
The clients that we serve – that is our reason for being and our existence – 
assisting people that need help (1:4). 
We are here to provide services that meet a need where people have a need 
(4.5). 
To me they are the most important people [the organisation’s clients] because 
that is what we are here for, that is what we exist for, and if we are not treating 
them as a priority, what are we in business for? They are number one (4:3). 
At the personal level, respondents mentioned that they worked for the organisation 
because it provided services they viewed as important.  They supported the 
organisations’ missions, were proud to contribute to achieving them and happy to be 
accountable for doing so. 
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That is our by-line [organisation mission statement] and I like that.  The times 
when I have gone and talked with families and they say you have been doing a 
fantastic job, the number of times my managers tell me about the eulogies when 
the families get up and say thank you (4.2).   
I think the most important stakeholders are the clients and their families. I think 
it fits in with the philosophy.  They are the central part of everything that goes 
on.  Everything should be thought of, I believe, in terms of how it affects them.  
They are the reason why everyone is here, to benefit them (1.5).  
Being accountable to clients was also part of their personal ethos of service.  
Respondents used terms such as ‘values’ and ‘ethics’ to describe this relationship.  
They were motivated by opportunities to ‘make a difference’ in the lives of their 
clients and, again, were happy to account for progress in achieving positive 
outcomes.   
Ethically we need to be doing what we say we are doing and that others need to 
be happy with what we are doing and those others being our stakeholders (2.4). 
For four respondents, being accountable to clients and maintaining high standards 
was considered part of their professional code.  Another respondent mentioned her 
fiduciary duty to clients.   
I am responsible to the members [the organisations’ clients]… I guess it is a 
fiduciary duty in that I am in charge of the finances and there is a lot of onus 
placed on me in terms of honesty and integrity and accuracy and I guess that is 
my profession (3.7). 
[I am accountable for] my own ethics, a professional accountability that I am 
representing the views of the members, to the aims and strategies of the 
organisation.  I come from a health background. I mean not harming anyone in 
my work.  I am lucky in my work that I can make a difference to the people I 
am representing but I also have the responsibility that I am not harming them 
(2.2). 
An awareness of the importance of a strong client base underpinned perceptions of 
accountability to clients for four respondents from Case 3.  Case 3 was funded 
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primarily through fees paid by its users.  Ensuring clients received a quality service 
and so continued to use the organisation’s services was directly linked to the viability 
of this organisation.   
5.4 Summary: Client Accountability  
The voluntary organisations studied all considered themselves most accountable to 
their clients and for the quality of service they provide for them.  The relationship 
can be characterised as ‘soft’ accountability.  It is not driven by any formal external 
forces.   
However, actual mechanisms to operationalise the perceived accountability to clients 
generally did not exist.  Few attempts were made to measure client outcomes or even 
gauge their needs.  A review of research shows how difficult it is to develop client 
responsiveness and performance measurement systems for voluntary organisations.   
Government contract standards and regulatory compliance may be hindering the 
ability of the staff of voluntary organisations to develop performance measurement 
processes.  This issue will be explored further in later chapters.  
 110 
Chapter 6  
Internal Accountabilities 
‘The monthly report – oh my God – it’s due’ (1:2) 
This chapter reports on a group of stakeholders perceived as the second most 
important accountability relationship.  They all fall within the ambit of ‘internal’ to 
the organisation, that is, either within the direct chain of organisational command 
(board and staff) or those with formal powers derived from the organisation’s 
constitution (members).   
Each stakeholder – paid staff, the governing body, members and volunteers – is 
discussed separately, as each was perceived differently.  Most of the relationships 
can be categorised as ‘hard’ accountability.     
6.1 Paid Staff 
Accountability to paid employees was considered one of the top three important 
accountability relationships for 18 respondents; for four of these it was their most 
important relationship.  Accountability to staff was identified as important by 
respondents in all the cases (apart from Case 3, which employed only one person for 
a limited number of hours).    Two of the four CEOs, five out of the eight board 
members interviewed, and eight out of 14 managers considered paid staff as one of 
their important accountability relationships meaning all positions equally 
acknowledged accounting to staff was important.   
Two types of accountability to staff can be identified: 
• Upward accountability; and 
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• Downward accountability.  
6.1.1 Upward Accountability 
[Accountability means to me] in the first instance to my CE and obviously to 
the board, that is very clear in my job description (4:10). 
My accountability, the most important of all in any person’s job, I am 
accountable to the CEO.  And I do what he instructs me to, I argue with him, 
but I still do what he instructs me to (1:7). 
This accountability relationship was based on a hierarchical chain of command 
within the organisation.  It is hard accountability: accountability as answerability, or 
what is referred to as ‘core’ accountability (Mulgan, 2003).  The relationship 
manifests itself formally in terms of monthly reports to the Chief Executive (CE) and 
the governing board, individual performance assessments and being called to task for 
achievements by the CE or board.  It is outlined in job descriptions, strategic plans 
and responsibility for Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). 
The relationship was perceived to be the most important by CEs and management.  It 
was particularly important to respondents in Case 1.  The CE of this organisation 
expressed the need to enforce commercial disciplines.  His commercial background 
led him to restructure the organisation, to move from unclear job descriptions and 
‘jack of all trade’ service provision to clear boundaries and targets.  Initiating 
reporting and formal accountability relationships was perceived as an important 
aspect of this restructuring.   
When I joined the [organisation] we had a situation where a lot of staff were 
handling a whole different range of clients so we re-structured it all so we 
developed teams that would look after a certain type of client.  For example, our 
unemployed clients we have a team looking after them.  We have our seniors. 
We have a team looking after them.  We have our youth.  We have a team.  We 
separated them all out where as before we were expecting people to be a jack of 
all trades and master of none.  Now we have people who are specialist and 
qualified in each area and that is really to improve the quality of service 
delivery (1.4). 
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Formal reporting and hierarchy was also important for respondents in Case 4.  
However, they put less emphasis on the formal system, instead emphasising trust and 
collegiality between staff, and between staff and the board.    
Accountability to paid staff was not as important to respondents from Case 3.  Case 
3, a committee with a flat organisation structure, ran on trust and shared unwritten 
expectations (such as ‘pulling one’s weight’).  The committee did not conceptualise 
its relationship to its one part-time paid staff member in terms of employer-employee 
but rather as a committee member who does more work and happens to get paid for 
it. 
6.1.2 Downward Accountability 
This perceived relationship is the reverse of the previous one.  Board and committee 
members felt accountable to CE and management, and management felt accountable 
to staff.  In contrast to the previous relationship based on formal reporting, this 
relationship was perceived as ‘soft’ accountability; it was accountability as 
responsiveness, and was about their management style, values and acting 
responsibly.  Respondents in Case 1 and 4 placed much importance on this 
relationship.  Both organisations employ a large number of paid employees.  Staff are 
a vital part of these organisations’ ability to deliver.  
It was evident that this perception of accountability was driven by the perception that 
the organisations’ staff were skilled professionals paid lower wages than they would 
receive if they worked for other organisations, particularly in other sectors.   
We don’t pay top dollars.  They are professional people and really almost 
without exception everybody is doing their best (1:3). 
Typically voluntary organisations pay their staff less than they could get in the 
commercial world or government sector (1:4). 
Because they were perceived as being underpaid, there was a belief that voluntary 
organisations needed to compete for staff using non-monetary benefits, such as 
providing a pleasant working environment or because the organisation upheld key 
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values and a mission to which employees strongly related.  Treating staff well was 
seen as the organisations’ competitive advantage in attracting and retaining staff. 
To a certain extent what they [staff] are doing is for love (1:4). 
They are not well paid and it is a really difficult job so I think you need to value 
them – giving them training and lots of positive reinforcement about being 
valued and that they do a really good job and that they are important (1:5). 
They have two motives for working: one to feed the family; and, for many staff 
over the years, as an avenue of community service (4:7). 
Because the organisations are service providers they also perceived staff as key to 
ensuring happy clients.  Happy staff were perceived to provide quality services. 
Staff are the manifestation of the brand and therefore if staff are happy your 
customers’ relationships are happy (4:9). 
There was also an acknowledgement that the jobs staff undertook were difficult, 
especially some professional positions, and that was exacerbated by the lack of 
organisation resources to support them.   
I would never do his [the CE] job. You are reliant on your finances from 
donations and you never know what is going to happen each year. The 
customers are the less well off in the community (1:1). 
We are under-funded and working out of boxes under our desks because you 
have no shelving and you are sitting on the photocopier just about and those 
kind of things and it is important to realise that the key people [the staff] are 
going out everyday and dealing with often dysfunctional families and stressed 
out [clients] (2:7). 
The two perceptions of accountability to staff represent the two types of 
accountability: a formal reporting system (an example of ‘hard’ accountability) and 
an informal relationship based on being responsive to staff (‘soft’ accountability). 
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6.2 Volunteers 
Unpaid staff or volunteers were not directly mentioned in any respondents’ rankings 
of important stakeholders, though a number of issues were raised about volunteers 
and accountability.  Volunteers were conceptualised by respondents in Cases 1, 2 and 
4 as staff who were not paid18.   
Volunteers were not used in roles where professional expertise was needed because 
management acknowledged that they needed to be able to control the quality of their 
work and they did not think they had adequate control over volunteers.  Management 
also did not think that those volunteering for their organisations had the skills and 
training needed.   
We have made it a policy that the quality control of programmes is all important 
and unless we pay the staff and manage the staff and have all the discipline 
under control we believe we can not control the quality of our programmes 
(1:4). 
If you are an abuse victim and I come into your life, we have to know that I am 
going to do the right thing, because if I screw you up even more you might get 
abused even more so therefore I have to be accountable for my actions and the 
only way to do that is to pay you and professionally train you because 
volunteers can walk away (2:3). 
A reduction in the use of volunteers over time was a widely identified trend.  It was 
being driven both by the perceived need to professionalise services in order to 
comply with government contract standards, and the perceived additional costs and 
complications of changes to health and safety legislation.   
Two years ago they [volunteers] used to go on outings with the clients, they 
would take them for walks in the garden. They would push them in the wheel 
                                                 
18
 All respondents in Case 3, bar one part-time paid employee, were volunteers.  No distinction 
between paid and unpaid staff was made.   
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chair. With the new health and safety legislation that has all changed. They now 
have to go through quite a strident process of interviewing and police checks 
and all sorts of things – to a degree it excludes some of the volunteers that we 
would have previously used (1:5). 
The two organisations that did use volunteers – Cases 2 and 3 – engaged them to 
provide a non-professional service and perform roles that did not need any training or 
qualifications.  Both organisations stated that the service could not be provided 
without volunteers. 
We couldn’t get professional people to do that sort of work. It has to be done by 
a person who wants to do it for their own reasons not because they are paid for 
it (2:3). 
But relying on volunteers was not without problems.  There was much perceived 
competition over volunteers, particularly because the pool of available volunteers 
was perceived as dwindling. 
There is a lot of competition for volunteers out there and it is not just 
competition because there is a greater number of volunteer groups. It is also 
because there is more people in the workforce and their time is precious and 
their leisure and family time is precious (2:7). 
Getting the right volunteers was thought difficult: 
Sometimes it is getting volunteers in the right location if you are trying to match 
up in a suburb nearby and with similar interests, it is the right volunteers for the 
right person (2:7). 
Volunteers did not remain committed and the lack of consistency created problems 
for the quality of service delivery: 
The trouble with the committee is that it changes so that there is not really very 
much continuity (3:1). 
Volunteers could not easily be ordered around and decisions needed to be based on 
consensus which was thought time consuming and ineffective: 
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Sometimes the meetings take longer than they need to because we drift off on 
tangents and dribble on (3:2). 
It is interesting to note the importance placed on the inability to control volunteers.  
The perceived lack of a formal employment relationship comes through most 
comments.  Volunteers were perceived as uncontrollable and unaccountable for their 
actions.  This highlights the importance placed on the formal ‘hard’ accountability 
mechanisms.   
The problems the managers and board members of the case study organisations were 
experiencing are similar to those outlined in the literature.  That volunteer 
workforces create problems for accountability has been widely acknowledged (Clary 
et al., 1992).  As discussed in section 3.3.2, volunteers are not easily controlled, as 
the contractual accountabilities between employer and paid employees do not exist.  
Monitoring the performance of volunteers is considered fraught (Leat, 1996; Vigoda, 
2001).  The sheer number of volunteers working for many organisations makes it 
difficult to design accountability procedures, as do issues of retention, recruitment 
(Clary et al., 1992) and competition for them (Bruce, 1995).   
Specific issues arise from contracting with government.  Volunteers need to be more 
skilled, may be required to take on a greater workload than they are prepared to, and 
complete paper work (accountability reports) which they try to avoid as this is not 
the ‘real work’ they volunteered for (Wilson, 2001).  For these reasons, Wilson’s 
(2001) review of volunteering literature concluded that the management of voluntary 
organisations are increasingly reluctant to include volunteers in service delivery 
roles.   
Along with the rise in demand for skilled volunteers, contracting has also 
initiated a move towards use of paid staff in some organisations.  The 
‘unknown’ or ‘unreliable’ volunteer is increasingly being overlooked in favour 
of the more ‘dependable’ paid worker, in order to ensure certainty in meeting 
contractual commitments.  Paid workers are regarded as performing a better 
standard of work, bringing higher qualifications to the job, and offering greater 
continuity and stability – characteristics often identified as crucial when 
entering into government contracts (Wilson, 2001: 36-7). 
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6.3 Governing Body (Board/Committee)  
Fourteen respondents considered an accountability relationship with their governing 
body (either a committee or board) important.  For two respondents it was the most 
important relationship and for a further eight, the governing board was considered 
one of their top three important stakeholders.   
I think I am primarily accountable to the board to deliver on its selected 
direction and deliver on the business plans and budgets that we have passed 
(4.1). 
Accountability to the board was most important for respondents from Cases 3 and 4.  
In these organisations the board is considered to be powerful and central to the 
organisation’s performance.   
You are accountable to the board always about ensuring clinical standards are 
appropriate, contracts are being met, the building standards are being met, staff 
ratios are right and good care is being given at all times (4:4). 
The perceived power of these governing bodies was demonstrated by their ability to 
hold the CE and management to account, and in the recognition that they were at the 
apex of the organisational pyramid.  Its role in setting the course for the organisation 
was acknowledged and respected.   
Conversely, the board was not perceived as important in Cases 1 and 2.  Here the 
board members were perceived to be out of touch with clients and the organisation. 
The board is made up of professional people who don’t interact with clients. 
They come from a corporate background, they come from an affluent 
background so they wouldn’t have the opportunities to see how the other side 
lives (1:2). 
Their main role was perceived as fundraising, which while important to generate 
funds, did not translate into the board being seen as powerful.  These two boards 
were perceived by management and some board members as performing poorly.   
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Yesterday on the radio someone was talking about boards and directors and 
they said those days have gone when people don’t read their minutes, but it 
hasn’t in the non profit world (1:3). 
When accountability to the board is analysed, two distinct relationships can be 
identified: sideways accountability; and upwards accountability.   
6.3.1 Sideways Accountability 
Accountability to the governing body was perceived as most important by members 
of the governing body.   
I am accountable to the rest of the board members.  I am not accountable to 
anyone outside here (4.5). 
I am accountable to my fellow board members for my attendance and bringing 
some professional expertise and independence of mind and adequately 
preparing and asking the appropriate questions and participating (4.8).   
They were expressing ‘sideways accountability’ to their peers.  This was particularly 
so for the committee members in Case 3.  It was important to them that they were 
seen to be ‘pulling their weight’ on the committee, and that they were meeting the 
unwritten performance expectations placed on them.  
You expect people to give a reasonable effort (3:2). 
It is a good committee in that people do their share (3:3). 
This perceived sideways accountability can also be linked to the close social 
proximity between committee members and the users of their services.  There is a 
heightened sense of need to be seen to be doing a good job if your performance is 
being judged by your next door neighbour or if you could be called to account in a 
supermarket queue.   
The relationship can be conceptualised as ‘soft’ as it is based on a shared sense of 
purpose and wanting to achieve a similar goal.  The committee was very aware that 
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they were volunteers and not subject to any formal accountability.  Obligation and 
felt responsibility were the key drivers that ensured the organisation’s functioning.   
There is no coercion. No hierarchy apart from [the chair]. Even that is pretty 
tenuous. People are there because they want to be, not because they are being 
paid (3:2). 
In a voluntary organisation you have to realise that you are not paying anyone. 
You have to take a more consultative approach because you have much less 
ability to enforce than if I am paying you and I am your boss (3:3). 
Board members in Case 4 took their shared sense of purpose a step further.  The 
goals and values of stewardship19 drove their perceptions of sideways accountability.  
Their common worry about the fragility of current funding arrangements and the risk 
of not being able to serve future clients, coupled with a strong ethos of serving the 
weak, meant that they banded together.  Board members, in particular, shared a felt 
obligation to answer for their financial management. 
We have a responsibility to spend money like a forest [replant the trees that 
have been cut down] to spend wisely so we have long term sustainability and 
not hand over a raft of problems to somebody else to say we have made a mess 
of it (4:5). 
Sideways accountability was expressed as ‘soft’ accountability.  Given that board 
members were volunteers and not subject to any performance measures or hard 
accountability mechanisms, they were driven by their sense of mutual obligation and 
duty with a measure of informal peer pressure ‘not to let the side down’.   
                                                 
19
 Jeavons (1994) explores the concept of stewardship.  Stewards are committed to achieving the goals 
of their masters.  Given their dedication, they are entrusted to manage their masters’ affairs and 
expected to do so well.  They are accorded a large degree of discretion and work proactively to 
cultivate their masters’ resources (Jeavons, 1994).  The concept of stewardship is discussed further in 
Chapter 9.   
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6.3.2 Upwards Accountability 
Four respondents in management positions and one CE perceived themselves 
accountable to the board.  This perceived relationship can be seen as an extension of 
the formal hierarchical chain of command.   
As an employee, I am accountable to my board (my local board). They are my 
employers and they have contracted me to provide certain services and I report 
back on those services to them on a monthly basis and I report on behalf of the 
staff and the staff on the other hand are accountable to me as their employer so 
they give me monthly reports and between that we open dialogue, debriefing 
meetings and those sort of things.  So I am a bit old fashioned but I still see the 
chain of command (2.7).   
The relationship was based on formal reporting to the board and reflects the 
perceived power of the board.   
We have a system of variance reporting so every month we provide full profit 
and loss statements and balance sheets to the board and all the KPI information 
(1:4). 
6.4 Members 
This group of stakeholders hold formal constitutional or ‘legal’ rights to hold the 
board to account.  This is usually manifest in their rights to vote at Annual General 
Meetings (AGMs) where board members are elected and organisation strategies and 
high level policies ratified.  For two organisations, membership was tied to church 
hierarchies and parishes.   
Depending on the organisation’s history and the structure that has developed from 
this, this group of stakeholders takes several forms. Three different types of 
membership organisations were identified in the case study organisations: 
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• Member serving organisations (Case 3)20.  The organisation is established and 
operates to serve its members. Members join in order to be able to access the 
services for their personal use (Gordon and Babchuk, 1959);   
• Public good organisations (Case 1 and 4). The organisation is established and 
operates to serve some positive purpose generally attempting to contribute to a 
better society.  Members join to contribute to the cause promoted by the 
organisation (Gordon and Babchuk, 1959); and 
• The head office of a federated organisation structure (Case 2). The head office 
serves the autonomous federates.  The federates may be seen as members 
because they elect the head office board and vote at the AGM.   
Four respondents considered their accountability to members as their most important 
accountability relationship.  Seven, in total, mentioned the importance of accounting 
to members.  Five out of eight respondents from Case 2 acknowledged the 
importance of their accountability to members. These respondents were 
acknowledging the role their national organisation plays in providing services to 
federated local organisations.  These local organisations were conceptualised as 
members.   
For Cases 1 and 4, historic links to churches and the residual constitutional powers of 
the church hierarchy meant that these church-based members were considered 
important.  Church-based members were particularly important to Case 4 
respondents: five out of eight respondents mentioned their importance. 
                                                 
20
 For respondents from Case 3, members are also clients.  The organisation is run based on 
membership subscriptions and payments by members for fees.  None of the respondents 
conceptualised their members as members, but instead as those that receive the organisation’s 
services.  Given this perception, their responses were coded as ‘client’ not ‘member’ and are captured 
in the previous chapter.   
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We share the same name but we are a quite separate legal entity and we have a 
relationship with them through the fact that there is five [church areas] and they 
make up our [service] area and they, in conjunction with the board, appoint five 
board members; one from each of the five [church areas] so there is a direct 
relationship there (4.1). 
It was board members who generally perceived members as important.  Four 
respondents acknowledged that they were elected by members and were accountable 
because they were selected to represent the members’ interests.   
I believe the stakeholders are the [members] all round the country.  We are 
elected at an annual general meeting every year by them so we have a 
responsibility to them (2.5). 
The key stakeholders in my view are the [members] that appointed the board 
members to look after their interests … Those are the people that pay a 
membership sub and are entitled to a newsletter and entitled to come to the 
general meeting if they wish to (4.2). 
Members, particularly church-based ones, were also a recognised source of funds: 
fundraising being an important concern of the board.   
Most of our strong generous donors are linked up with the parishes (1.7). 
We have members for donations of course (4.1). 
There was also an acknowledgement of the potential power of the membership, and 
that if this relationship was not well managed problems could be created for the 
board.  
Other than write out their cheques ever year, [members] act as the conscience 
[of the organisation] and scream [obscenities when they are not satisfied with 
the organisation’s performance] (4.7).   
While board members perceived members as important stakeholders, management 
and CEs actively denied that there was any measure of accountability to members, 
especially those with church-based mandates.  They saw themselves working, as 
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professionals, for an autonomous organisation and did not want ‘meddling’ in their 
operations.   
One of the fights over the years has been the tendency [of the church] to want to 
hijack the resources of the organisation because they have other aspirations.  
They want to provide the latest trendy social services because it happens to look 
good when they front a TV camera.  I am duly cynical (4:7). 
I said to [the head of the church] on his visit here a few months ago, I said when 
the time comes for the church to come in here and tell us how to do our business 
we will start writing sermons (4:5). 
I don’t personally think that the church is that important stakeholder for a whole 
host of reasons. I think the church has its job, I think as history we have 
separated. We use the same name, we have the same brand, we have the same 
ideals and because the Christian ideals are so clear we don’t need to consult 
because the grounding is so solid (4.9).   
But however adamantly some management and CEs guard their independence from 
church-based members, the usefulness of this relationship is acknowledged at a 
symbolic level.  Members and a link with a church are sources of funds, and are seen 
to enhance the ‘brand’ of the organisation. 
She [one of the staff members] is doing some marketing papers and so as part of 
her paper did [the organisation].  She did some surveys in the community about 
what they thought of us or didn’t think of us….Generally people think if you are 
linked to a church you are probably going to be nicer, whether that is true or 
not, that is the perception of the community (1:5). 
Members and churches are also acknowledged as having a role in being a check on 
the organisation and so ensuring the organisation is on the right course. 
Members are relatively powerless as far as the organisation is concerned 
because of the nature of its constitution but they form one crucial function, they 
act as the potential conscience of the organisation (4:7). 
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The relationship with members is an example of a ‘hard’ accountability relationship.  
Members have the formal ability to demand an account of and sanction non-
performing board members.  Board members acknowledged members as important 
stakeholders.  Staff and CEs did not perceive them to be as important.  To staff and 
CEs, members were a useful source of funds and contributed to their organisations’ 
brands.      
6.5 Summary: Internal Accountabilities 
The importance placed on these internal accountabilities was somewhat surprising.  
The literature clearly showed that other researchers dismissed members (6 and 
Taylor, 1994) as important stakeholders.  The importance given to accounting to the 
governing body was mixed (Cornforth, 2003a), and paid staff were not mentioned as 
important stakeholders.    
Macdonald (1999) concludes that there has been little research into the nature of 
these internal relationships and that the internal workings of voluntary organisations 
are a ‘black box’.  Apart from her research on the internal controls (or lack of them) 
in a number of Australian voluntary organisations (Macdonald, 1999), a smattering 
of accounting research articles (Booth, 1997; Flack, 1997; Abraham, 1999; 
Richmond et al., 2003) and an obsession with the relationship between management 
and the board (refer Harris, 2001a), little research has been done on internal 
accountability relationships.   
Most of the perceived relationships described here can be considered ‘hard’.  They 
conform to orthodox thinking about formal hierarchical accountability within 
organisations.  The stereotype of voluntary organisations as being largely 
unstructured is not borne out by the importance placed on these relationships.  
Perhaps this is because of the indirect influence of contracting with government.  
Neo-institutionalists suggest that the governors and management of voluntary 
organisations have had to adapt to, or mimic, the dominant governmental paradigm 
and replicate the bureaucratic form of the government departments that they contract 
with.  Isomorphism, the idea that organisations over time model themselves on other 
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powerful organisations they interact with, is a thesis in good currency (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995; Scott, 1998).  Indeed, Wilson (2001: 30) concludes from 
her literature review that: 
The introduction of contracts in the voluntary sector has initiated the evolution 
of a professional culture within many voluntary organisations in New Zealand 
and in other countries. 
Or it may be large organisations providing complex social services function better 
with structured employment and reporting relationships (Kramer, 1994).  Perhaps 
even the proposed new class of professional voluntary sector managers have been 
influenced by predominantly business and public sector management theory, and 
have introduced such practices (Berman, 1999; Hallock, 2002).   
Whatever the reason, the inner workings of voluntary organisations have proven to 
be influential in the perceptions of accountability relationships recounted in this 
research. 
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Chapter 7  
Accountability to Government  
“The state traditionally speaks with forked tongues” (4:7) 
No respondent considered government as their most important relationship.  Twelve 
out of 34 respondents perceived accountability to government as one of their three 
most important accountability relationships.  In total 16 respondents perceived 
accountability to government as important. 
These 16 respondents were mainly CEs and managers.  This finding would seem to 
be explained by the fact that these positions are usually responsible for the delivery 
of government contracts, negotiating, monitoring and reporting to government.   
Respondents from Case 3 did not consider accountability to government as 
important.  This organisation is self-funded by members on a user-pays basis.  They 
received minimal government funding and did not seek more.  Government was not 
seen to be a priority stakeholder.   
In contrast, respondents from Case 4 saw themselves as most accountable to 
government.  They perceive themselves to be dependent on government funding, and 
the levels of funding they receive are volatile and insufficient to run their services.  
They have a large number of fixed assets (buildings and specific fittings) tied up in 
their service delivery and see themselves locked into a funding relationship with 
government.  The service they deliver is also highly regulated by government and 
they consider that the regulatory compliance needed for them to keep operating 
consumes too much of their resources. 
Respondents from Case 2 also saw themselves as being dependent on government 
funding, but perceived their funding to be stable and adequate.  They are in a 
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monopoly position as no other organisation could provide their services, which are 
politically sensitive.  They perceive that government is unlikely to withdraw their 
funding.  The services they provide are also subject to minimal regulation, and they 
perceive that they will not be called to account for anything more than the limited 
reporting they currently undertake.   
The CE and board of Case 1 introduced policies to ensure they maintained their 
independence from government.  Every service they provide must not accept more 
than 50% government funding.  They perceive themselves accountable to 
government but in a limited and measured way.   
Resource dependency theorists, as outlined in the theoretical framework, predict that 
those organisations who are dependent on a funder will perceive themselves 
accountable to that funder.  Respondents showed some resource dependent 
tendencies.  Those who perceived themselves most reliant on government funding 
prioritised the accountability relationship with government higher than those that did 
not see themselves reliant.   
The relationship between funding and perceptions of accountability is, however, 
more complex than the resource dependency theorists paint.  It was not the 
perception of actual dependence on government funding that correlated with 
perceptions of accountability but rather the perceived stability of the funding, the 
degree to which the organisation perceived itself locked into the dependence on 
government funding, and the degree to which government regulation affected the 
operations of the organisation.   
7.1 Types of Accountability to Government 
Three different types of accountability relationships can be identified:  
• Accountability for funding; 
• Accountability for regulatory compliance; and 
• Accountability to taxpayers.   
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7.1.1 Accounting for Funding 
This was the most common perception of accountability to government and was 
expressed in two slightly different ways.  The first, expressed by seven respondents, 
was a ‘means to an end’ or a ‘funder’ relationship. The organisation receives funds 
from government and perceives itself accountable for spending them appropriately. 
Government is perceived as the funder and the organisation as the recipient of funds. 
Government may be one of many funders.   
The second perception, of six respondents, is a legal expression, or a ‘contractor’ 
relationship.  The organisations thought themselves accountable for the specific 
outputs that they were contracted to deliver.  Government was perceived as the 
purchaser and the organisation as the provider.  The relationship was formal, legal, 
commercial, and professional. 
The organisations reliant on government contracts for resources perceived 
themselves engaged in both ‘contractor’ and ‘funder’ relationships (Cases 2 and 4).  
CEs are most focused on the ‘contractor’ relationship.  This can be linked to their 
lead role in the negotiation and management of contracts, and in reporting to 
government and the board on progress.  Management perceived themselves engaged 
in the ‘funder’ relationship.  While thinking they were accountable to the CE for 
delivery of specific outputs, management took a more service-orientated approach; 
funding was a means to achieve this.   
7.1.2 Regulatory Compliance 
Six respondents conceptualised their accountability to government in terms of 
regulatory compliance.  Respondents from Case 3 thought particularly about this.  
Case 3 received minimal government funding and, while acknowledging its 
importance, found compliance with regulation costly and time consuming.   
This accountability relationship engenders fear.  It was a common theme that 
services (and indeed most activities in the country) were subject to too much 
regulation.  Multiple references were made to a recent court case involving the 
prosecution of a volunteer sports administrator for the death of one of her event’s 
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competitors21.  Respondents feared that they may not comply one day and so be held 
personally liable.   
I can envisage a day when you won’t be able to have cake stalls because the 
food wouldn’t have been prepared in a commercial kitchen (3:3). 
I think it is a sad thing [increasing level of government regulation] in that you 
end up losing a lot of the voluntary sector in your community because they 
can’t afford to comply or don’t have the knowledge to comply and get scared of 
it (3:3). 
Respondents from Cases 1 and 4, while acknowledging the importance of regulation 
that improves the quality of care, were fretful about the perceived increase in the 
demands of regulations.  They noted that no additional government funding was 
provided to enable the higher standards to be met.   
7.1.3 The Aura of Taxpayer Money  
A mystique around spending taxpayers’ money meant two respondents thought they 
had an added sense of accountability to government.  This can be linked to the need 
for the organisation to maintain its reputation and legitimacy. Being seen to spend 
taxpayers’ money wisely was part of this.   
Most respondents, however, perceived money from government as another input or 
payment for services.   
                                                 
21
 Astrid Anderson, the organiser of the 2001 Le Race cycle race in Christchurch, was convicted of 
criminal nuisance following the death of a competitor in the race.  The court case in 2003 had a high 
media profile given the potential ramifications of its outcome for future event organisers.  A number 
of school principals cancelled camps in fear of liability following the decision.  Media attention 
focused on the organisers of the Tauranga, Katikati, Te Puke and Waiora Christmas parades who 
decided to cancel Santa’s lolly scramble fearing criminal liability should any child be hurt by falling 
sweets or the ensuing scramble for them.  The conviction was eventually quashed on appeal in 2004.   
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Government contracts and there is an expectation that you meet your 
contractual arrangements and it is really not more complicated than that but 
once you start getting into the emotional area of ‘you people are spending 
taxpayers dollars’ it is a beautiful excuse for [a government department] again 
to indulge in its exercise of power (4:7). 
Indeed, when perceptions of taxpayer money are compared with perceptions of 
funding from private donors (another important source of funding), donor dollars are 
held in higher regard.   
I am accountable to the man in the street who gives his money and it is really 
our job to make sure that money is used well (1:3). 
This is possibly because donor funds are not tagged to specific outputs, as 
government funding is, and can be used at the organisation’s discretion.  Funds from 
private sources are also more precarious.  How much the public will donate in one 
year, or how much is bequeathed, varies.   
7.2 Focus on Accounting for Funds 
Most of the perceived accountability to government focused on funding – either a 
‘funder’ or ‘contractor’ perception of the relationship.  This can be conceptualised as 
hard accountability.  To reiterate, a hard accountability relationship occurs when one 
party offers a delegation to another who, in turn, accepts it.  The delegator expects a 
report on progress and to impose sanctions should progress not be satisfactory.  
Government delegation to the management and boards of voluntary organisations 
takes the form of a contract or funding agreement.  Management and boards accept 
the delegation or contract and must then be accountable as required by the terms of 
the contract.  They may experience sanctions should they breach the terms.  The 
relationship can be presented diagrammatically as Figure 7.1. 
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Reporting on delegated tasks
 
Figure 7.1: Hard Accountability 
Each element of the relationship (delegation, reporting, sanctions) generated issues 
for respondents.   
7.2.1 Reporting and Sanctions  
The reporting and sanctions aspects of the relationship generated relatively few 
problems.  Generally voluntary organisations acknowledged the right of government 
to know what they were doing and willingly provided the information required.  All 
organisations had systems in place to generate the necessary data.  Indeed, some of 
the information they provided for government was also requested by the governing 
body.  Different government agencies requested different information, but generally 
organisations were able to cut and paste information from one agency template to 
another.  Paper-shuffling was seen as a necessary adjunct to government funding. 
They [government agency] want to see the results [of funding].  It is not too 
onerous.  We have a very good accounting system and we know exactly where 
all the money is being spent so it is not hard to provide it (1:4). 
Respondents thought, however, that some of the information they were asked for was 
meaningless.   
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Statistical things can actually be quite meaningless.  I know that it is a number 
crunching exercise.  I mean I asked one of my workers last week what is the 
difference between a referral and an inquiry and she justifies how she sees it 
when she puts the figures down and the case workers get together so that they 
are unified in how they do things but I don’t think anyone from [a government 
department] has sat down with them and said this is what we mean (2.7). 
They [government department officials] still keep sending us [reporting] 
templates that are not related to the contract at all.  It has things like the number 
of volunteers used in the service – we don’t use volunteers in the service, it 
would be inappropriate – the number of transports of clients, I mean we are not 
transporting clients.  We have told them and told them but they cannot seem to 
change their templates to put in a grid that matches the outputs we have signed 
up in the contract (2.7). 
They also believed that the information they provided was never actually analysed by 
the department.   
I don’t know how much background searching they do once they have got our 
background reports.  I think they tend to accept them as verbatim (2.3). 
The information requirements of departments were also not always clear and tended 
to change quickly, making collection difficult.  
I think we have to be accountable. I have no problem with that but they keep 
changing the rules.  The auditing changes.  Or you all of a sudden have the case 
manager out to audit.  Clarity would be good about how these procedures are 
going to be carried out (4.10). 
I think the criteria they lay down needs to be clear and concise (4.6). 
7.2.2 The Offer and Acceptance of Delegations 
The bulk of the issues raised about their accountability relationship with government 
arose from the delegation aspects of the relationship.  Respondents felt that what they 
were expected to deliver was inappropriate.  The offer (a contract, or funding 
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agreement) was perceived to make poor assumptions about client needs or to be 
poorly designed. 
We recently had a request for proposals for another programme.  We looked at 
it and immediately said it is unachievable.  There is no way an organisation in 
our view could do this.  It said for example that the outcome of the programme 
was that 80 percent of people referred to it had to be placed in full time work.  
We know from our experience of dealing with unemployed people that it is 
unrealistic – it can’t be done and it can’t be done the way they wanted it to be 
done (1.4). 
Contracts were defined narrowly in terms of outputs, which restricted the ability of 
voluntary organisations to focus on the total needs of the clients, or to take an 
outcomes approach.   
Most clients have more than one problem to solve before we can even think 
about moving them onto something better.  They have a drug problem, an 
alcohol problem, they are in financial trouble, they have been abused and its 
affecting their approach to life.  You have to resolve the basic underlying 
personal issues with them before you can expect them to get a positive outcome.  
To come along [the government department] and say we will put these people 
over to you, you run a motivational workshop, a needs assessment and help 
them find a job – its doesn’t always work (1.4).  
The price offered for delivery of the contracts also generated much frustration.  Price 
structures were seen not to differentiate by quality of the service provided.  All 
organisations were paid a standard price for services, so there were few incentives to 
provide a quality service over and above what was specified.  Services were part-
funded, which the respondents believed signalled limited government commitment to 
the ongoing provision of the service.  Government officials were believed to be most 
interested in getting the cheapest price.   
We spent $10 000 setting up a social service centre that was designed to provide 
for those sort of referrals…What [government department] has done 
consistently over the years is to say okay we will buy counselling off you at x 
dollars.  On that basis you hire staff and staff are the worst to move – buildings, 
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if you have to flog a building because you have to fold the thing up you cry a 
little but you do it, but where you are in a situation when you are locked into a 
contract and you don’t get a price adjustment … you constantly see your assets 
or endowments running at a loss.  It puts you in an impossible position (4.7). 
Until this year we were subject to a five-year price freeze.  During the five years 
costs went up 15 percent. And yet we were expected to absorb all that and 
continue to pay our staff competitive rates of pay and continue to be audited for 
quality of care (1.4). 
Respondents felt that officials entered into contract negotiations with a lack of 
understanding of their organisations, their clients and service provision, a lack of 
respect for their expertise in service delivery, arrogance in terms of knowing what 
should be delivered and to whom, and reluctance to listen to the respondents’ advice. 
Get in some policy people that are a higher calibre and actually know what it is 
like to be a provider and actually have some business acumen.  They have no 
idea what things cost, no idea (4.1). 
The negotiation was from a position of arrogance from their end.  Like we were 
the enemy – what are they protecting? (2.6). 
[A government department] officials do not understand NGOs.  It shows in the 
unrealistic demands about what we can and cannot deliver, about our level of 
resourcing (2.2). 
The people in [a government department] need to recognise that our staff are at 
the sharp end and know what works and what doesn’t work for these people.  
Whereas we tend to find that we are presented with a fait accompli (1.4). 
In terms of acceptance of the contract, respondents felt they had little choice. Little 
negotiation occurred.  Officials were perceived to operate on a ‘take it or leave it’ 
basis.   
Shocking, dismal, one sided … They have the power because they have the 
money.  We should be able to say we will do this work for you but in order to 
do it we need an increase on dollars of this amount and this is the justification.  
The Accountability of Voluntary Organisations 135 
 
Any contract I have been involved in should be able to have some negotiation in 
it.  But with government you can’t.  They just say sorry there is no more money 
and that is that (2.3). 
It is not contracting in the true sense because they say this is what they are 
going to pay you (4.6). 
Underlying all the comments was the perception that government officials did not, or 
could not, take the time to understand their business and to see their point of view.  
Respondents perceived that officials were not interested in having an ongoing 
relationship with them.  They consequently did not trust the officials they were 
engaged with.  They questioned officials’ and the government’s integrity and long 
term commitment to the voluntary sector.    
If you hook yourself into government policy – we have done it before – and we 
have ended up being burnt badly (4.1). 
The government wants us to do more in the social services area but three 
quarters of the cost is borne by this organisation so why you think you are 
making a great contribution to the nation you are actually providing reverse 
charity to government (4.5). 
We are very weary of being dictated to. We are happy to give full and frank 
accounts of our service but we want to provide a service the way we want to 
that is best for our clients (1.3). 
Majumdar (2004) drew similar conclusions from research considering the 
experiences of Otago voluntary organisations contracted to the Community Funding 
Agency (CFA)22. He found that respondents were not so much dissatisfied by the 
contracting process as with the way CFA officials managed the process.  In 
                                                 
22
 The Community Funding Agency, the government agency tasked with contracting with voluntary 
organisations for the provision of social services, became part of the Children, Young Persons and 
their Families Service in 1999.   
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particular, respondents reported that they were rarely consulted about policy options 
and programme design, their suggestions for programme enhancements were 
ignored, and officials were reluctant to invest in the long term development of their 
organisations.   
[the respondents from the voluntary organisations] were dissatisfied – not so 
much with the purchase of service contracting per se, as with the way the 
Community Funding Agency had been managing the contracting process.  They 
were unhappy primarily out of the conviction that … they were rarely consulted 
by the Community Funding Agency or permitted by it to be involved in setting 
the policy agenda, determining options, making decisions, and monitoring and 
evaluating outputs and outcomes (Majumdar, 2004: 93). 
7.3 Summary: Accountability to Government 
Accountability to government was perceived as third most important behind 
accountability to clients and internal stakeholders.  It was, however, considered the 
most difficult and obstructive relationship.  Accountability to government was 
perceived as accounting for funds and regulatory compliance.  The relationship was 
generally considered problematic, with most issues generated by the ‘delegation’ or 
contract negotiation aspects.  Reporting on the contract was, in contrast, considered 
relatively straight forward.   
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espondents perceived that they were most accountable to their clients. 
Providing a quality service to clients was the reason for their 
organisation’s existence.  Accountability relationships within the 
organisation were of secondary importance.  There is a strong chain of internal 
command and control as well as a degree of collegial obligation.  Accountability to 
government agencies for funds and compliance with regulation was perceived as 
third most important.  Regulatory compliance was seen as a necessary evil, and 
government funding as an input needed to provide services to clients.   
Chapter 8, the first chapter of this section, explores how these findings compare with 
what the previous research and theory predicted would be uncovered.  Differences 
between predictions and results are explored.  Chapter 9 discusses the implications of 
the findings for the government – voluntary sector relationship, thus addressing the 
secondary aim of this research. Chapter 10 presents the research conclusions.   
R 
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Chapter 8  
Discussion 
 
This chapter discusses the research results in light of the previous research and 
theory outlined in Chapter 3, and offers explanations for unexpected and 
counterintuitive results.   
8.1 What is Accountability?  
Within the literature two types of accountability relationships were identified: hard 
accountability and soft accountability.  The characteristics of each were identified in 
Table 3.1.  The accountability relationships perceived by respondents can be 
classified into each of these.   
8.1.1 Hard Accountability Relationships 
The accountability relationships that were perceived in terms of ‘hard’ accountability 
were: 
• Staff perceiving themselves accountable to management (their superiors); 
• Management perceiving themselves accountable to the board;  
• Staff, management and the board perceiving themselves accountable to the 
organisation’s members; and  
• Staff, management and the board perceiving themselves accountable to the 
government agencies they had funding, contracting or regulatory relationships 
with. 
That these relationships were perceived as hard is somewhat predictable.  
Employment contracts, performance assessment and reporting control the internal 
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relationships.  Legal contracts govern funding relationships with government and 
compliance with regulations is also legally based.  The relationship with members is 
based on the organisations’ constitutions.  All the relationships involved formal 
paper-based reporting, measurable and pre-specified deliverables, and sanctions for 
non-performance.  They conform to the ‘hard’ model of accountability with 
delegation, reporting and sanctions. 
For these relationships, accountability is answerability. It is being called to account 
or being held to account (or what Bovens (1998) terms ‘passive accountability’ or 
Mosher (1968) calls ‘objective responsibility’).  It is accountability defined in terms 
of how the concept originated – audit.  It is the delegation of the authority to act on 
another’s behalf and then, based on an inherent lack of trust that humans can serve 
needs other than their own, requiring a report back (Mulgan, 2003).  Sanctions after 
the fact are the mechanism of control (Bovens, 1998).   
8.1.2 Soft Accountability Relationships 
A number of soft accountability relationships were perceived: 
• Staff, management and board members feeling accountable to their 
organisation’s clients; 
• Management feeling accountable to their staff; and 
• Board members feeling accountable to one another.    
These relationships are not hard because they do not contain all the elements of the 
‘hard’ model of accountability.  They, to take the client example, do not involve a 
direct delegation.  Respondents chose to work on behalf of their clients.      
For these relationships accountability is answerability as well as responsiveness.  All 
respondents felt an obligation to ensure they achieved positive outcomes for their 
clients.  Management felt obliged to their staff to keep them happy and supported.  
Board members felt a sense of collegial obligation to perform and contribute to board 
business.  The relationships are characterised by choice and lack of coercion.  There 
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may be no overt delegation of tasks, no specific performance targets, no formal 
reporting or direct sanctions.    
8.1.3 Soft Accountability Relationships are Prioritised by Respondents 
Respondents generally gave more weight to the soft accountability relationships.  
The overwhelming focus on clients – as a soft relationship – best illustrates this.   
However, previous research and theory would suggest that hard relationships would 
be prioritised.  With hard accountabilities come much needed resources and this is 
presumed to be an organisational priority (Gronbjerg, 1993; Anheier et al., 1997).  
Soft accountability relationships were identified in the literature, but there was a 
definite sense of these being less important than hard relationships.  Indeed some 
authors debate whether an accountability relationship without coercion or control is 
actually accountability (Laughlin, 1990).  While most authors concede that both hard 
and soft forms of accountability are valid (Chew and Greer, 1997; Swift, 2001; 
Kaler, 2002a; Kaler, 2002b; Llewellyn and Lindkvist, 2003), accountability is 
usually assumed to be hard.   
Given the predicted focus on hard accountabilities, the respondents’ focus on soft 
accountabilities was somewhat surprising.  An explanation for this can be found in 
the assumptions made by previous research and theory.  Most voluntary sector 
research hails from North America and focuses on accountability as a mechanism of 
improving the performance of voluntary organisations (refer Gamm, 1996; Cutt and 
Murray, 2000; Hoefer, 2000; Holland, 2002)  Young et al (1996) and Hoefer (2000) 
explicitly state the reason for their research was the number of high profile fraud 
cases within large American voluntary organisations and the need for voluntary 
organisations to prove that they are accountable.  Bogart (1995) also states that 
voluntary organisations need to defend their right to tax exemption.  Increased 
accountability is seen as a remedy for waning trust in voluntary organisations (Cutt 
and Murray, 2000).  Given the definitions of accountability adopted by these 
researchers – accountability as a mechanism of reducing fraud – the presence of soft 
accountability is unlikely to be detected. 
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Due to difficulties developing acceptable non-financial measures, government 
contracting regimes focus on outputs and finances, or hard accountability (Klijn and 
Teisman, 2000; Klingner et al., 2001; van Slyke, 2002).  Given that much funding of 
the voluntary sector comes via government and contracting with government has 
been subject to relatively extensive research (Gronbjerg, 1993; Kramer, 1994; 
Nowland-Foreman, 1997; Campbell, 2002), hard accountability relationships are 
more visible than soft ones.  Accountability in this context is associated with 
finances (Milofsky and Blades, 1991; Blasi, 2002) and external control over outputs 
(Bernstein, 1991; Ebrahim, 2003).   
The key explanatory theories used in much of the research to date (resource 
dependency and stakeholder theory) also implicitly assume hard accountability 
relationships.  Resource dependency theory assumes voluntary organisations want to 
avoid dependence on one funder by seeking multiple funding streams.  Multiple 
funding streams means they cannot be so easily controlled by the accountability 
demands of a single funder (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Accountability is implicitly 
assumed to equate to answerability and control.  Similarly, stakeholder theory 
assumes that voluntary organisations will answer to the most powerful stakeholder 
(Freeman, 1984).  Again, accountability is about control and power asymmetries.   
8.1.4 The Implications of the Focus on Hard Accountability 
Hard accountability relationships implicitly pit the principal and agent against each 
other.  The tension between principal and agent is assumed to be central to the 
relationship.  Agents must account for their actions.  The assumption is that they 
cannot be trusted because their interests will not be congruent with the principals’.  
The accountability relationship, therefore, focuses on controlling the agent. 
Economists have long toiled with the problems of controlling agents. The agent is 
assumed to be self-interested and will operate with guile when able.  The principal 
must then enforce their will.  Agents are made answerable for their actions via 
monitoring, reporting, exact specification of the contracts, sanctions and performance 
incentives.  Accountability aims to limit the discretion of the agent, focus them on 
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what the principal wants them to do and reduce opportunities for them to take 
advantage of the principal (Jenkins and Meckling, 1976; Moschandreas, 1994).   
But the actions of an agent can never be fully controlled by the principal.  
Moschandreas’ (1994) summary of economic research demonstrates how much of 
the research focuses on how to control employees, in particular limiting management 
discretion and addressing information asymmetries.  Her summary also shows that 
performance-based pay and specific job descriptions and clear reporting lines are 
often proposed as solutions to the ‘agency problem’.  The problem, however, 
becomes greater when the principal and agent are members of different 
organisations, geographically and even paradigmatically separated, as is the case of a 
government funding agency and a voluntary organisation contracted to deliver social 
services. 
A level of discretion or judgement can be desirable, especially in the case of the 
delivery of complex social services considered in this research.  A number of 
researchers have concluded that tightly specified performance measures can reduce 
voluntary organisations’ ability to respond to the needs of clients (Miller, 1998; 
Markham et al., 1999; Harris, 2001b; Campbell, 2002).  Dicke’s (2002) and Ospina 
et al’s (2002) studies suggest that while effort is easily measurable, outcomes for 
clients are not.  Performance measures usually focus on output and financial targets 
and become benchmarks with no incentives to achieve above them.  Developing 
performance targets that measure professional or ethical competence is difficult.  As 
such, Dicke (2002) concluded that accountability systems may not protect vulnerable 
citizens from harm.   
Clerkin (2002) suggests that the threat of sanctions will be detrimental to the 
performance of voluntary organisations.  He cites a wide range of research 
suggesting that when organisations operate under the pressure of sanctions, they 
centralise authority and use more formalised and standardised processes.  When this 
occurs, decision-makers within the organisation are left with few sources to generate 
information and they make sub-optimal decisions.  Discretion is removed from the 
The Accountability of Voluntary Organisations 143 
 
front-line workers, thus reducing their ability to respond to their clients’ needs 
(Clerkin, 2002).   
Henderson et al (2003) argue that conceptualising accountability as punishment 
results in missed opportunities for developing the voluntary organisation and 
increasing the quality of the services it provides. 
In-depth reporting by the agent and monitoring by the principal is costly to both 
parties and will never be fully complete.  Even if the goals are clear, it may be 
impossible to scientifically measure whether they have been achieved (Blasi, 2002).  
Dicke’s (2002) empirical study found respondents in American voluntary 
organisations falsified the information they gave to government agencies.  Officials 
visited the organisation infrequently so were unable to verify the information.  
Evaluations of performance were snapshot decisions made by officials with heavy 
caseloads, usually in the absence of baseline information to decide whether 
improvements had been made (Dicke, 2002).  Brown and Moore (2001) and Ebrahim 
(2003) both conclude that voluntary organisations have multiple principals and 
accountabilities and conflicts.  For Ebrahim (2003), the conflicting pressures placed 
on voluntary organisations from different principals leads them to develop coping 
mechanisms such as producing rhetoric in their reporting.  
From the respondents’ perspective in this research, these problems were present in 
their relationship with government.  Contract specifications were perceived to reduce 
their ability to service all their clients’ needs, regulatory compliance became more of 
a focus at the expense of measuring service quality, performance measures did not 
capture the essence of the service provided, and reporting was seen as a superficial 
exercise.   
In sum, from the perspective of the voluntary sector respondents, the mechanisms of 
hard accountability are not satisfactory and soft accountability relationships are 
actually of more importance.   
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8.2 To Whom do they think they are Accountable? 
Stakeholder theory predicts that respondents will feel accountable to stakeholders 
who have power over the organisation, an urgent and legitimate demand for an 
account (Mitchell et al., 1997; Agle et al., 1999).  Previous research showed that the 
powerful, legitimate stakeholders with urgent demands were government agencies 
that provided funds and contracts, large donors, the organisation’s volunteers, and 
voluntary organisations working in similar areas with similar missions.  Based on 
previous research, stakeholders could be classified as in Table 8.1: 
Important accountability 
relationships 
Acknowledged but Less 
Important Accountabilities 
Potential or unclear status  
Government agencies Members Professional bodies 
Volunteers Clients Paid Staff 
Large donors Local Communities Governing Board 
Peer organisations Small donors  
Table 8.1: Important and Less Important Stakeholders: The Predictions of the 
Literature 
This research, however, found some stakeholders were accorded different priorities: 
Priority stakeholders Acknowledged but Unimportant stakeholders  
Clients Donors – individual 
Paid Staff Donors – trusts 
Board Local Communities 
Members Peer organisations  
Government agencies  
Table 8.2: Important and Less Important Stakeholders: The Research Findings 
Several differences exist.  Clients were prioritised by respondents but not in the 
previous research.  Funders, government agencies and philanthropic trusts, who were 
key sources of funding, were not given as much priority as was expected.  Indeed, 
government agencies were considered by respondents as only the third most 
important stakeholder.  Members were prioritised by respondents when they were 
dismissed by previous research as ‘paper armies’.  Paid staff were also considered 
important by respondents but not so in previous research.  Peer organisations were 
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not considered important by respondents when previous research identified them as 
key allies. 
Such counterintuitive differences invite explanation as follows.    
8.2.1 Pipers not Paid 
Perhaps the most surprising finding of this research was the lack of importance 
respondents placed on being accountable to funders.  Instead of prioritising 
accountability to their funders, respondents felt themselves most accountable to their 
organisation’s mission.  The mission is why their organisations, and their jobs, exist.  
This translated into serving clients – positive outcomes for clients being the basis of 
the organisations’ missions.  Tandon (1995) found a similar focus on organisation 
missions in his work with non-government organisations (NGOs).  Ebrahim (2003) 
concluded that the client focus, as embodied in a mission statement, encourages an 
internal, ethical (soft) dimension to accountability. 
For nonprofit organisations, mission statements play an important role in 
providing a focal point around which to develop internal accountability since it 
is the mission that provides ‘a verbal link between the presumably deeply held 
principles and the conduct of those representing the nonprofit’ … In this sense, 
missions add an ethical or value-based dimension to accountability since they 
emphasise the internal motivations of actors rather than the external pressures 
exerted by principals (Ebrahim, 2003: 199). 
For management and board members, the focus on achieving the organisation’s 
mission – making a positive difference for the organisation’s clients – translates into 
a soft accountability relationship towards staff.  Board members and management 
feel obligated to staff to ensure they are happy and supported.  Happy staff perform 
and so work hard to deliver the organisation’s mission.  Happy members also 
promote a positive image for the organisation.  Unhappy members provide a 
potential source of disquiet that could damage an organisation’s reputation.  A 
number of respondents specifically mentioned the potential negative power of a 
disaffected membership as the reason why they prioritised accountability to this 
stakeholder.  The focus on mission, staff and members all points to the importance 
The Accountability of Voluntary Organisations 146 
 
respondents placed on the reputation of their organisation.  Being seen to make a 
positive difference to clients matters to the respondents.  Happy staff ensure this 
happens and happy members are crucial to maintaining a positive reputation.   
But why the focus on reputation?  Kearns (1996) and Young (2002) provide an 
explanation.  They independently argue that voluntary organisations are ultimately 
accountable for ‘doing good’.  In serving clients, the organisations are being seen to 
make a positive contribution to society.  This then entitles them to support – 
importantly, funding –  to ensure they keep up the good work.  A current stream of 
voluntary sector research considers the importance of organisations being trusted.  
The findings are the same and a number of researchers have drawn similar 
conclusions: organisations that are trusted or held in high regard are those that 
receive funding (refer Herzlinger, 1996; Tonkiss and Passey, 1999; Carson, 2002; 
Sargeant and Lee, 2002; Bekkers, 2003).  
Perceptions of accountability were not, therefore, driven directly by resource 
concerns.  Being seen to be ‘doing good’ ultimately ensures funding.  Perceived 
accountability relationships then align to the aim of being seen to do good: to clients 
for providing a good service; to staff so that they provide a good service; and to 
members so they reinforce the reputation.   
This alignment of accountability relationships around a common purpose of 
delivering positive outcomes for clients is somewhat counterintuitive.  Rochester 
(1995) clearly identifies what should be fundamental tensions within voluntary 
organisations.  Management and staff are said to be caught between the authority 
vested in elected officers (such as boards) and bureaucracies within management 
hierarchies, and between the demands of current members and potential needs of 
future ones.  Such tensions were not documented in this research.  The drive to serve 
clients seemed to ensure all respondents’ efforts were pointed in a similar direction. 
Stakeholder theory has not been useful in explaining the staff of voluntary 
organisations’ perceptions of accountability.  Perceived accountability to clients runs 
counter to its predictions.  At face value, clients have little or no power over the 
organisations, they have no urgent demands, and some would argue that they have no 
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legitimate claim over the organisation as they are receiving charity.  They often have 
no choice in who provides the service, and no leverage because they receive the 
service for free.   
Stakeholder theory was developed in a business context where rowdy shareholders 
are assumed to exercise their ability to sack the board.  They are assumed to be 
powerful stakeholders23.  The relationship between stakeholders and power in the 
present context is, however, more nuanced.  Clients do not have direct power over 
the voluntary organisation.  But through serving them, the organisation is able to 
generate a positive reputation, demonstrate its worth and so attract resources.  As 
mentioned in the previous section, the main shortcoming of stakeholder theory in this 
context is its assumptions of hard accountability, in particular direct action and 
sanctions.    
8.2.2 An Unexpected Focus on Internal Stakeholders  
All the stakeholders considered important in the previous research were external to 
organisation.  They were not within the organisational or constitutional boundaries of 
the organisation.  Respondents in the present research, however, reported staff, 
members and the board as important.  The focus on organisation mission and the 
associated importance of staff, members and the board in contributing to this 
explains why these internal accountabilities were perceived to be important.   
There is an assumption in much voluntary sector research that the organisations are 
‘black boxes’.  So accountability within voluntary organisations has been given 
minimal research attention, apart from a ground-breaking study on internal controls 
(Macdonald, 1999), some consideration of  accounting practices and the potential for 
introducing ‘triple bottom line’ or ‘social accounting’ mechanisms (Macdonald, 
1999; Brown and Moore, 2001; Gallagher and Radcliffe, 2002; Duncan and Stocks, 
2003; Keating and Frumkin, 2003) and a fixation on the relative accountabilities of 
                                                 
23
 Whether private sector shareholders actually do, and are able, to exercise their power is, however, 
widely questioned (see (Owen et al., 2001) 
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board members and management (Alexander et al., 1993; Golensky, 1993; 
Bradshaw, 2002; Hallock, 2002; Moore, 2002).  Indeed, other researchers have noted 
the lack of research on what happens within a voluntary organisation, particularly in 
regard to staff, as the vast amount of management and organisation theory that deals 
with employee performance may not be relevant to voluntary sector organisations.  
The motivation of voluntary sector employees may differ from their private and 
public sector counterparts whose activities have provided the basis for this theory 
(Vigoda, 2001; Keating and Frumkin, 2003).   
The research here challenges the implicit assumption that what happens within 
voluntary organisations is not important.  Above all, it shows that internal 
stakeholders are perceived to be of key importance in achieving the organisation’s 
mission, and ultimately ensuring organisational survival.   
8.2.3 Peer Organisations and Volunteers were not Considered Important by 
Respondents 
Previous research highlighted the importance placed on the organisations’ volunteers 
(Clary et al., 1992; Leat, 1996). Leat (1996) argues that volunteers are within the 
‘inner core’ of the voluntary organisations’ accountability relationships. They are 
central and considered important to the functioning of the organisation.  The 
importance of accounting to peer organisations (the voluntary organisations they 
work alongside) was also noted as important (Kumar, 1997; Markham et al., 1999; 
Ospina et al., 2002).  In Kumar’s (1997) research, for example, the voluntary sector 
managers studied considered accountability to peer organisations as one of their top 
five accountability relationships.  She identified ‘network’ accountability, the web of 
accountabilities to peer organisations managers perceived as important, as a key 
feature of voluntary sector accountability. 
Neither of these stakeholders were considered important by respondents in the 
current research.  While respondents acknowledged the importance of volunteers as 
the backbone of the voluntary sector, they were not considered vital to the 
organisations that employed professionals to deliver their services.  It was considered 
difficult to make volunteers accountable for their actions.   
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Respondents noted a trend towards the decreasing importance of volunteers, because 
of the perceived need to provide high quality, and therefore professional, services.  
Volunteers were generally unqualified to work with clients.  This trend is noted 
internationally (Davis Smith, 1995; Lewis, 1996; Taylor, 1996a; Russell and Scott, 
1997; Berman, 1999; Locke et al., 2001) and in New Zealand (Suggate, 1995; 
Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party, 2001).  It is linked to the 
increasing amount of contractual work voluntary organisations are undertaking 
(Taylor, 1996a; Locke et al., 2001).   
An increase in government contracting can also be seen as the reason why peer 
organisations are not considered important.  Chetkovich and Frumkin (2003) 
identified increasing competition amongst voluntary organisations.  Recent research 
has shown that competition over tenders for government contracts has reduced 
collegiality among organisations (Miller, 1998; Backman and Smith, 2000; Mulroy, 
2003).  For example, in Miller’s (1998: 411) words: 
[as a result of government funding] agencies failed to build up a very extensive 
system of either local or national networks and therefore had an undeveloped 
sense of belonging to a sector with some collective as well as individual 
purposes.  Rather, they appear to have functioned more as individual private 
organisations….As one respondent stated, “a level of fear, insecurity and 
competition is now very ascendant…very destructive”…Others acknowledged 
there had been a divisive consequence of funding of a variety of groups each 
claiming their uniqueness and that growing economic inequality has been 
neglected.  One Ontario funder felt that the sector was unprepared and lacked 
the capacity or know how to collaborate. 
Evidence points to this occurring in New Zealand.  Respondents considered that it 
was important to promote their ‘brand’ and raise their organisation’s profile above 
others.  Several respondents, when discussing their organisation’s strategic plans, 
were keen to point out that such information was to be treated as commercially 
sensitive.  The Report of the Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party (2001) 
noted that voluntary organisations eager to secure contracts would happily undercut 
rivals.  Competition for skilled volunteers, funding from donors and for government 
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contracts, was a central part of respondents’ day-to-day reality.  This reality is not 
conducive to inter-organisational collaboration.   
8.2.4 Summary: To Whom do They Think They are Accountable?  
So what does all this mean?  Accountability to clients was given the highest priority.  
In doing so, respondents are ensuring their organisation is seen as worthy of support.  
Internal accountabilities are given second priority.  These reinforce the focus on 
clients, with staff, management, board and members all focused on providing a 
quality service.   
While these findings conform to the stereotype of voluntary organisations run by 
passionate types (Buckmaster, 1999), they also show that respondents feel 
responsible for achieving positive outcomes for clients (soft accountability), and are 
also externally monitored for doing so (hard accountability relationships with 
members and government funding agencies).   
8.3 For What Do They Think They Are Accountable?  
From the voluntary sector and accountability research literatures, it was expected that 
respondents would think themselves accountable for a ‘ladder’ of things: proper use 
of money (fiscal), following correct procedures (process), quality of their work 
(programme or outputs) and appropriateness or relevance of work (outcomes) 
(Stewart, 1984; Leat, 1988).  A number of researchers have suggested that fiscal and 
process issues would be given more weight than quality or outcomes, because 
outcomes were more difficult to measure and funders usually only demanded 
information on outputs (Milofsky and Blades, 1991; Fry, 1995; Tandon, 1995; 
Kumar, 1997; Cutt and Murray, 2000; Hoefer, 2000; Campbell, 2002).   
The respondents in this reasearch, however, thought themselves primarily 
accountable for achieving their organisation’s mission – providing quality care for 
their clients.  Young (2002) would find this heartening.  He argues that they should 
be ultimately accountability for achieving their missions and that: 
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the viability of non profit institutions in the long run rides on addressing their 
ability to be accountable to themselves (Young, 2002: 18). 
Similarly, Kearns (1996) argues that a ladder approach to accountability traps 
voluntary organisations into a narrow operational and management frame.   
Respondents here felt that their focus on achieving their mission was undermined by 
contracting with government.  Narrow performance measures and the piecemeal 
nature of programmes meant it was difficult to address the underlying needs of 
clients and so achieve positive outcomes.  The Report of the Community and 
Voluntary Sector Working Party (2001) drew similar conclusions.  Voluntary 
organisations have an interest in services that aim to maximise the well-being of 
clients.  The needs of all family members may need to be addressed in order to 
achieve positive outcomes for one.  However, Government funding pools and 
contracts distinguish between social, economic and cultural elements.  The piecemeal 
approach to funding leads to a ‘spare parts’ approach to service delivery, with 
separate agencies each entering into specific arrangements to provide the 
wheels, the brakes, the interior furnishings etc but no one taking responsibility 
for the engine or the whole vehicle (Community and Voluntary Sector Working 
Party, 2001: 94). 
Respondents’ focus on their mission is, however, aligned to the current public 
service attempts to move to an outcomes focus (Advisory Group on the Review of 
the Centre, 2001).  Respondents arguably are focused on outcomes yet, the actual 
mechanics of the contracting process constitute barriers to voluntary organisations’ 
desired operations and, ironically, to those of government.   
Nevertheless, it should be strongly noted that while respondents perceived 
themselves to be accountable for achieving their organisational mission, they are not 
actually attempting to gauge how well they are doing.  Measuring organisation 
performance – particularly in terms of social service provision – is difficult.  Only 
one organisation has made an attempt to do so, while the others show little interest.  
Much work will need to be done if effectiveness is to be measured, so that 
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respondents can be held accountable for their success and failure in achieving their 
organisations’ stated missions.   
8.4 Why Do They Think They Are Accountable?  
Organisation theory attempts to explain why organisations behave in certain ways.  
Resource dependency theory predicts that organisations will be accountable in order 
to secure resources.  They will seek to answer to a variety of funders so as to reduce 
dependency and the potential to be controlled by a single funder (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978).  Neo-institutional theory predicts that organisations will answer to 
powerful stakeholders or ‘institutions’ – adopting the norms and structures of the 
institutions and complying with their laws and rules – in order to secure their status 
as a legitimate organisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995; Scott, 1998).   
These two theories are complementary and it was expected that both reasons, to 
secure resources and legitimacy, would be the basis of respondents’ perceptions of 
accountability.   
The respondents, however, did not give resource-based rationales for their 
perceptions of accountability.  Accountability to government for funds received was 
mentioned, though the emphasis was placed on the funds as a means to providing 
services, or as an organisational input.  Rather, the focus was on providing quality 
services for clients and retaining the good staff needed to provide the services.  Staff 
and clients do not directly attract resources.   
As already established in the previous sections, accountabilities to staff and clients 
are related to ensuring the organisation maintains a good reputation.  A good 
reputation is a necessary ingredient for attracting the funding needed for the 
organisation to survive.  The blunt link between key stakeholders and resources 
predicted by resource dependency theorists is not apparent here.  The link is instead 
indirect, with the organisation’s reputation providing the crucial connection.   
The neo-institutional theorists would have expected this.  For them, organisational 
survival is dependent not only on the flow of resources into the organisation but on 
perceived legitimacy of the organisation.  Legitimate organisations are those that 
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conform to the expectations of their environment (Scott, 1998).  Conformity is said 
to occur at many levels, from legal dimensions (such as compliance with government 
regulation) to normative dimensions (such as being seen to uphold Christian values, 
for example) (Selznick, 1996; Scott, 1998).  Being seen to provide a quality service 
to clients – complying with laws, acting in ways that are considered appropriate, 
being seen to hold values that are expected of voluntary organisations (such as 
prudence, altruism, charity, servitude) – all generate much needed organisational 
legitimacy.   
Neo-institutionalism highlights the unwritten expectations of voluntary 
organisations.  For instance, the unspecified standards of care expected of 
organisations that provide social services, especially those that receive government 
funding to do so.  Compliance with building codes and health and safety legislation 
may be all that is officially required of the organisation, but other unspoken 
expectations, such as maintaining a caring and compassionate attitude towards 
clients, are compelling.  Breaking the norms and obligations that are implicitly 
expected can result in a loss of legitimacy and inconsequential sanctions, such as the 
withdrawal of funding.   
Recent public controversy over some American voluntary sector managers’ salaries, 
as detailed by Kearns (2001), provides an example of the consequences of breaking 
an implicit norm.  Salary bands are set at the discretion of the organisation but when 
the salaries paid to the managers of a voluntary organisation were disclosed to the 
public, a furore resulted.  The salaries paid were perceived by funders as excessive 
and, thus, the organisation broke an implicit funder expectation that voluntary sector 
managers would receive modest salaries.  This must be linked to an implicit 
expectation that donated or granted funds be used for services not for paying 
managers (regardless of the skills of the managers or market salary levels). Breaking 
this norm resulted in harsh sanctions for the organisations, with funders withdrawing 
their support (Kearns, 2001).   
Maintaining legitimacy by conforming to significant written and unwritten social 
expectations is the basis of respondents’ perceptions of accountability.  Funders 
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expect them to be providing a quality service, and to be operating in a manner that is 
acceptable.  Acceptability is defined in both formal terms (compliance with laws, 
regulations and contract specifications) and informal terms (such as being seen to do 
a good job by using resources prudently).  By prioritising service to clients and the 
staff that deliver services, voluntary organisations are securing the means to be seen 
as legitimate, and thus, continue to attract the resources they need to operate.   
8.5 Predictions vs Findings: A Summary 
Based on previous research and theory, a model of the predicted perceptions of 
accountability was presented in Chapter Three.  In light of the research findings and 
analysis, this model needs to be revisited. 
It was predicted that voluntary organisations will behave as such:   
Voluntary
Organisations
Stakeholders
Prioritised by perceptions 
of power, urgency 
and legitimacy
Accountability demanded for use of 
resources
Organisations seek to secure 
resources (proactive)
‘Hard’ Accountability Relationships
‘Soft’ Accountability Relationships
Conform to stakeholder demands 
(reactive)
Secure organisation legitimacy
 
Figure 8.1: Theoretical Framework 
A number of important departures from these predictions were recorded: 
• The voluntary organisation circle was not as empty.  A number of perceived 
important accountability relationships existed within the organisation, including 
formal accountabilities based on the organisation’s hierarchy and collegial 
responsibility between board members; 
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• While the external hard accountability relationships identified did relate to 
securing resources (i.e. the perceived relationship with government), internal 
hard accountability relationships were identified as well (employee 
accountability to employers); 
• Both hard and soft accountability relationships were identified.  However, the 
soft relationships were more prominent.  Securing organisational legitimacy was 
seen as more important than directly courting funders; and  
• Stakeholders were not prioritised by the level of power, urgency and legitimate 
claims they made on respondents.  They were prioritised instead by their 
perceived ability to secure the legitimacy of the organisation.   
Redrawn to accommodate these variations, the perceived accountabilities of 
respondents can be depicted as in Figure 8.2. 
Volunteer 
organisations
Stakeholders
Prioritised by legitimacy 
brought to the 
organisation
‘Hard’ Accountability
‘Soft’ Accountability
Manage-
mentStaff
Board members
 
Figure 8.2: The Framework Revised in light of Research Findings 
In sum, responsibility to clients was perceived as most important.  This is because 
serving clients generates the legitimacy the organisation needs to attract resources 
and support.  Other accountability relationships perceived to be important reinforce 
the focus on clients.  Chains of accountabilities inside the organisation ensure that 
the organisation is focused on serving its clients, achieving its mission and securing 
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legitimate status.  Funding, and accounting to funders, was perceived as input needed 
to sustain service delivery.   
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Chapter 9  
Implications for Government: The 
Relevance of Stewardship Theory 
 
Most respondents were focussed on clients, outcomes and quality.  They generally 
identified their relationship with government as a hindrance rather than an aid.  
Contracting and funding agreements with government agencies were seen to be 
driving down standards of care.  Poorly designed programmes, irrelevant measures, 
and a piecemeal approach to service provision were seen to detract from the quality 
of the service respondents could provide to their clients. 
The problems with government contracting and funding arrangements have been 
well documented internationally, so this finding was not unexpected.  Cordes et al  
(2001), for example, document ‘mission drift’ as a consequence of American 
voluntary organisations seeking to attract government funding. They state that (2001: 
95): 
Human service nonprofits may diversify or redefine organisational missions, 
move into service areas that have greater resources or more stable sources of 
funding and embrace marketing strategies to attract new clients.  
From the Canadian context, Miller (1998) found that in order to manage the 
government contracting process, voluntary organisations had appointed professional 
managers and sought to recruit experienced business people on to their governance 
board.  Respondents from Miller’s study commented that, as a consequence, those 
running voluntary organisations were often out-of-touch with clients and their needs 
and were focussed on delivering the programmes they received government funding 
for at the expense of achieving positive outcomes for clients.   
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Harris (2001b), commenting on UK government funding of the voluntary sector, 
identifies the challenge contracting poses to voluntary organisations to maintain their 
organisational autonomy in the face of government attempts to develop closer 
‘partnerships’ and control more aspects of voluntary organisation management and 
governance.  Taylor (1999), also studying the UK voluntary sector, considers the 
impact of government contracting on voluntary organisations’ ability to advocate and 
be politically active.  While she concludes that levels of political advocacy may not 
have been greatly reduced in organisations receiving government funding, this poses 
an ongoing risk.  Given the role she considers voluntary organisations play in 
representing the voices of the clients they serve in the political arena, this is an area 
she considers need to be monitored carefully.  
The Report of the Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party (2001) detailed 
similar problems in New Zealand, including the ‘professionalisation’ of community-
based voluntary organisations so that they could win and manage contracts and the 
resulting reduced ability to tap into their ‘community passions’ and community 
knowledge (2001: 91).  Advocacy was also raised as an issue needing further 
exploration (2001: 158).   
Given that voluntary organisations deliver over $650 million of social services for 
the government24, their role in achieving positive outcomes for the people receiving 
them is substantial.  This chapter discusses the implications of the research findings 
for the government–voluntary sector relationship.   
9.1 Self-Serving Agents Operating with Guile 
Respondents’ perceptions of how they were viewed and treated by government 
officials were uniform.  Respondents felt that officials treated them as the ‘poor 
                                                 
24
 It was estimated that in 1998 the New Zealand government purchased over $650 million worth of 
social services from voluntary organisations.  This was considered a modest estimate as the analysis 
only included 14 departments (Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party, 2001).  
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cousins’.  They perceived that their skills were not recognised, their ideas and 
suggestions not valued nor their concerns considered valid.   
When their perceptions are analysed using agency theory with its principal–agent 
assumptions as a frame, it becomes clear that respondents perceive that they are 
being treated as agents and officials are operating as principals. 
Specifically respondents perceived that: 
• They were viewed as inferior and officials saw themselves as the experts.  There 
was no negotiation or dialogue about the contents of the contract or funding 
agreement.  Agency theory assumes the principal has a superior position in 
regard to the agent and will work to maintain the power imbalance.  Indeed, 
principals enact mechanisms to control agents (such as financial incentives and 
monitoring regimes) and ensure power asymmetries; 
• Respondents perceived that officials expected them to try to defraud the system 
or produce poor quality work.  The integrity and expertise of the respondents 
was not recognised.  One of the key tenets of agency theory is that agents are 
assumed to have different interests from the principal and to chose to work to 
better themselves at the principal’s expense; 
• The main form of communication between respondents and officials was 
monitoring reports.  The relationship was distant and paper-based. Agency 
theory promotes external monitoring as a mechanism to control agents; 
• Reporting focused on specific outputs that were often irrelevant to service quality 
or organisational performance.  Detailed and pre-specification of contracts is 
another tool agency theorists promote to control agents; and 
• Contracting was an economic transaction with the goal of maximising efficiency.  
Respondents perceived that officials took a ‘take it or leave it’ approach focused 
on competition between providers and driving down the price of service 
delivery.  Agency theory evolved from a predominantly economic perspective.  
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It is not surprising that respondents’ perceptions of how they are treated by officials 
are strongly influenced by agency theory.  Agency theory was central to the 
restructuring of the New Zealand public service in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(Boston et al., 1996; Shaw, 1999).  In particular a chain of principals and agents from 
ministers to chief executives to management and front-line staff was often referred to 
(Anderson and Dovey, 2003).  These relationships were regulated by contracts based 
on performance, the most important being the contract (termed performance 
agreement) between minister and chief executive (Boston et al., 1996).   
The Treasury, as the power house of the restructuring, applied agency theory to the 
government’s relationship with voluntary organisations.  Briefings written towards 
the end of the restructuring period showed Treasury officials were particularly 
concerned that those receiving public services delivered by voluntary organisations 
could not tell if they were receiving a quality service or not (The Treasury, 1995).  
‘Consumerism’, the power of the client to choose the provider delivering the best 
quality service and so identify poorly performing providers was not, therefore, a 
useful mechanism to control agents.  Government instead, it was concluded, needed 
to be vigilant about regulating and monitoring voluntary organisations’ delivery to 
reduce information asymmetries and ensure voluntary organisations were not 
shirking.  The development of contracting policies and practices was based on such 
assumptions (The Treasury, 1995).   
9.1.1 Agency Theory and Public Administration 
Agency theory has been widely used by public administration researchers.  In recent 
years, its ability to explain relationships in this context has been increasingly 
challenged (Waterman and Meier, 1998; Dicke, 2002).  Emerging insights from 
psychologists and sociologists showing that not all employees are motivated by 
personal gain have been central to these critiques (Block, 1996; Davis et al., 1997; 
Altman-Sauer et al., 2001; Dicke, 2002; Whitaker et al., 2002). The assumptions 
made by agency theorists that individuals are self-serving have, therefore, been 
subject to widespread criticism.  Davis et al (1997: 23) summarise: 
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Jensen and Meckling (1994) criticised this model of man as being a 
simplification for mathematical modelling and an unrealistic description of 
human behaviour.  Doucouliagos (1994) argued that labelling all motivation as 
self serving does not explain the complexity of human action.  Frank (1994) 
suggested that this model of man does not suit the demands of a social 
existence.  Hirsch, Michaels and Friedman (1987) said that in exchange for 
simplicity and elegance in their models, economists engage in a somewhat 
broad brush approach that may reduce empirical verisimilitude and engender 
less than robust policies.  In short, agency theory assumptions limits its 
generalisability.   
Researchers have shown that other assumptions made by agency theory are similarly 
inappropriate for the public sector context.  Agency theory assumes a simple model 
of one agent, one principal, conflicting goals, and easily specified and measured 
outcomes.  The limitations of such assumptions are well recognised by many agency 
theorists, several of whom have attempted to develop expanded models (Eisenhardt, 
1989a).  But at the core of the theory are assumptions about individuals and the pre-
requisites needed for a contractual relationship.   
Government officials and voluntary sector providers have multiple principals and 
multiple sources of rewards and sanctions (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  The dyadic 
relationship assumed between one principal and one agent ignores the organisational 
and environmental variables that shape the relationship. According to Waterman and 
Meier (1998: 180): 
Although the model is built around voluntary transactions, it does have a 
normative element in that principals are supposed to control agents.  With the 
introduction of multiple principals – many if not all with claims of political 
legitimacy – the principal–agent model offers no clear resolution about which 
principals should be responded to and which should be ignored.   
Social service contracts are complicated by issues of programmability: the degree to 
which appropriate behaviour by the agent can be specified in advance, and the 
measurability of outcomes.  Social service outcomes can take a long time to emerge, 
joint effort may be required to achieve them, and it can be difficult to measure 
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progress (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  The nature of social service contracting poses 
challenges to the prerequisites needed by agency theory, that is, measurable 
outcomes (so that the principal can sanction the agent for poor performance), and the 
ability to specify what the principal’s wishes are at the beginning of the contract.   
Further, agents providing public services need to exercise a degree of discretion.  
Principals (managers) cannot oversee all the actions of their staff.  Gregory (2003: 
560) summarises: 
If accountability is to be secured through the upward flow of information 
through organisational hierarchies it is often very difficult, sometimes 
impossible, for superiors (principals) to be certain about the truthfulness of the 
accounts given by subordinates (agents), especially when supervision is not 
immediate and direct and answerability is exercised after the event.  For 
example, police officers on duty in patrol cars necessarily exercise discretion in 
how they spend their time on the job.  They often cannot be directly monitored 
by their superiors, who must rely on ex-post accounts given by the officers of 
what they have been doing. 
Agency theory focuses on specification and monitoring of contracts as a means by 
which principals can control agents (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  Considine (2002) argues 
that this leads to social service ‘Taylorism’ and the loss of strategic leadership by 
principals.  Instead of focusing on strategic goals, principals are encouraged to 
micromanage in order to control their agents (Considine, 2002). 
Further, agency theory assumes a static relationship.  Research has shown that the 
nature of a principal and agents’ relationship may change and evolve over time.  As 
parties learn more about each other, the need for monitoring may be reduced 
(Waterman and Meier, 1998; Angwin et al., 2004).   
Arthurs and Busentiz (2003) also argue that many of the agency problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard should be addressed by the principal before they enter 
into a contract.  Government officials should learn whether a voluntary organisation 
is capable of delivering on a contract before the contract is signed. Such due 
diligence, they argue, is often not completed (Arthurs and Busentiz, 2003).   
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9.1.2 Agency Theory and Respondents’ Perceptions  
The findings from this research also challenge the applicability of agency theory to 
voluntary organisations contracting with government agencies. Agency theory 
predicts that respondents will have different aims from their government funders (the 
principals), will operate opportunistically and with guile to achieve their own aims, 
and will shirk as much as possible.   
However, respondents had similar high level goals to officials – that is, positive 
outcomes for clients – they were focused on providing a quality service, not on 
cutting corners, and they perceived themselves to be going the extra mile at their own 
expense.  They saw themselves working for clients in the face of barriers created by 
the contracting process.  They also instigated internal accountabilities (accountability 
to staff and members and within the board) to reinforce their perceived 
accountability to clients, as well as feeling personally responsible for doing so.   
Rather than shirking by attempting to produce less services than required, as agency 
theory predicted they would do, respondents were actively fund-raising to increase 
levels of service provision.  Also rather than shirking by producing services of lesser 
quality than required, as agency theory also predicts they would do, respondents 
adopted government quality measures as their own quality standards.   
Respondents had similar goals to government officials.  They wanted to provide a 
quality service to clients and achieve positive outcomes for them.  The assumed goal 
conflict was not apparent.  The assumed shirking resulting from divergent goals was 
similarly not detected.    
Rasmussen et al’s (2003) study of Canadian voluntary organisations drew similar 
conclusions.  They found predictable disquiet from voluntary organisations towards 
government officials’ behaviour.  Voluntary sector managers thought services were 
being ‘off loaded’ to them and that their government funding was unnecessarily 
unstable and ad hoc.  Government officials were aware of these frustrations but felt 
driven by concern for using taxpayer money most effectively.  But there was a 
degree of consensus about the importance of improving the relationship:  
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By and large there appears to be an awareness that it is still early in the 
emerging government / non-profit relationship and that there is much room for 
creativity and innovation in the partnerships with community and non profit 
organisations.  There is clearly awareness on the part of government managers 
that better ways should be found to make partnership agreements less 
cumbersome so that clients are indeed better served (Rasmussen et al., 2003: 
89). 
As well as mutual recognition of the importance of their relationship, when the 
respective attitudes to clients were analysed, both voluntary sector managers and 
government officials showed a client focus.  Differences arose in how best to achieve 
positive outcomes for clients. Government officials emphasised rules and procedures 
to assure quality service provision to all clients.  Voluntary sector managers were not 
concerned with rules but rather focused on needs of individual clients (Rasmussen et 
al., 2003).  These findings show that government officials and voluntary sector 
managers, while holding different views on the best way to serve clients, both had 
the same end goals.   
Agency theorists have similarly come to accept that the assumption of goal conflict 
will not always be valid.  Eisenhardt (1989) concedes that goal alignment may occur 
in highly socialised or clan-orientated firms, or in situations where self-interest gives 
way to selfless behaviour.  As goal conflict decreases so does the need for in-depth 
monitoring.  Agents will behave as the principal would like regardless of whether 
their behaviour is monitored.  In such situations agency theory may not be relevant. 
Agency theory is most relevant in situations which contracting problems are 
difficult.  These include situations in which there is … substantial goal conflict 
between principals and agents such that agent opportunism is likely … 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a: 71). 
Indeed, Arthurs and Busentiz (2003) state that researchers must provide a theoretical 
rationale for why goals between the two have diverged before applying agency 
theory to explain behaviours (in the present research no such rationale seemed to 
exist).  They argue that the normative assumptions of goal conflict have been blindly 
assumed and applied in the literature.  These assumptions, however, may not be 
The Accountability of Voluntary Organisations 165 
 
significant in some contexts.  Agency theory will not be applicable to all situations, 
or may only be applicable at certain times.  Waterman and Meier (1998) conclude 
that goal conflict should be treated as a variable in a relationship, not as a constant.   
9.1.3 If the Assumptions are Invalid, are the Mechanisms of Accountability Promoted 
by Agency Theory also Invalid?  
Agency theory promotes external monitoring and reporting as a key mechanism to 
control agents and align agents’ actions to their principal’s goals.  Given that the 
present research shows the tenuous status of the assumptions that respondents will 
have different aims to officials and will work with malice to achieve their own 
means, the implications for the mechanisms of accountability that govern the 
government–voluntary sector relationship must be considered. 
Respondents reported that they found reporting to officials a somewhat meaningless 
task.  While happy to provide the information requested, they perceived that the 
information they provided was superficial and they questioned whether it was 
actually used by officials.  Indeed, reporting on the throughputs or outputs of 
contracted services could be distracting respondents from asking themselves the hard 
outcome questions they did not seem to be addressing.   
External monitoring and reporting has been identified as a characteristic of hard 
accountability.  The limitations of this type of accountability relationship have been 
previously discussed.  Hard accountability mechanisms may reduce voluntary 
organisations’ performance to the lowest common denominator of regulation or 
contract specification, remove respondents’ discretion and their ability to innovate, 
and increase the cost of reporting – reporting that does not contribute to the quality of 
the service produced.  Indeed, Fry (1995) challenges the assumption that external 
controls after the fact motivate voluntary sector organisations and ensure they 
produce excellent work.   
From the governmental perspective, external monitoring is not proving effective 
either. Dicke and Ott (2002) report on research that showed only two percent of 
American government case managers reported that the external reporting methods 
used by their agency were adequate for overseeing their contractors.   
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New Zealand researchers have found similar results. Barnett and Newberry’s (2002) 
study of contracting for mental health services concluded that the current monitoring 
and reporting requirements in this sector focused on cost containment at the expense 
of concern about how best to apply resources to achieve agreed objectives.  
Indicators of quality were absent from monitoring systems.     
Providers were required to supply their RHA [Regional Health Authorities] 
with financial and numerical information.  Typically this information consisted 
of the information required for invoicing, referred to by one provider as ‘just 
outputs, bodies on beds’, occasional reports on complaints and incidents and 
annual financial reports.  This form of reporting, evidently intended as 
performance monitoring, was summed up as ‘simple, cheap and ineffective’ 
(Barnett and Newberry, 2002: 200). 
Ashton et al’s (2004) study of contracting for health services found that there were 
many problems in monitoring the contracts.  They found some RHAs were able to 
monitor providers on a systematic and ongoing basis, but that many simply watched 
and waited for poor performance and followed up only if there were particular 
indicators of concern:   
… purchasers rarely provided feedback to providers and often did not follow up 
on the information provided.  Reasons given for this included the fact that some 
providers’ information systems were undeveloped (and therefore unreliable).  
However, purchasers also often lacked the technical skill and the time required 
to analyse and interpret the data (Ashton et al., 2004: 26). 
A recent report by the New Zealand Controller and Auditor General (2003) into 
government contracting practices found that officials, under work load pressures, 
failed to follow contracting guidelines.  The report concluded that contract 
monitoring and management was poorly performed by all three funding agencies 
considered.  Decision-making about the organisations receiving contracts was 
haphazard, the contracts themselves were not complete, and progress reports were 
not demanded (Office of the Auditor General, 2003).   
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These findings show that, just as respondents did not perceive themselves as agents, 
government agencies struggled to be effective principals.  Agency theory suggests 
that principals should be actively trying to solve the problem of information 
asymmetries by investing in information systems and gathering information about 
the performance of their voluntary sector providers.  Voluntary organisations hold 
valuable information about services.  With such information, agency theory assumes 
that voluntary sector managers will attempt to build slack into contracts by reducing 
the quality or level of service delivered.  Respondents, however, perceived that 
officials were not interested in the information they had, nor reading the monitoring 
reports provided to them.  In short, government officials were not seen to be acting as 
effective principals.   
MacDonald’s (1997) Australian study also found that officials struggled to be 
effective principals.  Officials were overloaded and had limited travel budgets, so 
had limited contact with voluntary organisations.  Decisions about contracts 
generally turned over year to year.  Decision-making was centralised and based on 
aggregated information.  Officials were not keen to expose shirking because of the 
potential embarrassment to their political masters.  Officials were also expected both 
to develop the capacity of groups, so they could fill service delivery gaps, and audit 
them, often in the same meeting.  She concludes that agency theory does not account 
for the political processes and pressures on the principal, and for the need for 
principals to be actively creating suppliers (Macdonald, 1997). 
9.1.4 Current Attempts to Address Accountability Problems 
The limitations of the current accountability mechanisms for contracting with 
voluntary organisations are of concern to the current administration.  In 2001, the 
Treasury issued Guidelines for Contracting with Non Government Organisations for 
Services Sought by the Crown, and a revised set in late 2003.  The Guidelines sought 
to promote a better relationship between government and the voluntary sector, 
provide best practice in contracting, ensure that the government and voluntary 
organisations got mutual benefit from money spent on Government objectives, and 
that there was accountability for public money.  The Treasury suggests contracts 
need to represent value for money, be quality driven and provide for appropriate 
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accountability for public money, but also recognise the objectives and autonomy of 
the voluntary sector (The Treasury, 2003).   
However, the level to which the guidelines are adopted is seen as an issue by 
respondents interviewed by Treasury in the 2003 revision process, as is the ability of 
officials to actually implement them (The Treasury, 2003).  The Community–
Government Relationship Steering Group (2002) surveyed government agencies to 
investigate responses to the guidelines.  They found that while several agencies had 
taken the guidelines seriously and made changes to their contracting practices, only a 
few agencies had developed substantial changes to practice in line with the 
guidelines (Community-Government Relationship Steering Group, 2002).   
The major initiative, Funding for Outcomes, is driven by a Cabinet directive25 to 
speed up progress in developing and implementing an integrated approach to 
government contracting with non-government organisations.  The project focuses on  
Reducing transaction costs incurred by providers through separate negotiations 
with government funders [and] reducing compliance costs by reaching 
consensus on a single quality assurance and audit process for each joined up 
funding agreement (Ministry of Social Development, 2004: 1). 
Funding advisors are currently being appointed to bring government agencies 
together to prepare ‘joined-up’ funding agreements.  Providers (voluntary 
organisations) will need to prepare only one report that will satisfy all funders’ 
accountability requirements.  Monitoring and audits will be co-ordinated between 
departments so as to minimise the number of visits needed.   
This research shows that the problem in the government–voluntary organisation 
contracting relationship lies not in the reporting and monitoring phases of the 
relationship, which are being addressed in this initiative, but in the delegation or 
                                                 
25
 Cabinet Minute: Social Development Committee (03) 31/3 ‘Funding for Outcomes: Progress 
Report’ 
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negotiation phase.  Officials’ ‘take it or leave it’ approach to contract negotiation was 
seen as the major barrier to a successful relationship.  The compliance costs of 
reporting are by comparison only a minor irritation.   
The intervention creates ‘super’ contracts with the potential to further reduce the 
bargaining power of voluntary organisations.  At present, they may be able to turn 
down a contract with one agency if the terms are not favourable because they can 
accept work from another agency.  ‘Super’ contracts have the potential to further 
drive down delivery prices, especially when agencies are privy to information about 
how much they each pay.  ‘Super’ contracts will be hard to walk away from. 
Voluntary organisations will need to invest in the capacity to deliver the whole 
contract and will not be able to drop pieces of it should they prove unprofitable.  
While negotiating with one agency was difficult for respondents, negotiating with the 
power of three or four will be potentially even more difficult.  This initiative has the 
potential to improve officials’ performance as principals but may exacerbate the 
problems voluntary organisations experience.   
9.2 Stewards not Agents?  
This research has found that voluntary organisations may have similar goals to the 
government agencies they contract with.  Agency theory assumptions that voluntary 
organisations will work contrary to what officials expect of them are challenged.  
Stewardship theory may be a more useful framework for thinking about contracting, 
as it assumes principals and agents have similar goals.  
9.2.1 Stewardship Theory 
The origins of the concept of stewardship are biblical.  Stewards, as valued 
employees who are entrusted with running households, are mentioned in both the Old 
and New Testaments.  Stewards are seen as servants of someone or something 
greater than themselves, are proactive and have the discretion to take risks on their 
masters’ behalves (Jeavons, 1994).  Jeavons (1994: 114-5) provides an analysis of 
the biblical use of the concept of stewardship: 
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What do these passages tell us, then, about the scriptural or sacred view of 
stewardship? ... First, the steward is always a servant of someone or something 
greater than himself.  This characteristic does not mean that he or she is a slave 
… But it does mean that the steward’s role and work is defined by his or her 
commitment and allegiance to someone or something greater; his or her 
appointed task is to attend to another’s interests.  Second, these narratives tell us 
that the interests that the stewards look after are more than ‘economic’ in the 
way we now use that term; they are more than financial.  The steward’s job is to 
arrange and maintain the right ordering of all the affairs of a household or 
establishment in congruence with his or her master’s interests and values.  Thus, 
we find indications that the steward should be expected to be involved in a wide 
range of activities, beyond just accounting and commerce.  Third, these stories 
tell us that good stewardship cannot be taken for granted.  They indicate that 
being a good steward is hard work.  Indeed, they seem to suggest that finding a 
‘wise and faithful’ steward may not be easy in any realm of life.  Finally, they 
suggest that we may need to begin to think of the steward in a more active 
sense; not just as a conservator of resources, but rather as one who takes a 
proactive role – perhaps even some risks – in cultivating resources to be used 
for moral purposes … this concept [also] encompasses the idea that stewardship 
is an obligation of trust.  And, interestingly, that trust is seen as going two ways.  
The steward’s role demands that he or she be trustworthy …. Yet the 
implication is also clear that the stewards who serve well in this regard can trust 
that their interests will also be well served in abiding by this commitment. 
Stewardship theory has been applied to the study of organisations.  Proponents argue 
that pro-organisational and collective behaviours are of higher utility than the 
individualistic, self-serving behaviours, assumed by agency theory (Dicke and Ott, 
2002).  Put simply, if the organisation does well, its members will do well so they 
invest their energy in their organisation’s success (Davis et al., 1997).  Therefore, 
people will put the organisation’s needs first.  They are not assumed to want to shirk 
or act opportunistically, as agency theory assumes.  They are instead motivated to 
work to achieve the organisation’s goals (Block, 1996).   
Given a choice between self-serving behaviour and pro-organisational 
behaviour, a steward’s behaviour will not depart from the interests of his or her 
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organisation.  A steward will not substitute or trade self serving behaviours for 
co-operative behaviours.  Thus even when the interests of the steward and 
principal are not aligned, the steward places higher value on co-operation than 
defection…Because the steward perceives greater utility in co-operative 
behaviour and behaves accordingly, his or her behaviour can be considered 
rational (Davis et al., 1997: 24). 
Stewards still have basic survival needs, such as a regular salary.  However, the 
differences between a self-interested agent and a steward are in how these survival 
needs are met.  Stewards realise that there is a trade-off between personal and 
organisational needs and choose to work for organisational needs.  By doing so, 
stewards assume their personal needs will be met (Davis et al., 1997).  Other 
theorists acknowledge that stewards may work for altruistic reasons – unselfish 
concern and devotion to others – without expected return (Corbetta and Salvato, 
2004).  Ott and Dicke (2000) argue that altruistic motives best explain voluntary 
organisations and their employees, as employees are selected and socialised to care 
about and serve clients.   
Less controlling organisation structures and mechanisms are needed for stewards.  
Extending the autonomy of stewards maximises the benefits of their behaviour. 
Informal and intrinsic accountability mechanisms, rather than ‘hard’ legalistic or 
mechanistic ones, are best suited to stewards: the promulgation of professional 
standards, peer review and mechanism that build a sense of internal responsibility 
(Ott and Dicke, 2000). Control can be counter-productive because it signals that the 
steward is not trusted with a level of discretion.  Such controls will lower the 
motivation of a steward to work for the organisation (Davis et al., 1997; Tosi et al., 
2003).   
9.2.2 Differences in Assumptions Between Agency and Stewardship Theories 
The differences between the assumptions of agency and stewardship theories can be 
summarised as such.   
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Assumptions about Individuals 
The fundamental difference between the theories is their assumptions about 
individuals.  Agency theory assumes individuals are rooted in economic rationality.  
Individuals base their decisions and actions on maximising their resources.  As Davis 
et al (1997) notes, given a choice the agent or principal is assumed to choose the 
option that increases his or her individual utility.   This assumption has been 
developed from the last 200 years of economic research.  It is also the basis of the 
‘agency problem’; that is, when the interests of the principal and agent do not align 
and an increase in one’s utility is at the expense of the other.   
A body of sociology and psychology literature has challenged this view as too 
simplistic.  Work in 1960s and 70s by McGregor (1960), Maslow (1970) and Argyris 
(1973) developed an alternative model – the self-actualising individual – based on 
the view that humans have a need to grow beyond their current state and reach higher 
levels of achievement. Individuals will seek higher level and non-individualistic 
goals, such as contributing to an organisation’s success.  They will achieve personal 
fulfilment in doing so. Individuals unable to express their aspirations will become 
frustrated.  This can be seen as a theoretical basis of modern stewardship theory 
(Davis et al., 1997).   
An individual is assumed by stewardship theory to display pro-organisational, 
collective behaviours. Given a choice between self-serving and co-operative 
behaviours, the steward will choose co-operative behaviours that serve the 
organisation.  Such behaviours are perceived to lead to organisational success and 
contributing to organisational success is perceived by the steward as generating great 
personal benefit (Davis et al., 1997).   
Motivation 
Agency theory focuses on extrinsic rewards: tangible, exchangeable commodities 
that have a market value.  The aim of such rewards is to control the agent’s 
behaviour.  Such is the central objective of agency theory: imposing controls on 
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agents in order to keep their self-serving behaviour in check (Jenkins and Meckling, 
1976). 
Stewardship theory focuses on intrinsic, intangible rewards: those not easily 
quantified such as opportunities for growth, achievement, affiliation and self-
actualisation. The aim of such rewards is to keep the steward motivated.  Motivated 
stewards will maximise their performance and work towards organisational goals 
(Davis et al., 1997).   
In contrast to agency theory, control is not central to stewardship theory.  Indeed, 
Block (1996) argues that the autonomy of stewards should be extended as much as 
possible as they can be trusted to work in the best interests of the organisation.  Few 
organisational resources should be spent on monitoring the work of stewards.   
Identification 
Stewards have a strong identification with their organisation’s mission and values. 
Achievement of organisational goals brings satisfaction for stewards.  Self-serving 
agents, in contrast, do not identify with their organisation’s missions and any issues 
that their organisation may face.  They seek to avoid blame and to avoid having to 
accept responsibility.  They most closely identify with their own needs (Davis et al., 
1997). 
Use of Power 
Using a widely cited typology of power bases, Davis and colleagues argue that there 
are two main types of power: institutional (vested in principal by virtue of their 
position in the organisation); and personal (developed through the context of an 
inter-personal relationship).  They argue that agency theory adopts notions of 
institutional power by prioritising incentive systems and the importance placed on 
recognising the authority of the principal.  Stewardship theory relies on personal 
power (Davis et al., 1997). 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) summarise the differences in the two theories as 
control and collaboration.  Agency theory stresses control: curbing human 
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limitations through discipline, value of extrinsic motivation, and external monitoring.  
Stewardship theory stresses collaboration: collective orientations, tapping into the 
individual’s aspirations and intrinsic motivations, and the importance of service 
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).   
 
The differences are summarised in Table 9.1: 
Agency Theory – Control  Stewardship Theory – Collaboration 
Focus on contractual relationships where the 
goals of principals and agents are not aligned 
Focus on long term relationships where the 
goals of principals and stewards are aligned 
Assumes agents will shirk: act opportunistically 
to achieve personal needs 
Assumes stewards will work to achieve shared 
goals as the way to fulfil their personal needs 
Agents motivated by extrinsic rewards, usually 
personal remuneration 
Stewards motivated by intrinsic rewards such as 
achieving the organisation’s mission 
Agents working for their own self interest Stewards strongly identify with organisations’ 
mission and purpose 
Agents controlled by institutional structures: 
hierarchies, reward systems 
Stewards controlled by personal relationships 
Table 9.1: Differences between Agency and Stewardship Theory 
9.2.3 Stewardship Theory and Soft Accountability 
Making different predictions about how people will behave leads stewardship 
theorists to alternative conclusions about accountability, as against those proposed by 
agency theory.  People are assumed to want to work for the organisation’s goals.  
They should therefore be given the discretion to do so.  Localised decision-making is 
proposed as important, as are longer-term and qualitative measures, to ensure people 
can know if they are making a positive difference (Block, 1996).   
Accountability, it is argued, develops from parties sharing the same goal.  When this 
occurs an internal sense of responsibility for achieving the goal develops.  As the 
parties are assumed to have similar goals, and incentives aligned to achieve these 
shared goals, principals are able to step back from the details of the relationship and 
focus on providing strategic direction for their agents.  As principals are freed from 
much of the often costly and time-intensive process of monitoring agents, they can, 
for example, invest more time in researching what services should be delivered.  
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They can also use the time saved from monitoring to develop measures which map 
the outcomes of the service provided.   
Agents are also accorded more discretion.  This may, for example, include the ability 
to make decisions about how services are delivered.  Agents, given their assumed 
interest in the success of the organisation and the services it delivers, will also co-
operate in the process of identifying outcomes and measures.   
Micro-management and heavily specified contracts are unwarranted, as there is 
agreement on the broad direction (Cornforth, 2003b).  Soft accountability 
mechanisms, such as professional licensing, codes of ethics and peer review, are seen 
as more effective than hard ones (Dicke, 2002).   
Fry (1995) argues that the adoption of soft accountability mechanisms will make 
voluntary organisations more accountable to stakeholders than they currently are.  
Organisation members will ensure they behave in a manner consistent with achieving 
the organisations’ goals and will judge themselves and be judged by their peers for 
doing so.  Hard accountability mechanisms only measure what tangible work has 
been completed.  Soft accountability mechanisms cover not only the tangible work 
completed but also the way the work was undertaken (how people chose to act).  
They are therefore, he suggests, more far reaching than hard accountability 
mechanisms.   
9.2.4 Stewardship Theory Applied to the Government–Voluntary Organisation 
Contracting Relationship   
The current hard accountability mechanisms (such as monitoring, audit and 
reporting) used in the government–voluntary sector funding and contracting 
relationship would be seen by stewardship theorists as superficial.  They would 
instead focus on ensuring goals are shared.  This will mean that government agencies 
would take the time to understand what the voluntary organisations are trying to 
achieve, how they are doing it and where there is congruence of goals.  When it is 
identified that goals are shared the contracting process can begin.  There would be a 
large investment of time at the beginning of any relationship.   
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If, after discussions with a voluntary organisation, it was clear that the organisation 
had different goals to what officials were trying to achieve (or was not capable of 
delivering what was required), officials would seek another provider.  In practice, 
this may mean that organisations currently contracting with government will not be 
offered future contracts: a potentially difficult and politically volatile stance.   
Once a relationship was established, voluntary organisations would be trusted to get 
on with the job.  Performance measures focusing on measuring outcomes for clients 
would be jointly developed over time.  Blanket controls and ‘boilerplate’ contracts 
would not be used.  Non-financial motivations would be acknowledged.  Knowledge 
generated from the performance measures would be used to modify service delivery.  
Dialogue between parties would focus on delivery problems, and potential 
improvements or innovations.  The information asymmetries that are problematic in 
principal-agent relationships would still exist: the staff of voluntary organisations 
will have more information about service delivery than officials.  Under a 
stewardship framework, such asymmetries would not be seen as a potential source of 
risk for principals (such as an avenue for inflating contract prices), but rather 
expertise that should be incorporated into policy processes.   
Officials could use the time freed-up from the detailed monitoring of contracts to 
provide long-term strategic guidance and research on effective service delivery and 
the attainment of outcomes.  The stewards (voluntary organisations) would be freed 
from detailed reporting, and the provision of government-designed piecemeal 
programmes to do what they do best – deliver in-depth services to clients – and the 
principals (officials) could support this through research, development and 
investment in strategy.   
Officials may chose to contract better with fewer organisations given the resource 
intensive nature of establishing relationships.  This is not without risk for the 
voluntary sector.  Fewer organisations may receive funding.  A trusted ‘inner-circle’ 
could develop.  Under such circumstances, new organisations, for example, may be 
excluded.  Organisations receiving funding may also find it difficult to maintain their 
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unique qualities as they develop a close relationship with government, as predicted 
by neo-institutionalists (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).   
Of benefit to the voluntary sector will, however, be the increased investment 
government agencies may make in building the capacity of voluntary organisations.  
In particular, officials may be interested in improving the ability of voluntary 
organisations to monitor how well they are doing against their mission, so they can 
self-regulate.  The inability to monitor their performance has been identified as a key 
weakness by this research.   
A number of conditions would need to be met if stewardship theory and soft 
accountability were to effectively govern the government–voluntary sector 
relationship.  Voluntary organisations would need sophisticated systems of 
performance management and self-criticism to ensure they are working towards the 
shared goals (Miller, 2002b).  This research and other studies have found that 
internal performance measurement is a weakness, the level of self-regulation needed 
to ensure they are working to enhance the public good is not present.   
Both parties need to be interested in each other and looking for better ways to serve 
the public (have an outcome focus) (Henderson et al., 2003).  This research has 
shown that respondents perceived that officials had little interest in them and that the 
contracting process was about delivering outputs not outcomes for clients. 
Government needs to recognise that it puts up cultural barriers to working with 
voluntary organisations (Taylor, 1996a).  The Report of the Community and 
Voluntary Sector Working Party (2001) provided specific examples of such barriers 
operating in the New Zealand context such as the speed at which policy makers 
expect the voluntary sector to respond to draft documents.  A number of 
organisations reported that they were unable to participate in policy processes in a 
meaningful way. Umbrella organisations, who seek feedback from their 
constituencies before engaging with government agencies, saw themselves 
particularly hampered by the short time-frames allowed.  The speed and demands of 
the political cycle provide one example of a cultural barrier for voluntary 
organisations that prioritise discussion and consensus.    
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Government agencies need to be prepared to share decision-making (Whitaker et al., 
2002).  For the Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party (2001) this meant 
providing genuine opportunities to comment on policy and involvement in the early 
stages of policy development.  Respondents’ perceptions of the contracting process 
as a ‘take it or leave it’ one suggest this is a long way off. 
Time is also needed to develop shared expectations and sensible performance 
measures.  Experimentation will be needed (Whitaker et al., 2002).  However, as 
demonstrated by the example of a contract in the recent Auditor General’s report on 
the government contracting processes, practices currently do not result in shared 
expectations: 
There was no ‘meeting of minds’ on the part of the Ministry and [the voluntary 
organisation it contracted with] as to the length and expected outcomes of the 
contract.  The parties were confused over the length of the contract and the 
expected outcomes during the term of the contract (Office of the Auditor 
General, 2003: 59).   
9.2.5 There is no Panacea 
In theory, changing the assumption that voluntary organisations are stewards rather 
than agents, and the accompanying changes in accountability mechanisms may 
address many of the limitations of the current contracting regime.  However, the 
reality is much more complex.   
Acceptability in the Public Sector Context 
Stewardship theory is untested, particularly in voluntary sector research.  
Whether stewardship theory can have application in non-profits, where many of 
the stewards are volunteers rather than paid managers, is intriguing; and appears 
currently untested’ (Harrow, 2001: 224). 
Because stewardship theory is relatively new, its theoretic contribution has not 
yet been adequately established (Davis et al., 1997: 20). 
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The enthusiasm with which some of its proponents advocate this approach makes 
their claims seem too good to be true.  As Arthurs and Busentiz (2003: 155) argue 
‘stewardship theory paints an excessively rosy picture of the steward.’ 
Government agencies need to make voluntary organisations accountable for 
taxpayers’ money.  They need to be seen to be in control (Taylor, 1996a; Dicke, 
2002).  As guardians of the public purse, public agencies take what can be 
considered a risk-adverse approach. The mechanisms of external control, such as 
monitoring and reporting, can be seen to provide the needed assurance to both 
Ministers and the public that taxpayers’ money is being used effectively (Davis et al., 
1997).   
Being accountable for taxpayers’ dollars is one example of the different set of 
pressures that officials operate within.  Another set originates from the three-year 
political cycle and the associated changes in policy and programmes.  Such change 
will make it difficult for officials to establish committed long-term relationships with 
voluntary organisations.   
A regime built on the assumptions that providers should be allowed a high level of 
discretion is unlikely to be feasible in this context.  Public accountability systems can 
be seen as a trade-off between discretion and assumed innovation and efficiency, on 
one hand, and the need for control, on the other (Considine, 2002).  Increased control 
comes at an increased cost: costs could be in terms of the resources need to monitor 
behaviour, as well as the potential loses from reduced levels of innovation and the 
improvements in performance that can result from such innovation (Mayston, 1993).   
Discretion and soft accountability systems, versus control and hard accountability 
systems, and the trade-offs needed represent an intractable problem.  The debate 
about the respective benefits of internal responsibility (soft accountability) and 
external (hard accountability) controls has raged for decades, since it was originated 
by the seminal exchange between Friedrich and Finer in the 1940s.   
At the heart of the debate is the issue of how much discretion agencies can allow 
their providers; how far can they trust them?  For Das and Teng (1998), finding the 
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balance between control and trust is the key question for any alliance.  Both come at 
a cost to the organisations involved: 
The selection, development, and implementation of control mechanisms, such 
as budgets, planning systems, and cost-accounting systems can be expensive … 
Trust is not free either; trust building is a planned activity and takes 
considerable resources from organisations over time (Das and Teng, 1998: 496). 
For a relationship based on trust to develop, government agencies and voluntary 
organisations will need to become familiar with each other.  Bigely and Pearce 
(1998) argue that trusting relationships are only formed between actors who have 
established close bonds with one another.  Bhattacharya and Devinney (1998) add 
additional prerequisites needed for trust.  The interests of the two parties must be 
aligned.  As previous discussions of agency theory have shown, when each party is 
self-interested and working towards different goals, control becomes a central feature 
of the relationship, at the expense or as a substitute for trust (de Leon, 2003).  For 
trust to develop in a relationship a sense of shared higher level purpose is needed.  
Trust is also most likely to eventuate when parties have taken care and time in 
choosing their partners.   
However, in trusting voluntary organisations, Sheppard and Sherman (1998) note 
government agencies will be implicitly accepting the risks associated with being 
dependent on them for the delivery of services.  Trust implicitly involves loosening 
mechanisms of control and relying on voluntary organisations to deliver services of 
an acceptable quality.  Such interdependence increases the vulnerability of 
government agencies (particularly to poor performance by voluntary organisations) 
and increases the potential for betrayal or harm from voluntary organisations (such as 
the potential for being defrauded) (Bigely and Pearce, 1998).  Such risk is not easily 
absorbed within public management systems and by political masters. 
However, the seeds of enhanced discretion, soft accountability and intrinsic 
accountability mechanisms may already be present in the current public management 
system.  The reforms of the 1980s and 90s emphasised the role of consumers in 
monitoring service quality.  Through the exercise of consumer choice and the 
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development of mechanisms for complaint, service quality was expected to increase.  
Providers, be they government agencies or voluntary organisations, were expected to 
self-monitor their performance in terms of customer satisfaction.  If clients were to 
chose alternative services, funding would be reduced to the non-selected providers.  
While this research has shown that the managers and board members of the voluntary 
organisations studied were not responsive to their clients needs, this aspect of the 
public management system could be better activated.  Internal self-monitoring of 
performance by providers was recognised by some as more effective than 
administrative allocation via regulation and inspection (Ormsby, 1998).   
Indeed, another feature of the original reforms was the mantra ‘let the managers 
manage’ so recognising the importance of discretion. As Norman (2003: 33) 
describes, the pre-reform public management system focused on the hierarchical 
control of managerial actions: 
Control is a central preoccupation in the delivery of public services, because 
public agencies are ‘invested with awesome powers of compulsion – to tax, 
regulate, inspect, arrest – and attractive powers of reward – to subsidise, 
purchase, and protect.  Typically they [public agencies] exercise these powers 
as monopolists, immune from competition.  To make them accountable, we 
enshroud them in a maze of laws, regulations and court rulings; to keep them 
responsive, we expose them to access by endless reporters, lawyers, committees 
and investigators’ ... The solution to this problem of public sector control for 
much of a century was to deliver services through hierarchical bureaucracies, 
responsibly directed to elected representatives. 
Post reform, managers were to be freed from the web of rules and regulations that 
governed their actions, allowed to make decisions and then held accountable for 
results.  Efficiencies were thought to be generated from allowing managers discretion 
to make decisions about the service delivery (Boston et al., 1996).    
The assumptions of stewardship theory may not, therefore, be so removed from 
current public management realities. Discretion, soft accountability and intrinsic 
accountability mechanisms are present as threads in the current system.  Indeed, 
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Barnett and Newberry (2002) conclude that such mechanisms are relied upon for 
performance measurement and management in the mental health sector. 
Enduring Goal Alignment  
Questions must also be raised about the depth and sustainability of goal alignment.  
While the managers of voluntary organisations and officials may agree on high level 
outcomes, differences about service delivery may override consensus.  Differences 
may arise from the conflicting values of the respective parties.  Research suggests 
officials may prioritise adhering to rules and regulations more than their voluntary 
sector counterparts (Rasmussen et al., 2003).  If, for example, voluntary sector 
managers were contravening rules considered by officials as crucial, there is 
potential for the relationship to collapse.  When consensus is gone in a stewardship 
relationship, there is in effect, no workable relationship left.  Ongoing frustrations 
about funding may also block collaboration.   
Agency Theory is not all ‘Bad’: Stewardship Theory is not all ‘Good’ 
Agency theory has generated a number of important insights for public 
administration researchers, such as the importance of information systems 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a).  The current agendas of agency theorists may also provide new 
insights.  Researchers considering corporate governance and issues of separation and 
control are searching for efficient solutions for conflicts of interest, so to reduce the 
need for intense monitoring (Arthur et al., 1993). Others are exploring the potential 
of contracting for outcomes.  
One proposition is that outcome based contracts are effective in curbing agent 
opportunism.  The argument is that such contracts coalign the preferences of 
agents with those of the principal because the rewards for both depend on the 
same actions and, therefore, the conflicts of self interest between principal and 
agent are reduced (Eisenhardt, 1989a: 60). 
Both avenues of exploration may prove useful for public administration researchers.   
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Agency and stewardship theories are contrasted in many discussions.  There may 
however be potential for convergence.  Arthur and Busentiz (2003) question whether 
stewards turn off their self-interest or if their self-interest is well aligned to 
organisation goals.  Angwin et al’s (2004) research found that some CEOs who 
chose pro-organisational approaches did so because they thought it best for the 
company, while others did so from a desire to maximise their personal wealth.  The 
end actions were the same, even though some were operating as stewards and some 
as agents.  Arthurs and Busentiz (2003) also found that some of the relationships they 
studied began as principal and agent but over time evolved to principal and steward.  
Discretion and trust, it seems, can be earned over time.   
Davis et al (1997) argue that situational factors, such as the pre-disposition of the 
individual to a view about other individuals, the management philosophy of the 
organisation and even the cultural context of the relationship determine whether 
agency or stewardship theories are likely to be adopted.  Applying the appropriate 
theory to the appropriate situation is more important than debating which is best 
overall.   
We do not assume that agency theory is wrong or inferior to stewardship theory, 
as previous researchers have stated.  We attempt to reconcile differences 
between stewardship and agency theory by describing the conditions under 
which each is necessary’ (Davis et al., 1997: 22). 
9.3 A Way Forward  
Clearly both agency and stewardship theories have limitations.  But rather than focus 
on becoming more effective principals, as encouraged by current policy initiatives, 
governments could adopt some of the insights from stewardship theory.   
Officials could be encouraged, and appropriately resourced, to take more time to 
establish relationships with voluntary organisations, based on common expectations 
and goals.  Performance measures could be developed alongside voluntary 
organisations with the aim, not only of monitoring progress against goals, but also 
learning how to improve service delivery.  Government agencies could also invest in 
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building the capacity of voluntary organisations for monitoring their performance 
and self-regulation.  Officials could allow the managers of voluntary organisations a 
degree more discretion and assume that they will do a good job.  Detailed 
specification could be, over time, removed from contracts.  Officials may also 
investigate opportunities for making regulations less detailed and more outcome-
focused.  
The debate about the respective benefits of internal responsibility (soft 
accountability) and external controls (hard accountability) remains unresolved, to the 
extent that both types of accountability are seen by various scholars to be necessary 
in any relationship.  The trick is to find the appropriate balance between control and 
discretion.  As Ebrahim (2003: 208) argues: 
Accountability is both external and internal.  It may be defined as the means 
through which individuals and organisations are held externally to account for 
their actions (for example, through legal obligations and explicit reporting and 
disclosure requirements) and as the means by which they take internal 
responsibility for continuously shaping and scrutinising organisational mission, 
goals and performance (such as through self-evaluations, participatory decision 
processes, and the systematic linking of organisational values to conduct).  
Although external oversight is necessary, no amount of it will inculcate a felt 
responsibility … The challenge of accountability lies not in a binary 
relationship between oversight and independence but in a more complex 
dynamic between external, internal, upward and downward mechanisms. 
Respondents’ perceptions of their accountability relationship with government 
agencies suggest that the current focus on external controls is actually proving a 
barrier to the provision of quality services.  Finding a new balance between 
discretion and control is needed.  Adopting some of the insights from stewardship 
theory could help this quest.   
9.4 Summary  
The current accountability mechanisms used to contract and fund voluntary 
organisations are considered by both parties to be less than satisfactory.  The current 
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regime assumes voluntary organisations will behave according to the predictions of 
agency theory.  This research has found, however, that this assumption needs to be 
challenged.  The behaviour of those working in voluntary organisations is more 
explicable by stewardship theory than agency theory.  Stewardship theory suggests 
that soft accountability mechanisms are most appropriate.   
While the adoption of a regime based fully on soft accountability mechanisms would 
be politically and operationally difficult, applying some aspects of the stewardship 
approach would ensure a better balance between hard and soft accountabilities, and 
could help maximise the service outcomes desired by both government officials and 
the voluntary organisations they help to fund.   
 186 
Chapter 10  
Conclusions 
 
Personal observations of the problems generated by the accountability mechanisms 
of contracting, from both a government agency and voluntary sector perspective, 
provided the impetus for this investigation.  During an initial review of the literature, 
it became clear that one missing piece of ‘the contracting jigsaw’ was voluntary 
sector perspectives of accountability.  This research sought to explore the perceptions 
of accountability of voluntary sector managers and board members: to whom, for 
what and why they thought themselves accountable.  Considering the implications of 
the results for the government–voluntary sector relationship was the secondary aim.   
The literature, somewhat sketchy on the subject of voluntary sector accountability, 
provided some suggestions of what might be discovered.  Managers and board 
members will think they are accountable, the literature predicted, to those that fund 
them: government agencies and large donors.  They are reliant on volunteers and 
peer organisations, so will also prioritise these accountability relationships.  They 
will do so, said the stakeholder theorists, because these stakeholders are powerful 
and can exert pressure on the organisation, have demands that need to be addressed 
urgently and their demands are viewed as legitimate by the voluntary sector 
managers and board members.  A steady stream of resources is crucial to the survival 
of the organisation (an input from resource dependency theory) as is being seen as a 
legitimate entity (as emphasised by neo-institutionism).   
The literature also suggested how accountability would be conceptualised: as a 
formal, hierarchical relationship based on coercion and principal-agent constructs, or 
‘hard’ accountability.  An alternative concept of accountability – soft accountability 
– was also identified.  Less well developed and not widely adopted, soft 
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accountability encompasses a broader range of relationships: those voluntarily 
entered into, not necessarily formal or hierarchical.   
The actual results were somewhat surprising.  Clients were considered the 
stakeholders respondents felt most accountable to. This was particularly so for 
respondents who had regular contact with their organisations’ clients.  A group of 
internal stakeholders (staff, members and the board) were considered the second 
most important accountability relationships.  Managers and board members alike 
focussed on being responsive to the needs of staff. The board was particularly 
interested in being accountable to the organisations’ members, as they were directly 
elected by them.  The main funders of the voluntary sector, government agencies, 
were considered the third most important accountability relationship.  Even the two 
case studies dependent on government funding did not prioritise accounting to 
government agencies.  The predicted emphasis on funders did not eventuate.  
Volunteers or peer organisations were also not accorded the expected priority.   
In exploring the rationales given by respondents for their perceptions of 
accountability the seemingly counterintuitive results made sense.  Respondents were 
very aware of the importance of maintaining the legitimacy of their organisation.  
Organisations perceived to be legitimate receive funding and support: organisations 
perceived to be illegitimate do not.  Providing a high quality service to clients 
secured their organisation legitimacy.  Being responsive (as accountability was 
defined in the case of these relationships) to staff, the organisation’s members, and 
between board members, was a strategy to ensure they performed well and so 
delivered the high quality service needed for the survival of the organisation.  Once 
legitimacy was secured, the organisation would attract funding.  Resource 
dependency theory proved to be of limited explanatory value while the results 
suggest the centrality neo-institutionalists give organisation legitimacy is well-
placed.   
Respondents focus was on ‘soft’ accountability relationships.  Both the relationships 
with their clients and most of the internal accountability relationships were based on 
the organisation choosing to feel accountable.  This voluntary, ‘felt’ relationship 
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contrasts to the hard accountability relationship of contracting with government with 
its formal contracts, reporting mechanisms and threat of financial sanctions.   
In terms of the implications for the government–voluntary sector relationship, these 
findings challenge the assumptions on which the current New Zealand public 
management contracting regime is based on.  Agency theory, influential in the public 
sector reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s, emphasises contractual 
relationships as a mechanism to minimise the ability of agents (contracted voluntary 
organisations) to rip-off their principals (the government agency).  Agents are 
assumed to want to produce less, and at a reduced quality, for more funding.  They 
are also assumed to have different goals to their principals and seek to meet their 
own needs at the expense of their principal.  Respondents, however, had similar high 
level goals to the government agencies they contract with: positive outcomes for 
clients.  They sought additional funding to provide more services for clients, and 
adopted governments’ quality standards as their own.   
The agency theory framework, with its focus on the assumed inherent tension 
between principal and agent and mistrust, can even be seen to be self-defeating.  The 
hard accountability mechanisms promoted by agency theorists made it difficult for 
voluntary sector managers to consider the outcomes they were trying to achieve for 
clients and took the emphasis away from measuring the performance of their 
organisation. Instead, they report on the outputs they were contracted to deliver. 
Current calls to ‘do the same but better’26 may actually drive down service quality. 
At the heart of the issue is the nature of the assumptions made about voluntary 
organisations.  Currently, they are assumed untrustworthy and external monitoring 
and reporting regimes are in place, with the threat of sanctions as a tool of control.   
                                                 
26
 Such as in the recent report from the Office of the Auditor General (2003) that said government 
agencies should improve their contract specification and monitoring.   
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An alternative is to relax these assumptions and assume that to some degree, 
voluntary organisations have similar goals to government agencies and can be 
trusted.  Stewardship theory takes these assumptions as its starting point.  Stewards 
work for their principals’ best interests because such interests are aligned with their 
own.  They work pro-actively for the best outcome for the principal and are most 
effective when they have high levels of discretion.  Stewardship theorists promote 
internal, intrinsic methods of accountability, favouring self-regulation and 
professional licensing – or soft accountability.   
To recommend that stewardship theory be adopted as the frame for the contracting 
relationship with voluntary organisations would be to ignore the reality of 
government.  The need for control is inherent in Western public management 
systems.  Control is needed over the expenditure of taxpayers’ money and the actions 
of officials on behalf of Ministers.  Accountability systems (hard accountability 
relationships) operate to attempt to ensure that control.  This is especially so in New 
Zealand.  In the reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s, ensuring accountability 
and effective control of public resources was core to the design of the new public 
management system. As Schick (1996: iii) states: 
Accountability has not been an afterthought in New Zealand, as it has in other 
countries that have implemented reform.  Instead it has been robustly designed 
as an integral feature of the reformed public service.  
The realities of a three-year political cycle mean that activities must be completed 
and results delivered.  Accountability also operates as a control to ensure agencies 
meet specified performance standards.  To give voluntary organisations a high level 
of discretion to spend taxpayers’ money and deliver public services would be 
politically, and operationally unfeasible. 
However, stewardship theory offers some insights into how contracting can be 
improved.  Officials could be encouraged, and resourced appropriately, to learn 
about the voluntary organisations they may contract with.  They could ask of 
themselves hard questions such as, is this organisation trying to achieve similar goals 
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to our agency?  Contracts would not be let to organisations where the responses are 
negative.   
Performance measures would focus on outcomes for clients and be developed jointly 
with the management of the voluntary organisations.  They may be non-financial and 
rely less on blanket or standard provisions.  Officials may look to provide support, 
both financial and expertise, to develop the internal monitoring capacity of 
organisations.  This will better allow voluntary sector managers to both monitor their 
own performance as well as provide information on progress towards desired 
outcomes.   
For these changes to occur more government resources would need to be invested in 
contract management staff.  Smaller case loads and less pressure would allow 
officials to ensure the organisations their agency is contracting with have similar 
goals and to develop a better understanding of the organisations and the services they 
deliver.  Officials, and their managers, would need to take more of an interest in the 
performance of the organisations as the operational arm of their agencies.   
Such changes are not without risk to the voluntary sector.  Some organisations that 
currently receive funding may have very different goals to the government agencies 
that contract with them.  The options for this scenario are unpalatable – the 
organisation loses its funding, or changes its mission.  The resource-intense process 
of building a relationship and finding congruence may practically mean that 
government agencies develop larger contracts with fewer voluntary organisations.  
For the chosen few, ‘surviving the bear hug’ of government funding and close 
scrutiny may be difficult (Nowland-Foreman, 1997).   
There is no easy solution.  Indeed, the debate about the relative merits of external 
control and internal regulation has intrigued public administration scholars for many 
decades.  Debate about what assumptions should be made about human nature – are 
people trustworthy or not – began much before this.   
It is probably not a case of finding a ‘solution’, but rather finding a strategy that is 
appropriate for the current public management context.  The current focus prioritises 
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outcomes, co-ordination, a degree of devolution (or rather more of a focus on local 
issues), and multiple agency collaboration (Advisory Group on the Review of the 
Centre, 2001).  This is challenging current linear, hard accountability structures as 
Anderson and Dovey describe (2003: 2):   
Our present system of accountability is based on mechanisms built around a 
Westminster-style Parliament and principal/agency theory, which gives us a 
vertical and singular model of accountability.  It was thus considered that the 
adequacy of our current accountability mechanisms be re-examined in light of 
the impending pressures to change the way we conduct government activities 
and services.  These pressures are raising such questions as: How might formal 
accountability arrangements be designed in an outcomes-based management 
system? How might accountability mechanisms be designed for new delivery 
methods with less linear governance arrangements and with more diffuse or 
equalised power (for example partnerships with local government and voluntary 
groups, and power-sharing with communities)? 
This research suggests that hard accountability, with its focus on external controls, 
may have reached its optimal level of utility.  The pendulum, it seems, could usefully 
swing toward adopting some of the insights of stewardship theory and dimensions of 
soft accountability.  Such may be more appropriate for the current and future public 
management environment.  Indeed, O’Neill (2002) concludes that adopting a soft 
accountability approach, which she terms ‘intelligent accountability’, will not only 
improve public sector performance but increase the public’s trust in public 
institutions and satisfaction with the services they receive. In her words: 
… Currently fashionable [hard] methods of accountability damage rather than 
repair trust.  If we want greater accountability without damaging professional 
performance we need intelligent accountability.  What might this include? Let 
me share my sense of some of the possibilities.  Intelligent accountability, I 
suspect requires more attention to good governance and fewer fantasies about 
total control.  Good governance is possible only if institutions are allowed some 
margin for self-governance of a form appropriate to their particular tasks, within 
a framework of financial and other reporting.  Such reporting, I believe, is not 
improved by being wholly standardised or relentlessly detailed, since much that 
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has to be accounted for is not easily measured it cannot be boiled down to a set 
of stock performance indicators.  Those who are called to account should give 
an account of what they have done, and of their successes or failures, to others 
who have sufficient time and experience to assess the evidence and report on it 
… Well, have we begun to shift? Are we moving towards less distorting forms 
of accountability? I think there are a few, but only a few, encouraging straws in 
the wind…(O'Neill, 2002: 57-9). 
This research focussed on exploring the perspective of voluntary sector managers 
and board members.  Their concern was with the behaviour of the government 
officials they interacted with.  The findings and implications summarised their 
perspective.  A study that explored the perceptions of government officials of 
voluntary organisations would generate different insights and potentially draw 
conclusions about how voluntary organisations could improve their service delivery 
performance.  It would record a different set of frustrations and implications.  This 
would be an interesting and useful complementary exercise.   
The lack of baseline data about voluntary organisations in New Zealand may, 
however, constrain future investigations of the government-voluntary sector 
relationship, as it did this study.  Much value could be added to the understanding of 
voluntary sector issues from learning about how many organisations actually exist, 
with what function, their size, location, purpose, and volunteer and paid staffing 
levels.  A long list of researchers and policy makers have already called for such a 
resource (Suggate, 1995; Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party, 2001).  
Such a survey would be costly to undertake and conceptually difficult to manage.  
Fortunately, a number of other countries have already completed such surveys 
(including the UK) and New Zealand can learn from their experience (Salamon and 
Anheier, 1994).   
Further, New Zealand’s devolved public management system means that the amount 
of contracting with non-government agencies is unknown.  Individual agencies make 
their own service delivery choices: the ‘make or buy’ decision as it is often referred 
to (Boston et al., 1996).  How many agencies chose to ‘buy’, what they ‘buy’, how 
much they ‘buy’, and the actual nature of the contractual relationship is unknown (or 
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would not be released under the Official Information Act).  It may be that this 
analysis has not been undertaken because the actual level of dependence on 
voluntary organisations for service delivery would be a political embarrassment 
should it be publicly revealed.  However, the reason this data does not exist is 
probably a practical one.  It would involve much collation and co-ordination and it 
would be difficult to generate timely and accurate data.   
Without accurate and systematic data about the voluntary sector, selecting case 
studies was a difficult process.  Without knowledge of the population, sampling was 
not possible.  Theoretical replication proved a useful substitute (Yin, 1994).  On 
reflection, this technique and the two replication criteria adopted (dependence on 
government funding and reliance on volunteers) provided a useful range of 
organisations to study.   
This is even more so, given that the predictions generated from the ‘dependence on 
government funding’ criteria did not eventuate in the research findings.  It was 
predicted that the two organisations dependent on government funding would 
prioritise their relationships with government.  As discussed, resource dependency 
theory proved of limited utility and the relationship between government funding and 
perceptions of accountability was more complex.  The perceived stability of the 
funding, whether the organisation perceived itself to be a monopoly provider and 
whether it perceived the service it provided to be safe from axing were the important 
issues.  Government funding was seen as a means to an end - providing a quality 
service to clients - rather than the driver of perceptions of accountability 
relationships as expected. However, this criteria ensured a range of organisations 
were included; from a multi-million dollar provider, to a local community group with 
a budget based around a collection tin.  Differences between the predictions and the 
actual results can also be explained: the important of organisational legitimacy as the 
key. 
The replications of ‘volunteer’ criteria seemed to accurately align with respondents’ 
perceptions of accountability. The literature review pointed to the influence a 
reliance on volunteering had on an organisation’s accountability relationships.  
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Volunteers were predicted to be important stakeholders who were difficult to control.  
Respondents did mention the problems they had controlling volunteers. However, it 
must be noted that they did not place as much importance on accounting to 
volunteers as the literature suggested they would.  The literature suggested 
volunteers would be one of the priority stakeholders because the organisations 
depended on them to deliver services.  Increased levels of professionalism and 
perceived difficulties with health and safety legislation meant volunteers were not as 
important as they once had been.  However, the two case study organisations reliant 
on volunteers had fewer paid staff and were ‘less professionalised’ than the other two 
organisations that were not reliant on volunteers.  The criteria again usefully ensured 
a spectrum of organisations was studied: from a local volunteer-driven committee 
(volunteer reliant) to a large service delivery organisation operating in a professional 
and business-like manner (paid staff reliant).   
As with any case study research, the insights gained from an in-depth exploration of 
a small number of organisations, came at the expense of widespread generalisability 
across the voluntary sector.  However, steps were built into the research process to 
increase generalisability.  Indeed, the real measure is that this study’s results are 
generally in line with the results of other New Zealand and international studies and 
any differences can be accounted for.   
The proof of the validity of any research, however, is in the application of its 
findings.  This research has sought to provide a clearer understanding of what 
accountability means to voluntary sector managers, staff and board members.  In 
doing so, the implications for the government-voluntary sector relationship have 
been explored and suggestions made as to how current contracting practises could be 
improved.  The test of the findings will be the implementation of the suggestions.  
This would involve a change in mindset for the officials involved in the contracting 
process and their managers, from being encouraged to assume the worst of voluntary 
organisations to expecting the best.  Such changes do not come easily or without 
appropriate incentives.  Acknowledging the important role voluntary organisations 
play in delivering department outcomes could provide such an avenue for change.   
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In sum, it is about defining accountability as not only a tool of control and 
compliance (hard accountability), but also of ensuring the responsiveness of services 
to clients (soft accountability).  Block (1996: xv-xvi) suggests moving away from the 
current reliance on control and compliance is a key future challenge:  
These great institutions which provide our wealth, which put meals on our table, 
provide shelter for our families, medical care, and all the other pieces that make 
up our lives, have made a bet. The bet is on an idea.  The idea is that 
compliance and control are the best means to ensure future survival and 
prosperity … It didn’t work in Eastern Europe.  It created a ‘drab grey society’ 
… Success in the future will depend on businesses [and government agencies] 
that produce products and services that give an innovative and unique response 
to the customer or client in the marketplace.  Success in the future will depend 
on organisations that can create new knowledge that results in innovative 
products and services in the marketplace.  Success in the future will depend on 
people who have a passion for business [and public service], who generate new 
ideas, ways of doing things that result in new knowledge that results in 
innovative and unique products in the marketplace.  If these are the demands of 
future survival or prosperity, do we want to place our bet on compliance, 
watching and trying harder?  
While it is very easy to speculate about the changes that need to occur for voluntary 
organisations and government to work together better, actually implementing them is 
less easy to do.  Here lies the real challenge.   
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Appendix A  
List of Respondents 
 
Case 1 Case 2 
1.1  Board Member  
1.2  Senior Manager: Operations 
1.3  Chair Board Member 
1.4  CEO 
1.5  Senior Manager: Operations 
1.6  Senior Manager 
1.7  Senior Manager: Fundraising and PR 
2.1  Senior Manager: Support 
2.2  Senior Manager: Policy 
2.3  CEO 
2.4  Senior Manager: Operations  
2.5  Board member  
2.6  Senior Manager: Operations 
2.7  Chair / Board member  
2.8  Board member 
Case 3 Case 4 
3.1  Paid Staff member 
3.2  Committee member 
3.3  Committee member 
3.4  Committee member 
3.5  Chair 
3.6  Committee member 
3.7  Committee member 
3.8  Committee member 
3.9  Committee member 
4.1  CEO 
4.2  Board member 
4.3  Senior Manager: Operations 
4.4  Senior Manager: Operations 
4.5  Board chair 
4.6  Senior Manager: Operations 
4.7  Board member 
4.8  Board member 
4.9  Senior Manager: Strategy 
4.10  Senior Manager: Operations 
Table A.1: Respondents Interviewed 
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Appendix B 
List of Documents Analysed 
 
Case 1 Case 2 
Website 
Promotional Pamphlets (3) 
Annual reports 2001,2002 
Newsletters to members (3) 
Annual Reports 2000, 2001, 2002 
Website 
Promotional Pamphlets (4) 
Member newspaper (2) 
Policy Document 
Service Handbook 
Case 3 Case 4 
Website 
Promotional Pamphlet 
Minutes of AGM 2003 
Financial Statements to June 2003 
Newsletter to members  
Website 
Annual report 2002 
Policy Document on Government Contracting 
and Accountability 
Table B.1: Analysed Documents 
 
 223 
Appendix C 
Interview Schedule and Post Interview 
Coding Sheets 
 
C1 Interview Schedule   
Tell me about your role in the organisation. 
Who are the most important stakeholders to your organisation? 
(list) 
 
How would you describe your relationship with each?(prompts: 
formal / informal, negative / positive, coercive / voluntary) 
 
Why do you consider them to be important? 
 
Who are the stakeholders that are not so important? Why would 
you say they are not so important? 
 
(continued) 
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(continued) 
How much time do you think you spend on the relationship with 
each stakeholder? 
 
If you had unlimited resources and time to devote to 
stakeholder relationships, what would you do differently? 
 
Do stakeholder demands ever clash? How have you managed this? 
 
Has any one stakeholder ever got in the way of your 
relationships with other stakeholders? 
 
Tell me about an issue where you think your organisation acted 
in a very accountable way towards its stakeholders (why, how). 
 
Tell me about an issue where you thought your organisation was 
not acting accountably to a stakeholder (why, how). 
 
What does accountability mean to you? 
 
How do you think about accountability in your job?  
 
(continued) 
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(continued) 
How do you think of accountability in the context of your 
contract with government? (who do you think you are 
accountable to, why) 
 
When you are inputting into policy exercises, who do you think 
you are accountable to? 
 
How does your non profit status impact on who you see as 
stakeholders and your accountability relationships? 
 
What accountability issues keep you awake at night? 
 
Are there any questions you would have expected me to ask and 
I haven’t? 
 
Are there any other issues you would like to raise? 
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C2 Post Interview Memo  
Date of Interview: 
 
Name + Code: 
 
Position: 
 
Case Study Organisation: 
 
Main Issues / Themes in Interview: 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary: Information Received / Missed on Key Questions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-verbals:  interesting / illuminating / important / 
distressing 
 
 
 
 
Any new questions / lines of inquiry  
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Appendix D 
Results in Full 
D1 Who do Voluntary Organisations think they are Accountable to?  
Stakeholder (rank of importance) 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  Total 
Future Clients 1 1 1 0 2 5 
Clients 16 3 5 3 0 27 
The Board / Committee27 2 5 1 4 2 14 
Members 4 2 0 1 0 7 
Paid Staff 4 5 9 0 0 18 
Church-based members 4 0 0 3 0 7 
Peer Organisations28 1 0 3 1 0 5 
Trusts 1 2 0 0 0 3 
Individual Donors 0 3 0 0 0 3 
Government 0 7 6 2 1 16 
Local Government 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Federation29 0 1 1 0 0 2 
The Community  0 1 0 3 0 4 
Contractors / Suppliers 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Table D.1: The Stakeholders Respondents thought they were accountable to  
                                                 
27
 Case 3 was run by a committee which undertook both governance and management functions.  
Cases 1, 2 and 4 had formal boards and management teams. 
28
 Peer Organisations are voluntary organisations that work in a related area. 
29
 One organisation subscribed to a national federation which provided support to them, such as legal 
advice.  The organisation could be loosely considered a ‘local branch’ of the organisation. 
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D1.1 Accountability to Clients 
Chief Executive Board Members Management Committee 
3 5 11 8 
Table D.2: Respondents classified by their position who mentioned clients as an 
important stakeholder 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
7 5 9 6 
Table D.3: Respondents classified by case study who mentioned clients as an 
important stakeholder 
Chief Executive Board Members Management Committee 
1 3 3 0 
Table D.4: Respondents classified by their position who did not mention clients  
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
0 3 0 4 
Table D.5: Respondents classified by case study who did not mention clients  
D1.2 Accountability to Paid Staff 
Chief Executive Board Members Management Committee 
2 5 8 3 
Table D.6: Respondents classified by their position who mentioned staff as important 
stakeholders 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
5 3 4 6 
Table D.7: Respondents classified by case study who mentioned staff as important 
stakeholders 
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D1.3 Accountability to Government Agencies 
Chief Executive Board Members Management Committee 
3 4 9 0 
Table D.8: Respondents classified by their position who mentioned government as an 
important stakeholder 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
3 4 1 8 
Table D.9: Respondents classified by case study who mentioned government as an 
important stakeholder 
D1.4 Accountability to Board/Committee 
 
Chief Executive Board Members Management Committee 
1 4 4 5 
Table D.10: Respondents classified by their position who mentioned the board as an 
important stakeholder 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
0 3 5 6 
Table D.11: Respondents classified by case study who mentioned the board as an 
important stakeholder 
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D1.5 Internal Accountabilities 
Members 
 Number of Respondents 
Considered the most important stakeholder  4 
Mentioned in the top 3 important stakeholders 6 
Total: Mentioned members as an important 
stakeholder 
7 
Number of board members mentioning members  3 (out of 8) 
Number of staff mentioning members  3 (out of 14) 
Number of CEs mentioning members 1 (out of 4) 
Number of Case 2 respondents mentioning 
members 
5 (out of 8) 
Number of Case 4 respondents mentioning 
members  
2 (out of 10) 
Specifically for church-based members 
 Number of Respondents 
Considered the most important stakeholder  4 
Mentioned in the top 3 important stakeholders 7 
Total: Mentioned church-based members as an 
important stakeholder 
7 
Number of board members mentioning members  3 (out of 8) 
Number of staff mentioning members  2 (out of 14) 
Number of CEs mentioning members 2 (out of 4) 
Number of Case 1 respondents mentioning 
members 
2 (out of 7) 
Number of Case 4 respondents mentioning 
members  
5 (out of 10) 
 
D1.6 Future Clients 
Chief Executive Board Members Management Committee 
1 4 0 0 
Table D.12: Respondents classified by their position who mentioned future clients as 
important stakeholders 
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Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
0 1 0 4 
Table D.13: Respondents classified by case study who mentioned future clients as 
important stakeholders 
D1.7 Peer Organisations 
Chief Executive Board Members Management Committee 
0 1 4 0 
Table D.14: Respondents classified by their position who mentioned peer 
organisations as important stakeholders 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
0 5 0 0 
Table D.15: Respondents classified by case study who  mentioned peer organisations 
as important stakeholders 
D1.8 Community  
 Number of Respondents 
Mentioned community in the top 3 important 
stakeholders 
1 
Mentioned community in total 4 
Mentioned by case study 1 from each case study 
Mentioned by position  Responses spread evenly between CEOs, board 
and management  
 
The Accountability of Voluntary Organisations  232 
 
D1.9 Trusts and Donors  
For trusts (non government sources of funding): 
 Number of Respondents 
Mentioned trusts as most important stakeholder 1 
Mentioned trusts in the top 3 important 
stakeholders 
3 
Mentioned trusts in total 3 
Mentioned by case study All from case 1 
Mentioned by position  CEO and management  
 
For individual donors: 
 Number of Respondents 
Mentioned donors as most important stakeholder 0 
Mentioned donors in the top 3 important 
stakeholders 
3 
Mentioned donors in total 3 
Mentioned by case study All from case 1 
Mentioned by position  CEO and board 
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D2 What do they think they are Accountable for? 
 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th Total 
Quality of care for clients – client 
outcomes 
15 5 3 2 0 0 25 
Client safety 5 2 0 0 0 0 7 
Attracting enough resources to run the 
organisation 
5 1 0 1 0 0 7 
Not wasting money (financial 
prudence) 
3 0 0 1 0 1 5 
Delivering the specified outputs on a 
government contract 
2 2 0 0 0 0 4 
Being a good employer 1 2 1 0 0 0 4 
Personal performance 1 0 0 0 1 o 2 
Giving something positive back to the 
community 
1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Ensuring clients know about the 
service (promotion of the organisation) 
0 2 0 1 0 0 3 
Compliance with regulation 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Personal profile and reputation 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Providing information to donors about 
what was done with their money 
0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Table D.16: What respondents thought they are accountable for 
D2.1 Quality of Care  
Chief 
Executive 
Board 
Members 
Manageme
nt 
Committe
e 
4 5 9 7 
Table D.17: Respondents classified by their position who mentioned the importance 
of accountability for quality of care 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
6 5 7 7 
Table D.18:  Respondents classified by case study who mentioned the importance of 
accountability for quality of care 
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D2.2 Attracting Enough Resources  
Chief 
Executive 
Board 
Members 
Managem
ent 
Committee 
3 2 2 0 
Table D.19:  Respondents classified by their position who mentioned attracting 
resources  
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4  
4 2 0 1 
Table D.20: Respondents classified by case study who mentioned attracting 
resources 
D2.3 Financial Prudence 
Chief 
Executive 
Board 
Members 
Managem
ent 
Committee 
0 3 2 0 
Table D.21: Respondents classified by their position who mentioned the importance 
of financial prudence 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
2 1 0 3 
Table D.22: Respondents classified by case study who mentioned the importance  of 
financial prudence 
D2.4 Delivery on Government Contract  
Chief 
Executive 
Board 
Members 
Managem
ent 
Committee 
1 0 3 0 
Table D.23: Respondents classified by their position who mentioned contract 
delivery 
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Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
0 1 0 3 
Table D.24: Respondents classified by case study who mentioned the importance of 
contract delivery 
D2.5 Being a Good Employer 
Chief 
Executive 
Board 
Members 
Managem
ent 
Committee 
0 3 1 0 
Table D.25: Respondents classified by their position who mentioned being a good 
employer 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3  Case 4 
1 1 0 2 
Table D.26: Respondents classified by case study who mentioned future clients 
D2.6 Promotion of the Organisation  
 Number of Respondents 
Mentioned promoting the organisation as 
important 
3 
Mentioned by case study 2 (out of 3)  from case 1 
Mentioned by position  CEO (1) and management (2) 
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D3 Why did they think they were Accountable? 
D3.1 Why they thought they were Accountable to Clients  
  Case study Position 
Reason No. 1 2 3 4 CE Board Mgmt Comm 
The organisation 
mission / 
philosophy / 
values is client 
centred / clients 
are the reason the 
organisation exists 
17 7 2 6 2 3 0 8 6 
They are 
personally 
accountable to 
maintain 
professional 
standards of care 
4 1 0 2 1 0 0 3 1 
Because the 
clients are the 
customers 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Because the 
organisation 
represents them  
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
So clients don’t 
withdraw or leave 
4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 
Because clients 
are their peers 
2 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 
Table D.27: Reasons why they thought they were accountable to clients 
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D3.2 Why they thought they were Accountable to Staff 
  Case study Position 
Reason No. 1 2 3 4 CE Board Mgmt Comm 
To keep them 
happy so they will 
perform 
2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Because they are 
trained 
professionals 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Because they 
receive low wages  
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Because their jobs 
are hard 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Because they 
deliver the 
services to clients 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
To retain them 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Table D.28: Reasons why they thought they were accountable to staff 
D3.3 Why they thought they were Accountable to Government  
  Case study Position 
Reason No. 1 2 3 4 CE Board Mgmt Comm 
Because 
government 
provides the funds 
for them to serve 
their clients 
7 2 1 0 4 0 1 6 0 
Because they are 
spending 
taxpayers money 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 
Compliance with 
government 
regulations 
6 1 1 3 1 0 1 2 3 
They are 
accountable for 
delivering outputs 
and standards in 
contracts 
6 0 2 0 4 2 2 2 0 
Table D.29: Reasons why they thought they were accountable to government 
The Accountability of Voluntary Organisations  238 
 
D3.4 Why they thought they were Accountable to the Organisation’s 
Board/Committee 
  Case study Position 
Reason No. 1 2 3 4 CE Board Mgmt Comm 
For their 
performance, to 
their fellow board 
members 
6 0 1 3 2 0 3 0 3 
As part of their job 
description, 
providing a 
monthly report to 
the board 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
They are 
responsible for 
organisation 
performance  
5 2 0 1 2 2 0 3 0 
Because they  
trust management 
to do a good job 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Because the 
board are 
volunteers and 
give so much of 
their time 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Table D.30: Reasons why they thought they were accountable to the board 
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D3.5 Why they thought they were Accountable to their Members 
  Case study Position 
Reason No. 1 2 3 4 CE Board Mgmt Comm 
Members are 
autonomous and 
independent so 
have to respect 
their actions 
2 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 
They are elected 
by their members, 
get their mandate 
to act from them 
and report back to 
them 
5 0 4 0 1 1 4 0 0 
Because members 
give donations 
2 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 
Because members 
are the 
conscience of the 
organisation and 
will signal if things 
are not going right 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Table D.31: Reasons why they thought they were accountable to their members  
D3.6 Why they thought they were accountable to their church-based 
membership 
  Case study Position 
Reason No. 1 2 3 4 CE Board Mgmt Comm 
Because the 
church appoints 
the board  
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Because the 
organisation exists 
to undertake a 
Christian mission 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
It is a source of 
finances 
4 1 0 0 3 1 2 1 0 
They share the 
same name 
2 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 
The church set the 
organisation up 
2 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 
Table D.32: Reasons why they thought they were accountable to the church 
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D3.7 Why they thought they were Accountable to Peer Organisations 
  Case study Position 
Reason No. 1 2 3 4 CE Board Mgmt Comm 
Because peer 
organisation would 
be affected if they 
withdrew services 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
They get useful 
information from 
them (such as 
potential sources 
of funds) 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
They use peer 
organisations’ 
networks to deliver 
their services 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Being a good 
voluntary sector 
citizen 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Table D.33: Reasons why they thought they were accountable to their peer 
organisations 
D3.8 Why they thought they were Accountable to Future Clients 
  Case study Position 
Reason No. 1 2 3 4 CE Board Mgmt Comm 
It is their job to 
keep the 
organisation 
running 
5 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 3 
They need to 
ensure future 
generations 
receive quality 
care 
4 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 
Table D.34: Reasons why they thought they were accountable to future clients 
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D3.9 Why they thought they were Accountable to their Community 
  Case study Position 
Reason No. 1 2 3 4 CE Board Mgmt Comm 
The community 
help in fundraising 
2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Because they 
interact with the 
community a lot 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
It is important to 
be seen to be as 
part of their 
community 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
For achieving 
positive outcomes 
for the clients 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Table D.35: Reasons why they thought they were accountable to the community 
D3.10 Why they thought they were Accountable to Trusts  
  Case study Position 
Reason No. 1 2 3 4 CE Board Mgmt Comm 
They get limited 
funding from 
government so are 
reliant on funding 
from trusts 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
So they can 
operate 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
To show that they 
use the trust 
money properly 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
So they can keep 
getting trust 
funding 
4 4 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 
Table D.36: Reasons why they thought they were accountable to trusts 
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D3.11 Why they thought they were Accountable to Individual Donors 
  Case study Position 
Reason No. 1 2 3 4 CE Board Mgmt Comm 
Want to be less 
reliant on 
government so 
want more money 
from donors 
2 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Producing good 
information for 
donors so they 
secure ongoing 
and more funding 
from them 
4 4 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 
Allowing the 
organisation to 
operate 
3 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Using donors 
money properly 
3 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
Table D.37: Reasons why they thought they were accountable to donors 
 
  
 
